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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The international coalition in Afghanistan is losing public support, one fallen civilian at a time. 
Twenty billion US dollars in military expenditures each month and billions more in support operations 
and humanitarian aid still leaves the many civilians harmed by international troops with nothing. Since 
the initial US invasion in 2001, the lack of a clear, coordinated strategy to address civilian losses has 
been a leading source of anger and resentment toward military forces.  A new BBC/ABC poll shows 
a 12 percentage point drop in Afghan support for the international presence since 2007 and a drop of 
15 points from 2006.1  A once welcoming picture of the population has turned into scenes of frequent, 
widespread and sometimes violent protests over civilian deaths and a perceived lack of concern by 
international forces.
Avoiding harm to civilians altogether is the goal. When harm nonetheless occurs, the imperative must be 
easing civilian sufering and making amends for losses. Many are inally understanding this need, from 
US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Afghan President Hamid Karzai to the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial Killings Philip Alston.  But few if any have looked closely at the existing compensation 
and victim assistance mechanisms to see what works and what does not.  his report does just that.  he 
Campaign for Innocent Victims of Conlict (CIVIC) interviewed 143 victims of conlict in Afghanistan 
1	 According	to	an	BBC/ABC	poll	published	February	9,	2009,	“Afghan	people	‘losing	conidence’,	the	Afghan	
populaion	polled	in	2008	showed	63%	support	the	presence	of	US	forces,	down	from	71%	in	2007	and	78%	in	2006,		
htp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7872353.stm.
hat morning he went to consular of Pakistan to get a visa… and on the way back, he 
was faced with an ISAF convoy. He wasn’t aware and they ended up shooting.  … His 
brother called him and asked him what’s taking you so long. And one of the doctors from 
the hospital replied and said you should come and collect the body.  he irst few weeks, 
we were frustrated that he got killed, but ater a few months we received assistance, then 
we thought ‘his shows that they care – that they didn’t do intentionally.’ Now we don’t 
hold anything personal against the international community or international forces.
Man	with	family	member	killed	by	Canadian	forces	in	Kandahar	in	February	2007	helped	by	a	USAID	
program	designed	speciically	for	Afghan	war	vicims.
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to document the harm they experienced and ind out which, if any, of the existing compensation and 
victim assistance mechanisms met their needs and expectations.
Above all, CIVIC’s research shows that compensation and victim assistance is both possible and practical, 
despite statements from government and military oicials to the contrary.  In fact, several mechanisms 
for addressing civilian losses are now working on the ground. In addition to formal claims systems, most 
countries providing troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funds 
for ex gratia (meaning “out of kindness”) payments to civilians sufering loss of life, limb or property.2  he 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funds an individually tailored livelihood 
assistance program for survivors of international troop activities. he Afghan Government gives both 
immediate monetary condolences and longer term stipends to victims of the conlict.
hese mechanisms have enormous potential to meet civilian needs following harm, but civilians CIVIC 
interviewed said they received no help or that the help was too little, too late.  he gaps that allow 
civilians to be overlooked must be closed now, lest Afghans become increasingly angry, resentful and 
let to mourn tragic losses without the dignity of recognition.  Our interviews suggest there is oten a 
regrettable disconnect between the focus on “hearts and minds” at a policy level and the dedication 
of suicient resources and energy toward civilians whose hearts and minds are most at stake.  While 
circumstantial issues of security and corruption oten get in the way of aid to war victims, in many 
cases it is a lack of funding, lack of coordination between foreign and Afghan actors, a failure to make 
assistance more accessible or liability concerns that thwart real civilian relief. 
Why a report on help to civilian war victims and why now?  Providing speciic relief to Afghan victims 
of conlict is both a strategic and a humanitarian imperative, for international forces in particular. No 
amount of compensation or assistance can bring back a loved one. Yet the killing of a family member can 
be an invitation for generational revenge, made worse by ignoring that loss.  As one civilian who watched 
47 of his extended relatives and community members killed in a US airstrike in July 2008 told CIVIC, 
“People believe ISAF just pours salt in the wound, because of how they acted. People are angry because 
no representative from ISAF came to see what happened, or to apologize that it was a mistake.”3 
Billions of dollars are spent to win, keep and rebuild Afghan communities, but it only takes seeing one 
family maltreated and ignored by military forces for a community to turn against the international 
efort.  Victim assistance is equally critical on humanitarian grounds.  In 2007 and 2008, an estimated 
3,641 civilians were killed by parties to the conlict in Afghanistan.4 For every civilian killed, as many or 
more are injured, lose their homes or livelihoods.  For countless Afghan families living on the margins, 
the loss of a breadwinner, high medical or funeral costs, or the inancial burden of supporting disabled 
or dependent relatives can make even basic survival diicult.  For each family struggling to recover from 
losses, there are multiplying ripple efects on Afghanistan’s continuing development and stabilization.  
Summary of Findings
his report does not attempt to ofer any one solution or perfect approach to addressing the needs of 
conlict-afected civilians. here are however several stand-out conclusions that should guide any debate 
on compensating and addressing civilian casualties:5 
2	 	Detailed	informaion	on	each	of	these	programs	can	be	found	in	Annex	II.	
3	 	Ali,	Interview	#40a,	July	20,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
4	 	In	2007	and	2008,	an	esimated	3,641	civilians	were	killed	by	paries	to	the	conlict	in	Afghanistan. United	
Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	Protecion of Civilians,	United	Naions,	January	2009,	1.
5	 	Other	needs-based	assistance	that	does	not	have	a	criterion	of	aiding	vicims	of	conlict	speciically	is	not	
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Victim compensation and support is possible, and is expected by the 1. 
Afghan population.
Mechanisms to address civilian losses created by the US Congress, ISAF 2. 
member states and the Afghan Government must be more proactive, 
fully funded, and better coordinated if they intend – as they should – to 
reach out to all civilians directly harmed or afected by the conlict. 
A signiicant number of civilian survivors of combat operations receive 3. 
no help from international forces, and those that do oten ind it is too 
little, too late. 
Every family with losses not recognized and addressed is another 4. 
obstacle to Afghanistan’s stabilization and development. 
Anger and resentment over civilian casualties and property loss 5. 
dominate Afghan views of international forces; the anger is especially 
strong when no help is provided following harm. 
A focused, high-level dialogue on what further steps should be taken to succeed in these initiatives is 
critical and urgent. here are concrete, immediate measures that will improve the situation, including 
identifying victim’s families and responding to them proactively, tracking afected families and any aid 
they receive, and improving coordination among international troops. he report to follow contributes 
to the emerging debate by ofering a roadmap to existing mechanisms for compensation and victim 
assistance, how they work, how civilians feel about them, and when appropriate what “ixes” could 
improve compensation and victim assistance. 
Civilians harmed by international forces generally want timely and adequate help with necessary medical 
treatment, economic assistance for immediate rebuilding and long-term recovery, and to be given a 
sense that their losses have been recognized and redressed.  he more that any mechanism or program is 
able to provide this help, particularly help perceived to be coming from those they blame for their losses, 
the more families are able to recover physically, economically and inancially.  
No mechanism or program will satisfy all civilian needs and expectations all the time, particularly not 
given the operating conditions of Afghanistan. For this reason, it may be that a network of overlapping, but 
diferent approaches is the best way to reach as many conlict-afected civilians as possible. he following 
programs and initiatives by foreign militaries, foreign governments and the Afghan government are 
already being tried on the ground with varying results. 
Assistance from Foreign Militaries
Civilian survivors of the conlict rarely receive formal compensation payments, which imply an 
assumption of liability, from ISAF countries.  However, most ISAF member countries have some way 
of providing ex gratia (meaning “out of kindness”) payments to civilians sufering losses due to their 
troops’ activities. While not technically compensation, these ex gratia payments are perceived as such 
by Afghan civilians and can go a long way toward providing physical help and emotional redress. In 
fact, where civilians blamed international military forces (IMF) for their losses, there was no substitute 
discussed	in	this	report.	While	this	broader	network	of	emergency	relief,	humanitarian	aid	or	larger	development	
support	is	important	in	helping	communiies	and	individuals	recover	from	conlict,	the	aim	of	this	report	is	to	assess	the	
efeciveness	of	this	narrow	category	of	programming	and	assistance.
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for a direct apology and a gesture (oten monetary) of condolence from those forces. he beneits of 
these payments are unfortunately stymied by a complete lack of coordination between IMF and the 
unreasonable expectation that eligible Afghan civilians can and will seek out relevant troops to make a 
proper “claim.” here are signs that IMF are trying to make condolences more accessible, but the vast 
majority of those CIVIC interviewed had received nothing from IMF.
More controversially, many IMF also provide medical support and broader community relief – seen 
by some aid agencies as an infringement on humanitarian space.  Civilians were most positive about 
medical assistance, both because treatment is highly valued and because this assistance appeared to be 
more accessible than, for example, compensation. Community assistance funds, including the ISAF 
Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund and “quick impact” funds provided through Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams, were not noted by any civilians with whom CIVIC spoke. his does not mean 
assistance provided through these funds is not important or appreciated; it does suggest civilians do not 
recognize the assistance as a speciic response to their combat losses.
Assistance from Foreign Governments
CIVIC identiied only one foreign government-funded program speciically addressing conlict-afected 
civilians: the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP). Funded by USAID, ACAP provides tailored 
livelihood support and other in-kind assistance to civilians harmed by IMF as far back as 2001. Interviews 
with civilians suggest that ACAP is in large part succeeding, albeit slowly. Beneiciaries said ACAP 
helped them where other government, military or non-governmental entities did not respond, or failed 
to deliver promised help. he one drawback was the timeliness of assistance: with limited staf resources 
and signiicant security issues, ACAP assistance took months, sometimes years, to reach civilians 
(although recent staf additions suggest they will be faster in the future). For security reasons, civilians 
oten do not know who funds the assistance, and thus do not tend to see it as a gesture of amends or 
redress from the US. Nonetheless, assistance signiicantly improved beneiciaries quality of life, and so 
lessened some resentment toward the international community. 
Assistance from the Afghan Government
Similar to ex gratia payments, Afghan President Karzai’s Oice provides 100,000 afghanis (approximately 
$2,000) to families who lost a loved one and 50,000 afghanis to individuals injured (approximately 
$1,000) in the conlict. An Afghan ministry also oversees a social support pension providing monthly 
payments to those injured and for the survivors of those killed in the conlict. Afghan oicials reported 
that more than 270 million afghanis (approximately $5 million) were distributed to victims of conlict 
from Karzai’s oice in 2007, far more than the reported ex gratia payments of all IMF combined. While 
both programs were more accessible to civilians, they were plagued by corruption and administered 
inconsistently. hey also largely failed to provide redress to civilians because the payments were not seen 
to come from those causing harm. 
Recommendations 
here are concrete, immediate measures that can and should be taken to ix any of the problematic 
issues detailed in the analysis that follows, particularly those that deny civilians appropriate amends for 
harm.  he below recommendations are not all easy.  hey do, however, match the gravity and urgency 
of civilian sufering in this conlict.  
CIVIC irst and foremost urges all parties to the conlict in Afghanistan to take all possible steps to 
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avoid civilian deaths, injuries and property damage. In the event that civilians are directly harmed or 
otherwise afected by the conlict, CIVIC urges:
All actors involved in implementing compensation and victim support programs, to: 
Work jointly to improve identiication of civilians, whether through sharing databases, establishing •	
mechanisms for civilian referral and identiication or other measures that respect conidentiality 
concerns of both the actor and the civilian;
Coordinate eforts to ensure civilians receive any and all aid measures available, preferably in a •	
way that maximizes the beneit; 
Share best practices with other compensation and victim assistance programs.•	
Militaries comprising the International Security Assistance Force and NATO, to: 
Adopt a coordinated if not collective response to providing compensation and ex gratia payments •	
across all ISAF participants, whether they have combat troops or not;
Make standard procedure the tracking of any ISAF eforts at compensation, follow-up or other •	
amends alongside the new ISAF Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell created in 2008;6 
Ensure that any coordinated policy includes mechanisms for referring cases of civilian casualties •	
that may be eligible for compensation or ex gratia funds to the appropriate troops;
Develop practices and procedures that enable troops to be more pro-active in providing •	
compensation and ex gratia payments where harm occurs; 
Be as transparent as possible in investigations of civilian casualties and, where necessary, admit •	
responsibility (though not necessarily legal fault) quickly and publicly; 
Share best practices among ISAF countries on how to appropriately interact with civilians when •	
ofering compensation and recognition;
Make an attempt to provide civilians with a sense of redress and closure through public apologies •	
and recognition;
Ensure designated funding streams to address civilian harm resulting from combat operations. •	
Member countries of the International Security Assistance Force, to: 
Adequately fund the programs currently in place, which currently means increasing donations;•	
Develop mechanisms for providing compensation or ex gratia payments that provide immediate •	
relief and recognition in ways consistent with ISAF countries’ national policies; 
Work jointly with other member countries to develop common policies on compensation and •	
ex gratia payments to ensure Afghans are treated fairly no matter where they are or by who they 
were harmed.
he United States Government and/or Military, to: 
Create a position at the Pentagon to strategically address potential and actual civilian casualties;•	
Assess compensation, ex gratia and ACAP support to ensure they are providing a level of •	
assistance that matches civilian losses and the stated strategic interest of the United States to 
“win hearts and minds”7; 
Better coordinate with the Afghan Government and other IMF, where applicable, to ensure that •	
6	 	James	Brown,	Humanitarian	Afairs	oicer	UNAMA,	“Brieing	for	the	Kabul	Civil-Military	Working	Group,”	
presentaion,	January	29,	2009.
7	 	See,	e.g.,	Robert	M.	Gates,	Tesimony	before	the	Senate	Armed	Services	Commitee,	January	27,	2009;	United	
States	Army,	Counterinsurgency, United	States	Army,	December	2006,	191
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eforts to avoid double compensation do not result in civilians feeling ignored or unrecognized 
by US troops. 
he Afghanistan Government, to: 
Develop alternate mechanisms for identifying and verifying those eligible for the Martyrs and •	
Disabled funds that minimize corruption and maximize speed and accuracy;  
Share casualty information across all three existing programs; •	
Ensure all Afghans are aware of their rights to register a complaint or concern about •	 any warring 
party; 
Ensure Code 99 payments are provided to victims of Afghan National Security Force actions, •	
even where these forces are acting independently of IMF; 
Ensure Code 99 and Martyrs and Disabled payments are provided equally to victim of insurgent •	
attacks, unless doing so would put the recipients at risk of reprisals;
Coordinate the distribution of Code 99 funds with IMF (where the incident involved IMF) to •	
jointly plan the best available means of aid and redress for afected civilians.
he United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, to: 
Undertake a complete analysis of civilian-assistance programs currently in place so that aid •	
eforts are streamlined and, to the greatest extent possible, avoid duplicating aid to some civilians 
while entirely overlooking others; 
Track whether and when speciic relief for conlict-afected civilians is provided by the military •	
or other actors concurrently with tracking civilian casualties; 
Coordinate information gathering across all groups to facilitate the proper and prompt •	
identiication of civilians in need.
ABOUT CIVIC
Campaign for Innocent Victims In Conlict (CIVIC) is a Washington-based organization founded 
by the late Marla Ruzicka, a passionate humanitarian killed by a suicide bomb in Baghdad while 
advocating for war victims in Iraq. CIVIC believes that civilians injured and the families of those 
killed should be recognized and aided by the warring parties involved, and is working toward smart, 
compassionate policies for civilians caught in the crossire of conlict.
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From 2007 to 2008, the number of civilians killed in Afghanistan’s ongoing conlict rose 40 percent, 
according to UN igures.1 While shocking, the headlines ofer only a glimpse of the immediate and long-
term sufering of civilians caught in conlict. For every civilian killed, as many or more are injured, or 
lose their homes or livelihoods. Afected families struggle to rebuild their lives for years and sometimes 
generations ater an incident. Ater 30 years of conlict and under-development, much of Afghanistan’s 
population lacks regular access to suicient food supplies and clean water, much less to additional resources 
to manage setbacks due to conlict.2  For families 
living on the margin, the loss of a breadwinner or 
home, high medical or funeral costs, or the inancial 
burden of supporting disabled or dependent relatives 
can make basic survival diicult.3
his report assesses how existing compensation and 
victim assistance mechanisms developed by warring 
parties in Afghanistan address, or fail to address, 
civilian losses in the conlict.  Survivors are oten 
in desperate need of basic medical or economic 
assistance to recover, but oten also seek some form 
of recognition, apology or other emotional “redress,” 
as this report will refer to it, from those responsible 
for their loss. Compensation and victim assistance 
mechanisms have the potential to address both categories of need, though their ability to do so is 
frustrated by ongoing security and development issues in Afghanistan as well as deicient planning, 
coordination and implementation.
1  CBC News, “Afghan	civilian	deaths	increased	by	40%	in	2008:	UN,”	February	3,	2009,	htp://www.cbc.ca/world/
story/2009/02/03/afghanistan-un.html?ref=rss.
2	 	Afghanistan	is	ranked	174	out	of	178	countries	on	the	Global	Human	Development	Index.	Center	for	Policy	and	
Human	Development	Kabul	University,	Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007: Bridging Modernity and Tradiion: 
Rule of Law and Search for Jusice,	(Islamabad:	Army	Press,	2007),	3.	Poverty	levels	remain	high	with	30	percent	of	the	
populaion	below	the	“minimum	level	of	dietary	energy	consumpion”	and	68	percent	lacking	“sustainable	access	to	
clean	water.”	Ibid.,	19-20	and	23.
3	 	The	Afghanistan	Naional	Development	Strategy	placed	“war	survivors”	as	one	of	two	priority	groups	in	terms	
of	improved	social	protecion.	Government	of	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Afghanistan,	Afghanistan Naional Development 
Strategy, Social Protecion Sector Strategy,	(Kabul:	Government	of	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Afghanistan,	2008),	55.	
Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conlict 
has long been active in advocating that all 
warring parties in Afghanistan provide fair 
and adequate compensation, recognition, 
and any other appropriate assistance 
to civilians harmed by the conlict. It 
also calls upon the governments of those 
warring parties to fully support with 
funding the assistance civilians need to 
begin recovery.
INTRODUCTION
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he question of whether such mechanisms are practical and beneicial is important not only from the 
perspective of civilians but from the strategic perspective of the warring parties.  Civilian casualties have 
turned the Afghan public away from welcoming the international presence.  One man whose village was 
targeted in a nighttime search by US Special Forces in January 2009 told the Associated Press: “If these 
operations are again conducted in our area, all of our people are ready to carry out jihad. We cannot 
tolerate seeing the dead bodies of our children and women anymore.”4 
As Afghan anger toward the international troop presence has increased,5 and more areas have fallen 
under insurgent control,6 winning civilian “hearts and minds” through development, aid and other tactics 
has become an ot repeated mantra of US and international oicials.7 Yet in a culture where the killing 
of a family member may incite generational revenge, no amount of money will persuade communities 
to support “outsiders” who fail to make even basic gestures of respect and support to families mourning 
loved ones in the conlict. 
he following analysis of mechanisms that assist this speciic population is based on 143 interviews 
CIVIC conducted with conlict-afected civilians from across Afghanistan and of-the-record background 
interviews with US and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) oicials. Emphasis is placed on 
the accounts and perceptions of the civilians to ensure their voices are heard.
From immediate compensation by foreign militaries to livelihood assistance for long-term recovery, 
the programs discussed in detail below were created with the express aim of assisting conlict-afected 
civilians. Other needs-based assistance – provided by United Nations organizations, international 
organizations or non-governmental organizations – that does not speciically aid civilians afected by 
conlict is not discussed. his broader network of emergency relief, humanitarian aid and development 
is important in helping communities and individuals recover from conlict and merits further research 
and analysis. he aim of this report, however, is to assess the efectiveness of a narrow category of 
programming and assistance. 
Chapter One provides a brief outline of the particular conlict patterns leading to rising numbers of 
civilian deaths and injuries in Afghanistan. Chapter Two describes, through irst-hand accounts, the ways 
in which the conlict is placing signiicant economic strain on civilians.  Chapters hree, Four and Five 
provide basic program information, and civilian relections and critiques on the various compensation 
4	 	Jason	Straziuso,	“Afghans	Threaten	US	Troops	Over	Civilian	Deaths,”	Associated Press,	January	31,	2009,	htp://
www.iht.com/aricles/ap/2009/01/31/asia/AS-Afghan-Civilian-Deaths.php	.
5	 	The	year	2008	brought	a	signiicant	dip	in	the	popularity	of	the	internaional	forces,	paricularly	following	
several	high-proile	air-strikes	that	killed	dozens	of	individuals	in	the	second	half	of	2008.	See,	e.g.,	Afghanistan	
Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspecive on Operaions of Pro-Government 
Forces,	(Kabul:	Afghan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	December	2008),		51;	Liane	Hansen,	“2008	A	Deadly	
Year	for	Afghan	Civilians,”	Naional	Public	Radio,	Weekend	Ediion,	January	4,	2009,	htp://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=98964989&t=1&f=1021&sc=emaf.		Following	the	August	22,	2008	air-strike	by	IMF,	President	Karzai’s	
government	issued	a	statement	calling	for	the	end	of	air-strikes	on	civilian	targets:	“The	government	of	Afghanistan	has	
repeatedly	discussed	the	issue	of	civilian	casualies	with	the	internaional	forces	and	asked	for	all	air	raids	on	civilian	
targets,	especially	in	Afghan	villages,	to	be	stopped.”	Times	of	India,	“Afghanistan	demands	review	of	foreign	troops,”	
Times of India,	August	26,	2008,	htp://imesoindia.indiaimes.com/World/Rest_of_World/Afghanistan_demands_
review_of_foreign_troops/rssaricleshow/3406313.cms.
6	 	Internaional	Council	for	Security	and	Development,	Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance,	(London:	
Internaional	Council	for	Security	and	Development,	December	2008),	5.
7	 	Internaional	Council	for	Security	and	Development,	Taliban Poliics and Afghan Legiimate Grievances, 
(London:	Internaional	Council	for	Security	and	Development,	June	2007),	9.
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and victim assistance mechanisms. hese are categorized according to the actor providing this assistance: 
International Military Forces (IMF) (Chapter 3); civilian agencies of foreign governments (Chapter 4); 
and the Afghan Government (Chapter 5).  In addition, each chapter considers the extent to which the 
assistance is capable of generating a sense of redress among civilians. 
his report does not ofer concrete conclusions about the “correct” approach to make amends to 
civilians sufering losses, but rather aims to establish credible qualitative evidence that compensation, 
aid and recognition eforts are both necessary and possible in the context of conlict and particularly 
in Afghanistan.  Given the challenges of identifying civilians and getting aid to them successfully in 
Afghanistan, it may be that a network of overlapping but diferent approaches is the best way to reach as 
many conlict-afected civilians as possible – the ultimate goal. 
he most important issues related to civilian assistance programs are included in this report, yet we 
believe this should be used only as a starting place for further investigation and analysis on the part 
of international forces, international and national Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the 
Afghan Government – all stakeholders in the well-being of Afghan civilians. he provision of aid is a 
complex and challenging task. Success will only ever be achieved through careful preparation, thoughtful 
implementation and follow-on analysis of results.  War’s civilian victims deserve no less than all three. 
Methodology 
his report should not be read as an endorsement of any one program or approach, but rather as a 
presentation of indings CIVIC gathered in the course of its research in Afghanistan.  In the past, CIVIC 
has made public statements that do endorse or advocate on behalf of speciic victim relief programs 
discussed in this report, such as the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP) and ISAF’s Post-
Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund (POHRF). he research included here was undertaken to better 
inform CIVIC’s advocacy position with regard to these and other such eforts.  It is hoped that sharing 
this information will help other groups interested in aiding victims of conlict to do the same.
From February to November 2008, CIVIC interviewed a total of 143 civilians harmed by the post-2001 
conlict in Afghanistan. All attempts were made to interview civilians harmed at varying points across 
the conlict’s seven year timeline and to include a cross-range of diferent “groups” or “categories” of 
conlict-afected civilians, including those harmed by aerial bombings, suicide explosions, escalation of 
force incidents, night raids, explosive remnants of war and other tactics of warfare, as well as widows, 
refugees, IDPs, the disabled and children.  he goal of such variation was to assess gaps in coverage for 
certain types of conlict-afected civilians and the extent to which opinions varied depending on the 
region, the length of time it took for aid to be given, and the types of losses sustained.
A standard list of questions was used for all interviewees.  We asked all civilians to describe the ways 
their lives were afected by the conlict, the types of assistance they had received if such assistance was 
ofered, how hospital bills and property reconstruction were managed, the types of assistance they most 
required, and what impressions were formed of the actors providing aid and of those responsible for 
their losses. 
 
In addition to the 143 civilian interviews, CIVIC interviewed more than 80 oicials working in 
Afghanistan. We attempted to contact as many military or civilian representatives of ISAF member 
countries as possible to get a better sense of whether they had any victims assistance mechanisms and, 
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if so, what policies governed them. CIVIC also interviewed a wide range of journalists, aid workers and 
other organizations with knowledge of civilian casualties in Afghanistan about their perceptions of the 
importance and challenges of assistance programs for civilians following harm. Oicial reports, news 
articles, academic papers and organizational mandates were also consulted for this report.
Despite this extensive research, this report is not intended 
as a statistically sound sample of Afghans harmed in the 
current conlict.  hus, the information should not be 
used to extrapolate overall harm to civilians nor overall 
assistance received. Research evolved such that certain 
questions were not asked to civilians interviewed in the 
irst two months of research which later seemed pertinent. 
In addition, limited resources and security restrictions 
meant that CIVIC was not always able to get as broad 
a sample of certain groups of conlict-afected civilians 
as would be preferred. Finally, CIVIC works actively 
with several of the programs discussed in this report to 
improve support and assistance for victims of conlict, 
in particular the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program. 
While CIVIC made eforts to provide an objective point 
of view, the close relationship between CIVIC and these 
programs and similar goals is here fully disclosed and 
should be taken into consideration.
CIVIC relied on diferent translators in each province, 
and sometimes even diferent translators within a 
province. Although all translators were given interview 
questions in advance, the point of asking such questions, 
and ways to ask them without biasing the response 
(particularly where perceptional questions about 
programs, the military, the Afghan Government or the 
international community were involved), translators 
may have unintentionally inserted biases. Where these 
errors were apparent in later translations of recorded 
interviews, CIVIC struck the relevant portions or the 
entire interview. 
A full glossary of acronyms used in this report is included above. A few commonly used acronyms 
merit brief explanation here. International Military Forces (IMF) refers generically to all foreign troops 
in Afghanistan acting under either the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mandate or the 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mandate. Anti-Government Elements (AGE) includes both Taliban 
forces and other anti-government groups, and is used interchangeably with “insurgents.” 
For the security and privacy of civilian interviewees, all names have been changed except where 
indicated. Given the sensitivity of compensation issues, many oicials or implementing actors did not 
wish to disclose their identity. Where possible the position or role of these individuals is ofered instead. 
Interviews have been numbered for internal audit purposes. hese numbers are referenced in each 
footnote.  
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CHAPTER 1:
Background on Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan
Afghanistan has known conlict more than peace in the last thirty years. he security and stability 
promised by the international community following the initial US-led invasion in 2001 have failed 
to materialize. In the past two years, security has deteriorated and civilians have borne the brunt of 
increased violence. hey are not only unintentionally caught between insurgent forces and international 
and Afghan forces, but in some cases appear to be deliberately targeted or put at greater risk by certain 
parties. In 2007 and 2008, an estimated 3,641 civilians were killed by parties to the conlict in Afghanistan.1 
he insecurity and increased ighting barred serious progress on humanitarian and development eforts 
that might have otherwise addressed the concerns of conlict-afected civilians.2  
his chapter provides the broader context of how the ongoing conlict impacts civilians, including an 
overview of the parties to the conlict, the increased hostilities in the last two years and the speciic 
patterns of warfare afecting civilians.
Forces Operating in Afghanistan
On October 7, 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom following the Taliban’s 
refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden in the wake of the September 11 attacks.  In January 2002, foreign 
peace-keeping troops arrived in Afghanistan under the UN-mandated International Security Assistance 
1	 In	2007	and	2008,	an	esimated	3,641	civilians	were	killed	by	paries	to	the	conlict	in	Afghanistan.	United	
Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	Civilian Casualty Esimates Update, January – December 2008,	United	Naions,	
1.
2	 	United	Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	Armed Conlict and Civilian Casualies, Afghanistan Trends 
and Developments 01 January – 31 August 2008,	United	Naions,	3.	
We don’t know how the situation can be made better. his is two years we are seeing this. 
he government and the American forces … they are all killing the civilian people. And 
also the opposition forces … they are ighting and civilians are killed. We don’t know 
where to go. We don’t know how to ask them to stop these things, how to stop bombard-
ing. Please don’t shoot these people. Please don’t bombard. We are not Taliban, we are 
not opposition. We are not ANA. We don’t know how to say we can come to a normal 
situation.
Ahmad,	Interview	#42c,	July	29,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
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Force.3 ISAF was placed under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) control in August 2003.4 
US troops take part in the ISAF mission; however, 23,000 forces, including many paramilitary and 
intelligence, still operate independently under the OEF counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency 
mandate.5  OEF is currently focusing its operations in the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan, 
along the border with Pakistan.6
By January 2009, ISAF included 55,100 troops from 41 countries, the majority of which are provided by 
NATO members.7 ISAF’s mission is to support the Afghan government, to create a secure environment 
and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan.8 ISAF expanded its presence from Kabul with the 
establishment of Regional Commands (RCs) to the north (2004), the west (2005) and to the south 
and east (2006).9 ISAF troops carry out their stabilization and support mandate, together with civilian 
oicials, through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) located across the country. Each PRT is under 
the command of an ISAF member country. As of the publication of this report, the United States had 
responsibility for 12 PRTs; other ISAF members controlled 14 PRTs.10
Many ISAF and OEF operations are carried out jointly or in consultation with Afghan National Army 
(ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP) or other Afghan National Security Forces. 
International Military Forces (IMF) in Afghanistan will refer to both/either ISAF and OEF troops in 
this report. IMF are ighting Anti-Government Elements (AGE) that include the Taliban, al-Qaeda and 
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, oten referred to simply as “insurgents.” 
Escalation of the Conlict
Since 2006, instability has grown in Afghanistan with rising AGE insurgent activity. Above all, Afghan 
civilians have sufered. he year 2008 proved to be one of the deadliest years for civilians since the 
conlict began in 2001. he UN recorded 2,118 civilian casualties in 2008 alone, an increase of 72 percent 
from the 1,523 recorded in 2007.11  No accurate estimates of civilian casualties since 2001 exist, although 
the number is likely well over 8,000 based on available data.12 
3	 	Internaional	Security	Assistance	Force,	ISAF History,	North	Atlanic	Treaty	Organizaion,	2008,	htp://www.nato.
int/isaf/topics/history/index.html.
4	 	Ibid.
5	 	Internaional	Security	Assistance	Force,	ISAF Troop Placemat,	January	12,	2009,	htp://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/
epub/pdf/isaf_placemat_090112.pdf.
6	 	Jonathan	S.	Landay	and	Nancy	A.	Youssef,	“Obama	may	not	ask	allies	for	more	combat	troops	in	Afghanistan,”	
McLatchy Newspapers,	January	28,	2009,	htp://www.miamiherald.com/news/poliics/AP/story/877101.html	(esimaing	
current	OEF	levels	at	30,000	troops).
7	 Internaional	Security	Assistance	Force,	ISAF Troop Placement;	Internaional	Security	Assistance	Force,	ISAF 
History.
8	 	Internaional	Security	Assistance	Force,	ISAF Mandate,	North	Atlanic	Treaty	Organizaion,	2008,	htp://www.
nato.int/ISAF/topics/mandate/index.html.
9	 	Internaional	Security	Assistance	Force,	ISAF Troop Placement. 
10	 	Ibid.	
11	 	United	Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	Armed Conlict and Civilian Casualies,1.
12	 	The	United	Naions	esimated	3,641	civilian	casualies	for	2007	and	2008	together;	other	organizaions	would	
probably	have	higher	esimates	for	these	two	years.	UN	esimates	are	not	available	for	2006,	but	the	Afghan	NGO	
Security	Oice	(ANSO)	–	also	a	reliable	independent	monitor	–	esimated	1,315	civilian	casualies	for	that	year.	Data	on	
civilian	casualies	is	sparse	between	2003	and	2006;	the	level	of	conlict	and	corresponding	level	of	civilian	casualies	
was	also	lower	in	these	years.	Esimates	for	civilian	casualies	in	2001	and	2002	range	from	1,000	to	3,767.	United	
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As the ighting has spread, more communities are sufering and governmental and humanitarian actors 
are inding it increasingly diicult to address their needs due to security concerns.13 According to the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA): “Large parts of the South, Southwest, 
Southeast, and Central regions of Afghanistan are now classiied by the UN Department of Safety and 
Security (UNDSS) as ‘extreme risk, hostile environment’.”14 Staf from aid organizations are increasingly 
subject to direct attacks and threats. UNDSS recorded 30 humanitarian workers killed and another 92 
abducted between January and August 2008.15
Patterns of Warfare Afecting Civilians
Civilians frequently ind themselves caught between AGE and IMF, oten without warning.  As one 
farmer from Kandahar province told CIVIC: “We are not happy with the coalition forces or the AGEs. 
We are stuck in the middle of them and we cannot escape.”16 Particularly deadly for civilians are cross-
ire ights, suicide attacks, the use of human shields, air-strikes, shootings near military convoys and 
night raids.  Landmines and other explosive remnants of war kill and injure civilians both during the 
conlict and for years ater.  
Suicide Attacks
AGE are responsible for a growing proportion of civilian deaths, due mainly to their increased reliance 
on suicide attacks and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). According to UN estimates, 55 percent of 
civilian deaths (1,160) were caused by AGE in 2008, compared to 46 percent (700) in 2007.17 In 2008, 
IEDs and suicide attacks were responsible for 724 civilian deaths, 34 percent of civilian casualties.18
In 2007, Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that although a majority of suicide attacks targeted 
military, they resulted in ive times as many civilians killed as military personnel (181 civilians versus 37 
combatants).19 In 2007 and 2008, more of these attacks were undertaken in crowded public areas with 
disregard to civilian life.20 In February 2008, a suicide attack at a crowded dogight in Kandahar killed 67 
civilians and a high-proile bombing at the Indian Embassy in Kabul that July killed 50 civilians.21
Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	Protecion of Civilians,	United	Naions,	January	2009,	1.	Carl	Coneta,	“Strange	
Victory:	A	criical	appraisal	of	Operaion	Enduring	Freedom	and	the	Afghanistan	War,”	Project	on	Defense	Alternaives	
Research	Monograph	#6,	January	30,	2002	(esimate	of	casualies	as	of	Jan.	1,	2002;	based	on	reports	from	journalists	
in	the	Associated	Press,	Reuters,	BBC,	Agence	France	Presse);	Prof.	Marc	Herold	of	the	University	of	New	Hampshire	
(esimate	as	of	Jan.	1,	2002;	based	on	Western	media	reports	as	well	as	Al-Jazeera	and	the	Afghan	Islamic	Press).	See	
also	BBC	News,	“Afghanistan’s	Civilian	Casualies	Mount,” BBC News,	January	3,	2002,	htp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_
asia/1740538.stm.	Using	these	esimates,	between	5,956	and	8,726	civilians	were	killed	from	2001	–	2008,	excluding	
2003	–	2006	and	other	unrecorded	deaths.		A	tabulated	list	of	civilian	casualty	esimates	by	various	groups	for	2006	–	
2008	is	included	in	Annex	3.		
13	 	Internaional	Council	for	Security	and	Development,	Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance,	5.	
14	 	United	Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	Armed Conlict and Civilian Casualies, 3-4.
15	 	Ibid.,	4.	
16	 	Alif,	Interview	#92a,	July	22,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.
17	 	United	Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	Armed Conlict and Civilian Casualies, 2.	
18	 	Ibid.,	3.	
19	 	Human	Rights	Watch,	The Human Cost: The Consequences of Insurgent Atacks in Afghanistan,	(New	York:	
Human	Rights	Watch,	April	2007),	4.
20	 	United	Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	Armed Conlict and Civilian Casualies,	3	(noing	“insurgents	
have	shown	an	increasing	willingness	to	inlict	harm	on	civilians	in	such	atacks”).	
21	 	Ibid.	Higher	tolls	were	reported	in	some	media	reports.	See,	e.g.,	BBC	News,	“Scores	Killed	in	Afghan	Bombing,”	
BBC News,	February	17,	2008,	htp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7249138.stm;	BBC	News,	“Bomb	Rocks	Indian	
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SUICIDE ATTACK ON US BAGRAM AIR BASE
Khalil’s eldest son, Azim, was working as a translator on the US military base in Bagram. 
Azim hoped to go to university, but the family could not aford to send him. On the morning of 
February 27, 2007, he borrowed his father’s motorcycle and went to Bagram military base. At 
9.30 a.m., a suicide bomber detonated himself during a visit by US Vice President Dick Cheney. 
Azim was literally blown apart. He was eighteen years old.
Azim’s father described to us how his son’s “head, body parts, everything was blown to pieces. 
hey were all detached from his body.”i He showed us photographs of his dead son and told us:
We hide these pictures from his mother because she cries whenever she sees 
them. He was always a good boy. He had good habits, good manners. Not 
a day of his life was he disrespectful to his mother or me. He was humble, 
very gentle. Everybody loved him. When he died there were hundreds of 
pictures of him from his friends. We were planning on his marriage.ii
Other families lost their sons during the same suicide attack.  A mother and father told CIVIC 
how their son had been killed in Bagram on only the third day of his job. heir son, Abdullah, 
had been excited about his new job because he was desperate to learn English and chatting with 
foreign soldiers gave him the opportunity to practice. He was hoping ultimately to become an 
interpreter. He was also eighteen years old. 
Ater his death, the father, brother and uncle went to see the body and told how “when we saw 
his condition, we fell to the ground. We could not even stand up at the sight of it.”iii Abdullah’s 
mother also fought to see his body, but she was not allowed. She told CIVIC: “I pray to God that 
your mother never sees the sorrows that I have seen, that you are never in the condition that my 
son was in.”iv
	i								Khalil,	Interview	#19,	June	29,	2008,	Bagram	area,	Kabul	province.
	ii							Ibid.
	iii						Mahmoud,	Interview	#15a,	May	3,	2008,	Bagram	area,	Kabul	province.
	iv						Bibi	Gul,	Interview	#15b,	May	3,	2008,	Bagram	area,	Kabul	province.
Human Shields and Terror Tactics 
he Taliban and other AGE have increased civilian deaths and injuries by using them as human 
shields or by drawing ire from IMF without regard to civilian consequences. his is a relatively recent 
development, as the Taliban previously waged a war of perception with international forces; in the early 
days of the conlict, public statements by Taliban leadership claimed they were the ones to provide 
security, protection and welfare to civilians while foreigners were there only to kill and injure civilians. 
One security oicial working for UNAMA told CIVIC that, in his personal opinion, “the Taliban [in 
2007] was having an internal debate on the issue of civilian casualties” and whether to operate where large 
Embassy	in	Kabul,”	BBC News,	July	7,	2008,	htp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7492601.stm.
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amounts of civilians could get killed or injured,22 but that by 2008, many government and international 
oicials became “pretty sure that it’s oicial policy at the highest level [in the Taliban] to go ahead and 
kill civilians.”23
In November 2008, villagers attending an Afghan wedding party in Kandahar province said insurgents 
entered the area, ired on international forces and then forcibly prevented the villagers from leeing the 
area before IMF retaliated with an air-strike that let 37 members of the wedding party dead.24  Other 
civilians from the provinces of Kandahar and Helmand said that insurgents frequently ired from their 
villages and then led, their actions making 
innocent civilian communities a target for air-
strikes and IMF reprisals.25 
A recent report by the Afghanistan Independent 
Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) 
documents how insurgents are “systematically 
terrorizing the civilian population with ‘night 
letters,’ kidnappings, executions (oten by 
beheading) and other crimes.”26 
Air-strikes
Air-strikes are the leading cause of civilian 
deaths and injuries by IMF. In a September 
2008 report, HRW documented a near tripling 
of civilian casualties caused by IMF air-strikes 
from 2006 to 2007 (from 116 to 321 deaths).27 
UNAMA reported that 552 civilians were killed 
in IMF air-strikes in 2008. his igure included 
several incidents with signiicant loss of life, 
such as the August 22 air-strike on the village of 
Azizabad where up to 91 civilians were allegedly 
killed.28 IMF air-strikes in 2008 killed nearly 
22	 	United	Naions	Department	of	Safety	and	Security,	Interview	#178,	July	20,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	
province.
23	 	Ibid.
24	 	M.	Karim	Faiez	and	Laura	King,	“U.S.	acknowledges	37	Afghan	civilians	killed	in	ighing	last	week,”	Los Angeles 
Times, November	9,	2008,	htp://aricles.laimes.com/2008/nov/09/world/fg-afghan9.	
25	 	Basir,	Interview	#96c,	August	25,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
26	 	Afghanistan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	A Campaign of Murder and Inimidaion: Insurgent Abuses 
against Afghan Civilians,	(Kabul:	Afghan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	December	2008),	2.
27	 	Human	Rights	Watch,	Troops in Contact: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan,	(New	York:	Human	Rights	
Watch,	September	2008),	2.
28	 	These	igures	remain	disputed.	The	Afghan	Government	and	UNAMA	report	91	civilians	killed.	The	US	military	
reports	a	total	of	55	killed,	33	civilians	and	22	militants.		See	Carlota	Gall,	“Evidence	Points	to	Civilian	Toll	in	Air	Raid,”	The 
New York Times,	September	7,	2008,	htp://www.nyimes.com/2008/09/08/world/asia/08afghan.html;	United	Naions,	
“At	least	90	Afghan	civilians	killed	in	recent	military	operaions,	says	UN,”	UN News Centre,	August	26,	2008,	htp://www.
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27816&Cr=Afghan&Cr1;	Brig.	Gen.	Michael	Callahan,	“Execuive	Summary	of	AR	
15-6	Invesigaion	into	the	new	informaion	relaive	to	civilian	casualies	from	engagement	by	U.S.	and	Afghan	Forces	on	
21-22	AUG	2008	in	Azizabad,	Shindand	District,	Herat	Province,	Afghanistan,”	United	States	Central	Command,	October	1,	
2008,	1.
AIR-STRIKES IN AFGHANISTAN
“I could see all the dead and injured bodies. My 
son’s wife was horribly injured. And my daughter 
had been killed already. … She had been baking 
bread inside the house when the bomb hit. Due to 
the blast, she was thrown into the oven. Her body 
was totally burned. She was taken to hospital, 
but she died. … My son had injuries on his feet 
and the force of the blast had thrown him over 
the tree. Another daughter – she was blasted into 
so many pieces that we still have not been able 
to ind her body. She was in too many parts. My 
neighbors came and helped to drag the bodies out 
of the house. It was terrible, terrible.” Haji Nasib, 
lost nine family members and sufered signiicant 
property loss due to an IMF air-strike in Wardak 
province.
Haji	Nasib,	Interview	#95,	August	5,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
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twice the number of civilians harmed in 2007, and almost ive times as many as in 2006.29 As HRW 
reported, the air-strikes have also led to “signiicant destruction of civilian property and have also forced 
civilians to lee and vacate villages, adding to the displaced population in Afghanistan.”30 High death tolls 
from air-strikes have incited signiicant anger among the Afghan civilian population.31 
Shootings near IMF Convoys
Civilians are required to stop, or proceed slowly but maintain their distance, when approaching IMF 
checkpoints or when coming near foot patrols or convoys. here are illustrated signs along the roads 
and on the back of convoys posting these rules but civilians do not always remember to stop or do 
not understand the warnings. Miscommunications result in civilian deaths and injuries. According to 
UNAMA, 41 civilians were killed in these “escalation of force” incidents in 2008.32 
ISAF troops have recently begun to shine a laser beam on civilians to warn them to stop, but at irst many 
civilians had no idea what this meant. One man shot by a US convoy in the eastern province of Jalalabad 
at the beginning of 2008 remembered: “I got a signal from ISAF, but it was a laser. It was the middle of 
winter and I didn’t notice it. I didn’t know what it meant. hey usually give a horn honk, which is known 
as a signal to stop.”33 
In other cases, civilians say they stopped but due to confusion or misunderstanding were perceived as 
a threat and were shot.34 Sometimes ISAF troops will shoot more readily if the car approaching them 
meets the proile of a known security threat, even if that car is not being overtly aggressive.  
Night Raids
Civilians are killed and their property damaged by the IMF and other Afghan security or military forces 
during “night raids.”  Witnesses typically report groups of armed men in military uniform, usually 
a mixture of Afghans and foreigners, entering houses at night and sometimes forcibly. According to 
investigations by the AIHRC: “A common pattern reported to AIHRC was for the armed men to separate 
the men from the women in the household, tie up the men and oten take one or more of the men with 
them when they let. here have been incidents where men were not taken but simply shot on site.”35 
Night raids have resulted in the death of family members, prolonged detention of males in the family, 
injuries, property destruction and other losses.36 Not only do civilians protest that innocent individuals 
are being killed or arrested, they condemn the lack of cultural sensitivity. In a culture where women 
are generally hidden from public view and where the home is a iercely private domain, such raids by 
foreigners have caused deep resentment. As one man from a village in Kandahar province told CIVIC: 
“Really, the biggest need is for the foreign troops to educate themselves more about the Afghan culture. 
29	 	United	Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	Protecion of Civilians,	3.	
30	 	Human	Rights	Watch,	Troops in Contact, 5;	Internal	Displacement	Monitoring	Center,	Afghanistan: Increasing 
hardship and limited support for growing displaced populaion,	Norwegian	Refugee	Council,	October	28,	2008,	10.
31	 	Afghanistan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspecive on Operaions 
of Pro-Government Forces,	10.
32	 	United	Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	Protecion of Civilians,	3.
33	 	Mohddin,	Interview	#34,	July	6,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Jalalabad	province.	
34	 	Ibid.;	Torjan,	Interview	#21,	July	2,	2008,	Kunduz	city,	Kunduz	province.	
35	 	Afghanistan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspecive on Operaions 
of Pro-Government Forces,	18.
36	 	Ibid.,	3	and	22-23.		
CIVIC 13
he night raids in particular are really bad. hey are going into people’s houses and taking people and 
this is not right.”37
Landmines and Other Explosive Remnants of War 
Many civilians are injured ater combat by so-called explosive remnants of war (ERW) including land 
mines, cluster munitions and other unexploded ordnance (UXO), all  let behind over 30 years of 
conlict.38 he 2006 National Disability 
Survey in Afghanistan classiied 2.7 
percent of the population as having 
a disability, including approximately 
60,000 landmine survivors.39 Mine 
clearance and community education 
have helped to decrease the number 
of casualties from mines or ERW. Two 
years ago the casualty rate was 150 
persons killed or injured per month; 
now, according to the UN Mine Action 
Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA), 
it is closer to 50 - 60 injured or killed 
per month.40  In information released 
in February 2009, UNMACA recorded 
753 civilians injured or killed by EWR 
in 2008; men were eight times more 
likely to be harmed (673 men involved 
in incidents versus 80 women), and 
children represent 57 percent of those 
civilian victims.41
he majority of ERW still threatening 
civilians in Afghanistan were let by 
pre-2001 conlicts.42 Nonetheless, the 
initial 2001 US air campaign against the 
Taliban dropped signiicant numbers 
of cluster munitions and other ERW, 
particularly in the Herat and Kandahar 
areas.43 Where they do not result in 
37	 	Gol,	Interview	#89,	July	21,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.
38	 	Internaional	Campaign	to	Ban	Landmines,	Landmine Monitor: Afghanistan 2008, htp://www.icbl.org/lm 
/2008/countries/afghanistan.php.
39	 	Ministry	of	Labor,	Social	Afairs,	Martyrs	and	Disabled,	Afghanistan Naional Disability Acion Plan 2008-2011, 
(Kabul:	Government	of	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Afghanistan,	May	2008),	2.	
40	 	Susan	Helseth,	Senior	Technical	Advisor,	Vicim	Assistance	&	Mine	Risk	Educaion,	UNMACA,	Interview	#121,	
June	10,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	
41	 United	Naions	Mine	Acion	Centre	Afghanistan,	“Mine		and	UXOs/ERW	Data	2008,”	February	10,	2009,	Copy	on	
ile	with	author.
42	 	Farhad	,	Interview	#44b,	July	30,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
43	 	Jan	Ejeklint,	Cluster Muniions in Afghanistan; implicaion for internaional acion and regulaion,	(Kabul:	
Swedish	Commitee	for	Afghanistan,	April	2006),	27;	See	also	Human	Rights	Watch,	Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and 
CHILDREN INJURED BY LANDMINES  
On October 18, 2001, fourteen-year-old Khaled was 
collecting wood with his cousin when they came upon an 
unexploded cluster munition, a weapon used by US forces 
in the invasion:
My cousin found something and brought it to 
me. I said to him don’t touch that. He thought 
it was good metal and when he touched it, it 
exploded. All I remember is a very big sound 
and my head felt damaged. I remember seeing 
[my cousin’s] face. It looked burned and bloody. 
…When I woke up [in the hospital], I saw people 
in front of me, but I didn’t see my leg in front of 
me. I wondered what had happened.i
Another young man from the same city, Farhad, was 9 
years old when he was injured by a cluster munition dud 
in the same area. “All the meat of my legs were ripped up 
and now I have to walk using a stick. ... My brother was 
also damaged from the bomb, but he can walk. His chest, 
his arm and his legs have some wounds.”ii 
i							Khaled,	Interview	#49,	July	30,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
ii						Farhad	,	Interview	#44b,	July	30,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
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death, incidents involving cluster submunitions and other ERW usually leave civilians injured or severely 
maimed.  Between 2001 and 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) documented 
328 incidents where civilians have been afected by cluster munitions.44 he actual igure is probably 
much higher; the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan notes that as many as 50 percent of incidents 
go unreported, particularly where the result is death rather than an injury that would be treated and 
documented at a medical facility.45
IMF air-strikes and past conlicts are not the only source of mine and ERW issues. In May 2007, ive 
children were killed by a mine that, according to Afghan police, had been recently laid by the Taliban.46 
Statistics like those included above are useful, but cannot capture the devastation for Afghan civilians 
who lose a loved one, are injured in a way that permanently disables them, lose their homes or livelihood, 
or are displaced. Moreover, estimates of civilian casualties alone do not begin to describe the struggle 
Afghan families face trying to recover from these losses. he following chapter will describe that struggle 
in greater depth, laying the groundwork for an analysis of compensation and assistance mechanisms.
their use by the United States in Afghanistan,	(New	York:	Human	Rights	Watch,	December	2002),	15.
44	 		Jan	Ejeklint,	Cluster Muniions in Afghanistan; implicaion for internaional acion and regulaion, 34.
45	 		Ibid.,	32-33.
46	 	Internaional	Campaign	to	Ban	Landmines,	Landmine Monitor: Afghanistan 2007, 
htp://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/afghanistan.html.	
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CHAPTER 2:
he Human Costs of War
News reports and documentation eforts have focused primarily on counting civilian casualties. An 
accurate count is important to measure the reach of the problem and can pinpoint a need for improvement 
in estimating potential civilian losses by international forces, an obligation under international law.  But 
numbers fail to capture the short and long term sufering families face in trying to rebuild their lives. 
CIVIC spoke with many civilians who years ater being harmed still experienced grief and psychological 
trauma from the incident, preventing them from resuming a normal life. 
Beyond signiicant emotional sufering, a single incident may have serious long-term economic and 
social repercussions. he Afghanistan National Development Strategy placed “war survivors” as one 
of two “priority groups” needing improved social protection.1 Civilians told CIVIC how losses from 
conlict severely damaged or destroyed their livelihoods and economic support bases. Medical costs and 
funeral expenses oten forced civilians 
to spend their savings and/or take out 
loans that would take years to pay of. 
Communities struggled to absorb the 
impact when multiple families were hit, 
or when they lost a community leader 
or community infrastructure. Families 
and communities across Afghanistan, 
many already stretched thin, were 
forced to assume the additional burden 
of supporting dependents of the 
deceased, or relations whose homes or 
communities had been destroyed.
his chapter discusses ive situations 
confronting civilians afected by the 
war: 1) the loss of a family member; 
2) the injury of a family member; 3) 
living with an injury or disability; 4) 
living as an internally displaced person 
or refugee; and 5) wider community 
ramiications. 
1	 	Government	of	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Afghanistan,	Afghanistan Naional Development Strategy, Social 
Protecion Sector Strategy,	55.
Khalil,	holding	a	photo	of	his	son	Azim.		Azim	was	killed	on	February	27,	
2007	in	a	suicide	atack	on	Bagram	Air	Base	in	Kabul	(story	on	page	10	of	
this	report).		Photo courtesy of Erica Gaston
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Loss of a Family Member
Over two-thirds of the civilians interviewed by CIVIC have lost family members during the current war. 
he last two years saw a sharp rise in civilian casualties, leaving more families destroyed and grieving. 
he death of a family member puts signiicant inancial strain on civilians in Afghanistan, including ot-
overlooked expenses for funerals and remarriage. he burdens are particularly acute following the death 
of a principal income earner and for vulnerable social groups such as widows and orphans. 
Providing Ater the Loss of a Breadwinner
Many of the civilians killed in Afghanistan were adult men, the principal breadwinners for their families. 
When a breadwinner dies, it is customary in Afghanistan for other family members to provide for 
the surviving dependents. With resources and jobs in short supply, some survivors are now inding it 
impossible to feed all the people under their care.
A survivor from the July 17, 2008 bombing of the Zerkoh village in Shindand lost both his brothers in 
the air-strike. He must now support not only his own family but the family of his two brothers – a total 
of 25 people – despite having lost much of his property in the bombing.2  Similarly, an elderly man, Said 
told CIVIC how he became the sole income-provider for a family of twelve ater his son was shot by 
ISAF forces for approaching a cordoned-of security area. Said described how he worked as a daily wage 
earner but “I can’t ind enough money for my family. I’m in trouble.”3
 
Farhad, a 70-year old man from Kandahar province told us how his son — the sole income earner 
for the family — was killed in a suicide attack directed at ISAF forces. Now ten family members were 
let without an income, including ive children under the age of four. Farhad said they were forced to 
“borrow things such as wheat and vegetables from relatives and it is hard to survive day to day … we rely 
on our relatives a great deal.”4
he necessity to earn money ater the death of a breadwinner also afects the education of children who 
are forced to ind jobs rather than attend school.  Two young brothers, Karim and Hasan, described how 
their father had been riding in a rickshaw on his way to a wedding party when a suicide bomb directed at 
a military convoy exploded. International forces returned ire and the boys’ father was killed. Although 
they were still only in high school, the brothers dropped out of school and started work full-time so they 
could support their family of seven brothers and two sisters.5
Finally, the death of a son or brother who assisted in a family business also leads to a reduction in income 
or a signiicantly added workload for the remaining breadwinner. One boy who helped his father work 
an ice-cream truck in Kandahar was killed by a suicide bomb when he went to get a haircut. he father, 
Nazar, said he could not cope without the assistance of his son: “I wasn’t able to keep working because my 
job requires a lot of physical exercise. I have to move and chop the ice and move the truck. My boy was 
giving ice cream to customers and helping me. I would get some free time when my son was there.”6
2	 	Masood,	Interview	#42b,	July	29,	2008,	Shindand	district,	Herat	province.	
3	 	Said,	Interview	#83,	July	22,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.
4	 	Farhad,	Interview	#79,	July	20,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.
5	 	Karim	and	Hasan,	Interview	#24,	July	2,	2008,	Kunduz	city,	Kunduz	province.	
6	 	Nazar,	Interview	#84,	July	22,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.	
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Surviving as a Widow
According to an October 2008 report by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), “widows, 
especially in rural areas, remain one of the 
most vulnerable groups in the country. … he 
absence of food security has had a particularly 
negative impact on rural women, who are at 
the bottom of the patriarchal ladder of access to 
resources.”7 Women are excluded from most types 
of employment in Afghan society.8 Typically, the 
only way for widows to support their families is to 
be taken in by other members and/or marry one of 
the deceased husband’s brothers.
CIVIC interviewed Ara, a woman whose husband 
and son were killed in a suicide attack in November 
2007. Her husband ran a grocery shop where her 
son had also worked. he deaths were a traumatic 
experience: “When the blast happened, pieces of 
the lesh thrown from the blast landed in our yard. 
I ran down to [where the blast had happened] to 
see.”9  Ara now faces a signiicant economic challenge: 
“he big problem is that there’s no male in our family now. Only one very 
old father who cannot work much.  I have ive daughters to support. I’m 
not sure what else we can do. I am not able to think of these things or what 
we can do. We are drowning in agony and misery.”10
Another widow, Samira, managed to ind some employment ater her taxi-driver husband was killed in 
a US aerial bombardment in 2001. Her income, however, was insuicient to support the family and she 
was forced to rely on the generosity of various relatives.  She told us how it was diicult to support all 
her children and that she started washing clothes, housekeeping and taking any other small job to earn 
money. Eventually, she could not survive alone because “our family could no longer aford a home of our 
own and [so] we were passed from one relative to another.”11  
Samira described how the economic situation is causing her children to sufer: 
If my husband was alive my children would have everything like other 
girls and boys. hey ask me sometimes for things… normal things that all 
7	 	Internal	Displacement	Monitoring	Center,	Afghanistan: Increasing hardship and limited support for growing 
displaced populaion,	77.
8	 	Ibid.,	61	(noing	that	the	“economic	exclusion”	of	widows	and	their	children	together	with	their	“social	
marginalizaion”	complicated	the	reintegraion	of	IDP	and	returnee	widows);	Government	of	the	Islamic	Republic	of	
Afghanistan, Afghanistan Naional Development Strategy, Social Protecion Sector Strategy,	27.
9	 	Ara,	Interview	#17,	May	19,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
10	 	Ibid.
11	 	Samira,	Interview	#8,	March	13,	2008,	Kabul	District	11,	Kabul	province.
Sewing	 factory	 in	 Kunduz	 city	 where	 widows	 and	 female	
children	can	work	to	help	their	families.		Photo courtesy of 
Erica Gaston
CIVIC18
children ask for… a son would ask his father for a bicycle, a computer, a 
daughter for pretty things. Everyone has a wish. I wish my husband was 
alive so they could have all these normal things. So they could have a 
normal childhood.12 
Orphans
Orphans in Afghanistan ind themselves in a desperate situation. United Nations Joint Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimated that, through 2007, 2.1 million children had lost a father, a mother 
or both.13  here are likely even more now, given increasing rates of civilian casualties. hese children 
are extremely vulnerable members of society and, when they do not have extended family members to 
provide for them, they frequently end up in orphanages or on the street. 
CIVIC spoke with children in Jalalabad orphaned by the July 2008 IMF air-strike that hit a wedding 
party. One eight-year-old boy called Rafullah lost both his parents in the same air-strike and now lives 
in social services.  His three sisters are also in care.14 Another ten-year-old girl called Magwell described 
how she lost both her mother and her father in the air-strike, leaving eight daughters as orphans.  hree 
of the daughters are married, but the other ive have been taken to a social services organization caring 
for children with nowhere else to go.15 Both of these children were angry at the death of their parents and 
understandably did not have a positive view of the international community. 
Cost of Funeral and Remarriage
he burden of funeral and remarriage expenses was mentioned by a number of individuals interviewed 
by CIVIC. 
Nasrallah from Jalalabad lost his father in a March 2008 suicide bombing and subsequent shooting by 
IMF forces. His father was caught in the gunire while walking to a shop. Nasrallah told us how “the 
cost of funeral expenses was very diicult for the family to cover.”16 All seven brothers had to contribute 
money. 
In another suicide bombing, Ahmed lost his wife who was ive-months pregnant with their irst child. 
Ahmed was not only emotionally distraught, but sufered inancially because of the funeral expenses and 
the cost of remarriage.17 
Two or three men whose wives had been killed mentioned the inancial burden of remarriage.18 While 
it might seem callous to talk about the expense of remarriage in the wake of tragedy, this is the reality 
for many men given the Afghan social structure. For them, remaining unmarried was unthinkable, 
particularly if they had small children needing care.
12	 	Ibid.
13	 	United	Naions	Joint	Programme	on	HIV/AIDS,	“Orphan	esimates,”	United	Naions	Joint	Programme	on	HIV/
AIDS,	December	2008,	htp://www.childinfo.org/orphans.php.	UN	oicial	deiniion	of	an	orphan	includes	a	child	who	
has	lost	his	or	her	mother,	father	or	both.	
14	 	Rafullah,	Interview	#71a,	August	6,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Nangarhar	province.	
15	 	Magwell,	Interview	#71b,	August	6,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Nangarhar	province.
16	 	Nasrallah,	Interview	#54,	August	5,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Nangarhar	province.
17	 	Ahmed,	Interview	#55,	August	5,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Nangarhar	province.
18	 	Ibid.	Nasrallah,	Interview	#54,	August	5,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Nangarhar	province.
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Injury of a Family Member
Estimates of civilians killed by the conlict in Afghanistan show only one slice of the picture. For every 
Afghan killed, as many or more are injured by conlict, oten with equally devastating consequences 
for their families.  Many who are injured can no longer work or contribute to their family’s livelihoods 
because of their disabilities.  his loss of income or livelihood support, compounded with initial or 
continuing expenses for medical treatment, can be devastating for the many Afghan families already 
struggling economically. he emotional costs of injuries are impossible to quantify. 
Injury of a Breadwinner
Families sufer signiicant inancial burdens when a primary breadwinner is injured such that he (and 
occasionally she) is no longer able to earn a wage or contribute to the family livelihood. he 2006 National 
Disability Survey in Afghanistan found that 53 percent of men with a disability over 15 years old were 
unemployed, compared with 25 percent of unemployed men in the general population.19 
 
One farmer, the sole provider for his family, told us how he was injured in a suicide attack and could 
no longer work as efectively in the ields. His family felt the impact, as he brought far less produce 
home.20 
Ziaudin earned an income selling material from a cart before being injured in a suicide attack. Pieces of 
shrapnel were still embedded in his face and shoulders when CIVIC spoke with him. Ziaudin said the 
pain in his arms makes it impossible for him to push the cart so he can no longer make an income: “I was 
in the hospital for three days. I am the only breadwinner in the family and so I have taken half a piece of 
bread this morning and then I haven’t taken anything.”21
Cost of Medical Expenses
Expensive hospital bills and continuing treatment of an injury create heavy burdens on many Afghan 
families already struggling to survive.  Such expenses put families into debt, forcing them to sell land and 
livestock or personal belongings, such as cars and motorbikes, in order to raise cash. One man whose 
son was injured described how, “in order to pay for the hospital treatment, we sold half our land to pay 
for the bills.”22
Another man described how he has had to pay for medical treatments for every member of his family 
for the past seven years. Although he and his wife sustained relatively minor injuries, his now-teenage 
daughter, Miriam, has shrapnel wounds that severely disigured her abdomen and one of her legs:
My wife was injured, my daughter was injured, I am injured.… From the 
time of the incident [Oct. 22, 2001] until now my family has been under 
treatment. When I earn any money, I spend it on my family’s treatment. 
My house, my home, my life are getting worse all the time.23  
19	 	Ministry	of	Labor,	Social	Afairs,	Martyrs	and	Disabled,	Afghanistan Naional Disability Acion Plan 2008-2011, 
19.		
20	 	Abdul,	Interview	#42d,	July	29,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
21	 	Ziaudin,	Interview	#43,	July	22,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.	
22	 	Alif,	Interview	#92a,	July	22,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.	
23	 	Ziaudin,	Interview	#43,	July	22,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
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his father also worried his daughter would never marry or have a normal life.  Miriam would probably 
remain inancially dependent on her aging parents.
Like Miriam, many injured civilians become dependent on the full-time care and support of their 
families. his naturally puts inancial and emotional pressure on the family member-turned-caretaker. 
One man who lost sixteen members of his family in 
an air-strike in Kandahar described the long-term 
care now required for both his brother and sister, 
injured in the same attack: “My sister cannot eat by 
herself anymore. And my brother lost one leg and is 
paralyzed in the other leg. He is in a wheelchair.”24
Civilians Living with an Injury or 
Disability
Increasingly, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the Afghan 
government are developing broader medical, social, 
and vocational services for those with disabilities, 
but the network of support for the disabled, 
including those disabled by conlict-related injuries, 
is thin.  In Afghanistan, life is hard enough for the 
perfectly healthy; there are few extra resources or 
accommodations for the disabled. Additionally, 
stigmas against the disabled create signiicant social 
barriers against holding a job, going to school, 
marrying or other aspects of daily life.  
Alberto Cairo, an orthopedic doctor associated with 
the International Committee for the Red Cross who 
has been treating amputees in Afghanistan for 19 
years, has emphasized the problems facing Afghan 
civilians living with a disability: 
To be disabled is never easy. [It’s] not easy in Europe … we can imagine in 
Afghanistan. he future of the disabled, of the amputees in Afghanistan is 
going to be a very diicult condition for many years.25 
Poverty and Inadequate Treatment for Injuries
he overall weakness of the health system ofers few opportunities for follow-up treatment ater an 
injury – including operations, prosthetic limbs or physical therapy. A very small majority of Afghan 
families can aford to send their relatives abroad, so individuals live with crippling injuries that in other 
countries could be entirely overcome. 
24	 		Alif,	Interview	#92a,	July	22,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.
25	 	Internaional	Commitee	for	the	Red	Cross,	“A	decade	of	assising	Afghan	disabled	-	interview	with	Alberto	
Cairo,”	Segment	3,	0:56	seconds,	June	16,	2003,	htp://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5nkclc?opendocument.	
Families	 are	 oten	 let	 struggling	 to	 ind	 appropriate	
medical	care	for	family	members,	including	children.		Photo 
Courtesy of Rebecca Agule
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One man named Bilal sufered shrapnel wounds to his eyes when he was 19 years old. Six years later, 
he was inally able to travel to India to have his eyes examined. he doctor told him his vision could 
have been saved if he had been treated immediately or even a few years later, but it was now irreparably 
damaged.26 
Many organizations and hospitals in Afghanistan seek resources to provide free or subsidized treatment 
for injured survivors, but the overwhelming need and widespread poverty mean their limited resources 
cannot keep up with the immediate treatment and long-term care civilians require due to the conlict. 
A boy named Khaled, injured by a cluster munition when he was 14 years old, described how he lost his 
leg because the local doctors were unable to treat his injury and his family could not aford to send him 
abroad: 
My father had already died when I was two so we were very poor. My 
mother went to relatives when I was injured to ask for some money. … 
he doctors said that if we could go to foreign countries they might be 
able to treat my leg and not cut it but here the doctors did not have the 
skill. We did not have the money to do this though so they amputated my 
leg.27
he ICRC has noted that the “rehabilitation needs of mine survivors and other people with disabilities 
are seldom met.”28
Social Stigma and the Denial of Education
In Afghanistan, the way the disabled are treated by society can be as limiting for the injured as the injuries 
themselves. he man who lost his eyesight to shrapnel wounds above was well educated, especially for an 
Afghan. hough blind, he might have found work, but his family never considered the option. “Family 
and clan …they tend to take over and protect the person in need. hat’s OK. he problem is they don’t 
give the disabled the chance to rebuild their life,”29 Alberto Cairo, the ICRC orthopedic doctor, said. 
“As a result of attitudes like this, Bilal spent most of his days thinking bitterly about his lost future and 
listening to the radio,” his family said.30
An estimated 196,000 school-aged children are disabled, about 20 percent as a result of conlict.31  Social 
barriers compound physical injuries and keep them from a bright future.  Parween Azimi has been 
working on inclusive education in Afghanistan for the past 20 years and described how: “It’s a struggle 
just to get the school management, or the Ministry of Education to allow [children with disabilities] 
to go to school.  People think that they cannot be accommodated.”32 According to the 2006 National 
26	 	Bilal,	Interview	#3,	February	20,2008,	Gardez	city,	Pakia	province.
27	 	Khaled,	Interview	#49,	July	30,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
28	 	ICRC	cited	in	Internaional	Campaign	to	Ban	Landmines,	Landmine Monitor: Afghanistan 2007.
29	 	Internaional	Commitee	for	the	Red	Cross,	“A	decade	of	assising	Afghan	disabled	-	interview	with	Alberto	
Cairo,”	Segment	3,	1:20	minutes.
30	 	Family	of	Bilal,	Interview	#3,	Feb.	20	2008,	Gardez	city,	Pakia	province.	
31	 	Parween	Azimi,	“UNESCO-MOE	Focal	Point	for	Inclusive	Educaion,”	(Kabul:	United	Naions	Development	
Program,	June	29,	2008).	
32	 	Ibid.		
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Disability Survey in Afghanistan, 73 percent of school-aged children with disabilities (above 6 years of 
age) received no education, versus an estimated 51.4 percent of children without disabilities.33 
Soraj was 11 years old when he lost both his legs and was severely disigured by a cluster munition dud 
in Herat city.34 When the doctor irst saw him, he recommended to his parents they not treat the boy 
and instead give him an injection to kill him.  “One of the doctors, a surgeon, thought it was not good 
in Afghanistan to have a life with this type of body.”35 His parents fortunately went against the doctor’s 
advice, but they must now ight to get him any help or chance of a normal life.  Soraj told us how ater the 
incident the headmaster refused to let him return to school and only ater Soraj personally convinced 
the schoolmaster was he allowed to go:  
At that time the headmaster also had a disability. I told him: now you have 
lost your hand but you are the headmaster. And I promise to be the same 
as you: I can improve, I can learn. In the future, for example, I could work 
as an accountant or in a shop if I know how to read, how to write….  It 
was my right to go to school and I don’t want anybody to put my rights 
under their feet.36 
Now a young adult, Soraj says he only wishes there were more agencies and programs to help people like 
him develop their education and job skills, so they had an alternative to “begging in the streets.”37
Loss of Property
Damage or destruction of civilian property due to the ongoing conlict is even more pervasive than 
civilian deaths and injuries. Decades of conlict in Afghanistan, the overall poor level of development, 
and the geographic isolation of many communities combine to make property loss a particularly severe 
and long-term hardship. Many families do not have the means to rebuild a home or replace livestock 
or other livelihood supports.  Even where they do, it may take a long time to get materials given supply 
and transport limitations across the country. In the meantime, these property losses can leave families 
homeless and destitute, leading to malnutrition or other sufering.
Destruction of Family Home
Air-strikes are one of the most prominent causes of home destruction. In particular, Human Rights 
Watch found that responsive air-strikes called in to support ground troops are less accurate and increase 
the risk to civilian property.38 Insurgent tactics of iring from homes or villages and then leeing before 
IMF air retaliation has led to the destruction of many homes, particularly in the south.39
When homes are destroyed, civilians must either ind large sums of money to rebuild or they become 
33	 	Ministry	of	Labor,	Social	Afairs,	Martyrs	and	Disabled,	Afghanistan Naional Disability Acion Plan, 26.	
34	 	Soraj’s	name	has	not	been	changed	to	protect	his	idenity,	as	have	most	of	the	other	interviewees.	Soraj	has	
been	very	outspoken	about	the	efects	of	cluster	muniions,	and	has	taken	a	public	role	in	the	movement	to	ban	cluster	
muniions.	See	Patrizia	Pompili,	“My	Story,	by	Soraj	Ghulam	Habib,”	November	26,	2007,	htp://blog.banadvocates.org/
index.php?post/2007/11/02/Soraj-Ghulam-Habib.	
35	 	Soraj,	Interview	#44a,	July	30,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.	
36	 	Ibid.	
37	 	Ibid.
38	 	Human	Rights	Watch,	Troops in Contact: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan,	3.	
39	 	Ibid.,	25-28.	
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refugees or internationally displaced persons (IDPs). Moreover, when a house is destroyed gone too are 
all the family’s personal possessions, livestock and vehicles.  Many families told us they had to start again 
from scratch, with just the clothes on their back.
CIVIC interviewed one family in Herat whose house was destroyed in an air-strike that also killed the 
father:
he house was completely destroyed and burned. … Ater the incident, 
we lost everything: our two cows were killed, the motorbike was blown 
up, our six turkeys were killed. We were only able to bring out half of two 
carpets. hen, ater the incident, we moved to our aunt’s house in another 
village in Herat province. When we came to [our] aunt’s house, there was 
just one small room. We started from zero. hen we decided to move back 
to near where were lived before, where we had some land. And we were 
living in two small shops – in metal containers. We were living like this 
for six months. Life was tough.40
Another man, injured in an air-strike that also destroyed most of his home, explained how the cost of 
rebuilding put him into signiicant debt:
Some of the relatives assisted in rebuilding [the house] and we also took 
a loan from other relatives. hen ater one year [when my injuries were a 
little better], I started working again so that I could pay. he kitchen was 
totally destroyed. We still don’t have a kitchen and we want to rebuild 
it.41
Destruction of Family Business
he economic consequences can be equally dire when family businesses or other livelihood support is 
destroyed. Civilians who lost their livelihoods repeatedly told CIVIC that without a means of income 
they could not support any injured or dependents of the deceased or otherwise rebuild their lives.
Haji Mullah in Kandahar owned a nursery where he grew and sold potted plants. In April 2007, a suicide 
bomb exploded outside his shop: 
My nursery shop was damaged and about 800 lower pots were destroyed 
at a cost of around $3,200. his was my whole budget. I was selling them 
and getting money to feed my family. But now although I have started 
the business again, I have had to borrow money to do it and I became 
poorer.42 
Apart from the speciic damage to his stock, Haji Mullah explained that the tense security situation was 
ruining his ability to make money: “Our business depends on the security situation – many foreigners 
from diferent agencies used to come and buy a lot of lowers but now they don’t show up any more.”43
40	 	Amanullah,	Interview	#94,	July	31,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.	 
41	 	Bashir,	Interview	#93,	July	31,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.	
42	 	Haji	Mullah,	Interview	#86,	July	22,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.	
43	 	Ibid.
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A man called Haizullah had his business totally destroyed as a result of the ighting. He lived in a remote 
village in Helmand Province before he and his family led to Kandahar city. Haizullah was a doctor and 
a businessman. He owned a clinic and twenty shops in the area around his village. In September 2006, 
an air-strike by the IMF forces destroyed everything he owned. his let Haizullah and his three sons 
without a job or income:
I lost approx 2,000 trees, six houses, the clinic and twenty shops. …I have 
three sons and one son was helping me in the clinic when it was destroyed. 
Now I have nothing to do and I have no experience in other areas so I 
can’t start another business. I also can’t start anything without any money. 
… I was in health and I was a teacher. here are now no jobs for me. My 
friends and family are providing me with assistance now.44
In an agrarian society like Afghanistan, air-strikes damage agricultural land and livestock, not only 
destroying a family’s livelihood but taking away their basic means of survival. 
One man named Abdul who led from air-strikes in the Shindand valley of Herat told CIVIC how his 
farm and livestock were destroyed by an air-strike: 
I had cows, sheep, goats, they were all killed. Now I have nothing for my 
family. I could still manage to look ater my family if only I had that. 45 
Abdul’s neighbor, who led from the same strikes had similar concerns: 
It is terrible that I am in the country, but I am living like a refugee. I don’t 
know where to go. I don’t know how to live. I am supporting in part more 
than forty members of my family. I lost my tractor, my property. Maybe I 
will go for begging.46 
Living as an Internally Displaced Person or Refugee
Persistent ighting and insecurity force many families to lee their homes and communities. With nowhere 
to live, they become refugees or (IDPs). According to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)’s Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Center, ongoing conlict has led to the displacement of tens of thousands of 
Afghans each year since 2006.47 An estimated 44,000 civilians were displaced in the irst half of 2007 
alone.48  hey are now one of the most vulnerable groups in Afghan society for, as the NRC Secretary-
General has explained, “[t]hey may not only have lost their homes, family members and livelihoods, but 
they are receiving practically no support. he tragedy for these people is that as their needs are rising, 
44	 	Haizullah,	Interview	#90,	July	21,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.	
45	 	Abdul,	Interview	#42d,	July	29,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.	
46	 	Hayatullah,	Interview	#42a,	July	29,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
47	 	Internal	Displacement	Monitoring	Center,	Afghanistan: Increasing hardship and limited support for growing 
displaced populaion,	9	(noing	“The	conlict	is	esimated	to	have	displaced	tens	of	thousands	of	people	every	year	since	
2006,	but	their	number	has	been	impossible	to	determine	due	to	a	lack	of	access	to	the	conlict	zones.”).	
48	 	Ban	Ki-Moon,	Report of the Secretary-General on the Protecion of Civilians in Armed Conlict,	United	Naions,	
October	2007,	2.
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our ability to reach them is dramatically decreasing.”49
IDPs CIVIC interviewed told a common story: leeing in response to immediate ighting or bombing, 
oten grabbing what few possessions they had, and returning (if possible) to ind everything destroyed 
or stolen. “We let that same night. Some of our family members let even their shoes.… Ater four days 
I went back to the site but when I went to see my house, it was destroyed and nothing was there.”50
he decision to lee, even for a few weeks, carries heavy economic and personal consequences. Away 
from their homes, communities, and their family’s source of income, many refugees and IDPs depend on 
handouts or day labor to survive.  “here are about 20-30 individuals who moved to Kandahar city who 
are in my family,” one man told us. “When we 
were in the village, we made a living by working 
on the land. We had land and gardens. Our 
family all assisted in this. Now I have one son 
who has gone to Iran and he works there and 
sends the money back to the family. hat’s how 
we manage to survive here but it is diicult.”51 
Some IDPs and refugees are able to take 
shelter with friends or family in safe areas, but 
many more are forced into formal or informal 
refugee camps across Afghanistan and in 
neighboring countries. With rising violence, 
these camps are increasingly overcrowded 
and under-resourced. Families living there 
for weeks or months at a time are focused on 
basic survival needs, unable to get adequate 
health care, education, work opportunities or 
other services they might need to rebuild their 
lives. 
According to one woman in an IDP camp outside of Herat city: 
Our life is very diicult compared to up there in the village. We used to 
have possibilities up there… we could walk and chat with our neighbors. 
You know if relatives are together they can solve their problems together. 
For example, all our relatives had agriculture, had ields, had melons. We 
could just go to their ields and eat them when we were hungry. Now we 
have nothing.  I have all these children and I cannot provide for them.52
he Director of the Department of Refugees and Repatriation (DORR) in Herat estimated that in the 
49	 	Siri	Elverland,	“Press	Release:		Worsening	Situaion	for	IDPs,”	Norwegian	Refugee	Council,	October	28,	2008,	
htp://www.nrc.no/?did=9348233.
50	 	Ahmad,	Interview	#42c,	July	29,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
51	 	Abdul	Rahim,	Interview	#91,	July	21,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.
52	 	Malali,	Interview	#45,	July	30,	2008,	Maslakh Refugee	Camp,	outskirts	of	Herat	city.
IDP	camp	in	Kabul.		Most	of	the	dispaced	here	led	from	Helmand	
province,	the	sight	of	sill	ierce	ighing.		Photo courtesy of Erica 
Gaston
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three IDP camps in the Herat city area, 60-65 percent could not support the basic needs of their family.53 
Similar problems exist in IDP camps around Afghanistan – and particularly in the east of the country 
where many civilians are being forced to leave refugee camps in adjacent Pakistan, either because of 
increased ighting there or because of Pakistani government decisions.54
Many civilians driven from their homes are able to return within a matter of weeks while others ind 
the security situation too perilous to return for months or even years. Some IDPs have not been able to 
return because Afghan Anti-Government Elements have laid anti-vehicle and anti-personnel landmines 
on the roads leading to their homes.55 Economic costs can also play into the decision. One mother in 
Herat said they spent almost all of their money in the original light from their home. If they returned to 
the area and ighting broke out again, she said, they would not have enough money to leave again. 56 
If individuals are unable to return to their villages, they generally face severe diiculties settling in other 
parts of the country. According to the Afghanistan IDP Task Force of 2008, even though Article 39 of the 
Afghan Constitution recognizes the right of Afghans to travel or settle in any part of the country, local 
opposition to outsiders oten prevents IDPs from resettling in other areas.57
Wider Community Impacts
Civilian losses, such as a school, road, water system, or bridge, have far-reaching and community-wide 
impact. If an elder or teacher is killed, it can take a generation for the community to recover from the 
loss. When incidents afect many families in the same community, the burdens are shared and can have 
long-term consequences. Patterns of ighting in a given area limit available employment opportunities, 
international and local aid or government services. 
Compounding physical or livelihood losses are the emotional and psychological burdens for a community 
trying to go about its ordinary, daily business. Nighttime searches by international forces or general 
intimidation tactics by AOG can create a climate of fear across an entire community. Frequent bombings 
or ongoing ighting can leave even those without tangible losses with feelings of hopelessness, anger, and 
despair.
Intimidation and Loss of Community Leaders
Many community leaders, doctors, and teachers living in areas of Taliban control are subject to 
Taliban intimidation and are unable to perform their leadership roles within the community.58  Society 
as a whole sufers the negative efects.  In November 2007, a suicide bomber targeting Italian troops 
53	 	Director,	Department	of	Refugees	and	Repatriaion-Herat,	Interview	#135,	July	30,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	
province.	
54	 	Antonio	Guterres,	“Statement	by	Mr.	Antonio	Guterres,	United	Naions	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees,	to	the	
United	Naions	Security	Council,”	New	York,	January	8,	2009,		htp://www.unhcr.org/admin/ADMIN/496625484.html;	
Candace	Rondeaux,	“Ater	Decades,	Pakistan	Forces	Thousands	of	Afghans	to	Leave;	Oicials	Cite	Extremism,	Economics	
as	Reasons	for	Closure	of	Camp	in	Northwest,”	Washington Post,	April	15,	2008,	A09;	Habib	Khan	Khar,	“Afghans	Ordered	
Out,”	The Adveriser,	October	8,	2008,	39.			
55	 	Internal	Displacement	Monitoring	Center,	Afghanistan: Increasing hardship and limited support for growing 
displaced populaion,	16.
56	 	Shameem,	Interview	#46,	August	25,	2008,	IDP	camp	near	Herat	city,	Herat	province.		
57	 	Internal	Displacement	Monitoring	Center,	Afghanistan: Increasing hardship and limited support for growing 
displaced populaion,	16.
58	 	United	Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	Armed Conlict and Civilian Casualies, 3.	
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killed nine civilians and injured many others.  he most respected community elder, who had helped 
lead disarmament and peace negotiations among many tribes in the area, was also killed. His loss is 
irreplaceable, community leaders said.59 
A local aid worker in the Western region of Afghanistan told CIVIC he was working on delivering aid to 
a community in the Shindand valley of Herat province for over a year. he only way to access the valley 
was under the protection of a local community leader. Ater that leader was killed in a US airstrike on 
July 17, 2008, the aid worker said it would be impossible to reach those afected communities.60
Widespread Property Damage
Large-scale damage stretches community resources and afects the quality of life even for those not 
directly harmed by the incident, oten for many years ater the incident. 
CIVIC visited a community afected by a US air-strike in Herat city on October 22, 2001. he air-strike 
reportedly missed a military target and directly hit an area within the city, damaging or destroying the 
houses of forty-ive families, killing twelve and injuring tens of others. According to the father of one 
family, everyone he was close to was afected: “One of the bombs landed in our yard. he other landed 
on my brother’s house, the other my neighbor here, the other my neighbor there.”61 When CIVIC visited 
the area seven years later, the community was only just recovering. Even those who were spared direct 
harm complained about a general deterioration of their quality of life, and that they had received no help 
to recover.62 
he strain of recovery can be more pronounced for communities isolated by security conditions.  In 
February 2002, US air-strikes caused widespread damage to a small village called Shar-E-Cott in the 
southeastern province of Paktia. Multiple families were directly harmed; infrastructure damage to the 
town itself and to the surrounding roads impoverished the entire community. In part because of its 
isolated location and because of deteriorating security following the air-strikes, the community was cut 
of from almost all emergency relief or development aid. Although road access has recently improved 
through mass infrastructure projects, increased ighting and Taliban attacks still restrict the supplies that 
can reach the community.63
Conclusion
Losses from conlict go far beyond immediate deaths, injuries, or property losses headlined in the 
media. From immediate costs following harm to lost opportunities and livelihoods, many Afghans are 
pushed to the brink of desperation. heir losses can shatter traditional family and community structures, 
making it even less likely that isolated assistance or one-time payments could be of help.  Building 
on this background in the long-term consequences of conlict, the following chapter will introduce 
existing compensation, relief, and support mechanisms designed speciically to help families recover 
from conlict losses.
 
59	 	Shah	family,	Interview	#16,	May	19,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
60	 	Afghan	aid	worker,	Interview	#175,	July	29,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.	
61	 	Ziaudin,	Interview	#43,	July	29,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.	
62	 	Community	members,	Interview	#92,	July	31,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
63	 	Jon	Boone,	“Taliban	atacks	Nato	by	choking	supplies,”	The	Financial	Times,	August	12,	2008,	htp://www.
t.com/cms/s/0/3b437574-6891-11dd-a4e5-0000779fd18c,dwp_uuid=af522be6-4c8c-11da-89df-0000779e2340.html.
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Rahim	was	headed	to	Jalalabad	
to	pay	his	bills	when	a	suicide	
car	bomb	exploded	on	the	main	
road.		US	forces	started	iring	
and	riddled	his	car		with	1,250	
bullet	holes	injuring	him,	and	
killing	his		father	and	niece.		He	
received	an	ex	graia	payment	
from	the	US	military		in	the	
amount	of	$600	-	$200	for	the	
damage	to	the	car	and	$400	
for	his	injury.		He	also	received	
assistance	from	ACAP	and	$1,000	
from	the	Afghan	Government.	
See	page	55	for	more	of	this	
story.  Photo Courtesy of Rebecca 
Agule.   
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CHAPTER 3:
Assistance from Military Actors
Overview of Assistance Available to Conlict-Afected Civilians: From Military Actors, 
Foreign Government Actors and the Afghan Government
Since 2001, military actors, governmental agencies, international organizations and non-governmental 
organizations have developed a range of compensation and assistance programs to help civilians impacted 
by the conlict. he following three chapters will discuss programs where the criterion for assistance is 
that civilians must be directly afected by conlict. Discussion of these programs is organized according 
to the actors providing the assistance: the international military (chapter 3); foreign government actors 
(chapter 4);  and the Afghan government (chapter 5).  
In addition to the programs discussed here, a broader network of emergency relief, humanitarian aid and 
development support is available to all Afghan civilians, including but not limited to those speciically 
harmed by the conlict. For example, the tens of thousands of families displaced by conlict each year 
might depend on food and non-food aid from UNHCR, or the Afghan Department of Refugees and 
Repatriation. he Afghan Red Crescent Society or the International Committee for the Red Cross may 
provide immediate medical treatment. his broader network of aid helps communities and individuals 
recover from conlict. he aim of this report, however, is to assess the efectiveness of assistance provided 
by the warring parties that cause, even if unintentionally, harm to civilians while conducting their 
operations.
Each chapter includes an overview of existing programs and a discussion of what civilians thought 
about each program, whether they had heard of the programs at all and, importantly, whether they were 
helped.  
Beyond medical or economic assistance, many civilians told CIVIC they wanted an explanation and/
or an apology. Many sought recognition, or a sense that justice had been done even if the harm was 
unintentional on the part of a particular warring party. Each chapter will therefore discuss whether any 
of the mechanisms or programs helped conlict-afected civilians feel this sense of emotional “redress,” 
despite the obvious diiculties in quantifying such an intangible.  Additionally, rigorous research should 
be undertaken on this issue. hat said, almost all our interviews with civilians touched on feelings of 
redress, allowing us to identify certain common expectations and reactions. 
his chapter, on military assistance, will go into greater depth on these redress issues than subsequent 
chapters, in part because most of those interviewed expected apologies to come from IMF. Where civilians 
perceived the harm to come from IMF – and most of those interviewed did put the blame on the IMF or 
the AGE, not the Afghan Government – compensation by the Afghan Government or assistance from a 
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program not directly tied to IMF were no substitute for an apology and compensation from IMF. 
Compensation and victim assistance is possible, but there are increasing challenges to distribution. 
hirty years of conlict have let most of the country under-developed and impoverished with weak 
institutional capacity. A largely aid-dependent economy with lengthy and costly supply lines makes 
delivering even the most basic relief aid cost-prohibitive.  Aid workers and civilians alike cited security 
as one of the most pressing factors delaying or preventing aid and compensation from reaching conlict-
afected civilians.1  One humanitarian worker noted: 
“Any external aid, compensation into a Taliban-controlled area… it’s 
viewed by the Taliban as an external invasion into their zone of control. If 
someone gets public compensation or aid, and returns to their village in 
an area controlled by Taliban, they can expect to get it taken away or they 
can expect to be shot.”2 
Access to many areas is limited due to ongoing ighting and, separately, to the diicult terrain. 3  
Corruption is also a signiicant problem. Inlated or fabricated claims from civilians or civilian leaders 
were mentioned not only by military oicials but also by civilians working for non-governmental and 
international organizations, Afghans and internationals alike. 
Where relevant, these challenges to successful program implementation will be discussed along with 
examples where programs were able to successfully deal with these hurdles. 
Finally, although some civilians afected by the conlict in 2001 told CIVIC they had received food and 
medical assistance from the Taliban, CIVIC was unable to conirm any eforts at compensation or amends 
by Taliban or other insurgent groups in subsequent years. Only one Afghan oicial mentioned hearing 
about certain Taliban groups in southern Afghanistan paying out compensation payments;  no civilians 
were found to conirm this.4 While AGE were responsible for more civilian deaths and injuries last 
year than IMF, civilians with whom CIVIC spoke expected little from these insurgent groups. Similarly, 
when it came to making amends for damages, civilians expected greater recognition and assistance from 
IMF.  
1	 	Aunohita	Mojumdar,	“Afghanistan	Opinion	Survey	Reveals	Increasing	Worry	Among	Afghans,”	Eurasia Insight, 
October	29,	2008,	htp://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/aricles/eav102908b.shtml	(noing	a	2008	Asia	
Foundaion	survey	of	Afghan	aitudes	which	found	that:	“Corrupion	was	seen	as	a	major	problem	at	the	naional	level	
(76	percent),	with	as	many	as	51	percent	terming	it	a	major	problem	in	their	daily	lives.	Over	half	the	respondents	felt	
corrupion	had	increased	at	the	naional	level	over	the	past	12	months,	while	a	quarter	felt	it	had	increased	in	their	daily	
lives.”).
2	 	Internaional	aid	worker	based	in	Kandahar,	Interview	#164,	November	6,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	
3	 	John	Holmes,	United	Naions	Under-Secretary-General	for	Humanitarian	Afairs	and	Emergency	Relief,	lagged	
the	impact	of	increasing	instability	in	Afghanistan	for	humanitarian	relief:		“Coming	on	top	of	chronic	vulnerability	and	
widespread	poverty,	insecurity	has	contributed	to	the	increase	in	acute	humanitarian	needs…	The	lack	of	security	in	
some	areas	also	prevents	humanitarian	aid	workers	from	carrying	out	their	life-saving	work.”	CBC	News,	“Afghan	civilian	
deaths	increased	by	40%	in	2008:	UN.”	
4	 	Afghan	execuive	oicial,	Interview	#166,	November	17,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
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Assistance Available from Military Actors 
Many civilians and community leaders expect some form of compensation, recognition or both from 
the international military forces when IMF is blamed for their loss.5 Although providing help to civilians 
is not traditionally a military role, ISAF member countries have increasingly developed mechanisms for 
providing medical support, broader community support and most notably, compensation or monetary 
support to those afected by their troops.  here is no standardized system across ISAF forces for providing 
compensation but when money was provided, and especially when this was combined with an apology, 
civilians expressed satisfaction and reduced anger toward IMF.  his combined approach seemed to be 
the best way to make amends for civilian harm. 
Nonetheless, delivery of military assistance was oten problematic. With no way to securely investigate 
claims in some provinces, and tribal politics and corruption making it diicult to rely on local leaders, 
IMF were sometimes unable to verify whether a claim was valid. One British oicial told us: “here are 
lots of fraudulent claims and we just don’t know when the wool is being pulled over our eyes, which is 
quite a lot. We don’t know who to trust.”6 
Given the hurdles civilians face in accessing international military, for any compensation or assistance 
5	 	See,	e.g.,	Ali,	Interview	#40a,	July	20,	20/08,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province;	Torjan,	Interview	#21,	July	2,	2008,	
Kunduz	city,	Kunduz	province.
6	 	Former	UK	civilian	oicial	staioned	with	UK	troops	in	Helmand	province,	Interview	#157,	October	15,	2008,	
Kabul	city;	Kabul	province.
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mechanisms to work, it is of particular importance that IMF take responsibility to proactively respond to 
incidents of harm and track the making of amends to civilians.  Many civilians told us they had not heard 
of the military programs, were unable to access the correct oicial or that it was too diicult to identify 
the nationality of the troops responsible for damages. More recent prompt and responsive payments 
made by international militaries suggest that while direct payment to civilians was not a widespread 
practice in the past, steps are being taken to remedy these problems in the future. 
here are legitimate concerns about the expansion of military-led relief and assistance, including that it 
might infringe on humanitarian space, cause further emotional trauma to civilian beneiciaries, threaten 
humanitarian workers by blurring the line between civilians and the military, and be a less eicient 
means of distributing aid. he aim of this chapter is to document what IMF are doing to compensate or 
otherwise assist conlict-afected civilians in Afghanistan and how these eforts are received. Whether 
these eforts conform to existing guidelines on appropriate IMF involvement in humanitarian relief, 
including the Oslo Guidelines, the 2008 UNAMA Civil-Military Guidelines and other civil-military 
guidance, are policy decisions beyond the scope of this report.7 
7	 	See,	e.g.,	Oice	of	the	Coordinator	of	Humanitarian	Afairs,	Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and 
Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – “Oslo Guidelines,” (Geneva:	United	Naions,	November	2007);	United	Naions	
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Guidelines for the Interacion and Coordinaion of Humanitarian Actors and Military 
Across Afghanistan, (Kabul:	United	Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	May	20,	2008).	
MILITARY MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
One of the most signiicant ways IMF help civilians is with medical treatment more advanced than 
they would have access to otherwise. his note from a US Marine working in the Garmsir District of 
Helmand is indicative of the type of stories CIVIC heard, both from troops and from civilians:
During the irst few weeks we had several instances when villagers would come 
to us for medical assistance; some just general sickness, one case of a child with 
burned legs caused [by] a family member who poured boiling water on the child 
and a case of a child that was playing with an old mine when it blew up.  Marines 
never hesitated to assist, and in many cases ensured the local citizen was taken to 
advanced medical care.  he child with the injury from the mine is one of those 
‘typical’ Marine responses; our Marines and Corpsman provided immediate life 
saving care... rushed the child to FOB Delhi, near Garmsir where UK doctors 
continued stabilizing him, then ISAF lew him to KAF where an MRI discovered 
a piece of shrapnel in the brain and a neurosurgeon removed it... 2 weeks later I 
was on a patrol and happened across the very village where this child was from 
and they were very glad to hear that he was recovering from his wounds.  You 
don’t read about this st[u]f, but it happens….
L.	Rene	Cote,	Civil	Afairs	Oicer,	24th	Marine	Expediionary	Unit,	July	17,	2008
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Medical Assistance
Medical treatment may be provided to civilians on military bases, in PRT compounds and on the ground 
(oten in battle situations) by military medics and in mobile medical centers that travel into remote 
provinces. It is universally of a higher quality than that of local Afghan hospitals.
Many PRTs and military bases also provide “walk-in” medical clinics where civilians who are injured 
or ill can visit and receive free help. For example, ISAF’s Regional Command West, led by Italy, has a 
clinic that provides medical care to civilians, whether injured due to conlict or otherwise. Regional 
Command West (RCWest) MedCap personnel – medical personnel traveling with military patrols – 
reportedly treated 8,564 civilians in the irst seven months of 2008, for conlict related injuries, as well 
as other non-combat related ailments. French troops stationed in Kabul occasionally hold open clinic 
days, make medical tours of neighborhoods in Kabul and refer civilians who have been injured, whether 
by international troops or otherwise, to the French hospital located on the ISAF base on Jalalabad Road 
in Kabul.8
Military medical treatment is provided regardless of whether the Taliban or the IMF was responsible 
for the civilians’ injuries. While medical assistance through military hospitals, clinics and mobile teams 
is not exclusive to conlict-afected civilians (assistance is provided whether someone was injured by 
farming machinery or in an air-strike), many war-afected civilians said it was the only help they received 
from the IMF, or anyone for that matter. 
Community Support
Broader community relief is provided to communities through military projects funded by, for example, 
ISAF’s Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund, and those undertaken by various PRTs. While these 
types of projects are sometimes used to help communities sufering from drought or other natural 
disasters, they are oten used to serve communities that have sufered directly from the war. In areas 
civilians cannot access due to security concerns, they may be the only help available to conlict-afected 
communities and families. 
NATO member states created the POHRF in late 2006 to provide help for civilians afected by ISAF 
operations. ISAF administers POHRF, and funds are drawn from voluntary donations of ISAF member 
countries. he fund is prohibited from providing individual compensation or other ex gratia payments. 
Instead, the fund’s mandate is to rebuild infrastructure damaged by ISAF troops or provide “in extremis”9 
emergency relief or other in-kind, non-monetary aid to civilians afected by ISAF operations.10 In 
practice, the use of POHRF oten diverges from this narrow category of repairing damage or in extremis 
relief. For example, in RCWest it was used to provide “drought relief ” for Gor province and to fund 
8	 	French	Military	CIMIC	Oicer,	Interview	#168,	May	18,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
9	 	In	conformity	with	the	UNAMA	Civil-Military	Guidelines,	and	other	civil-military	guidelines,	POHRF	is	intended	
to	be	used	only	for	“in	extremis”	situaions:	the	military	personnel	should	only	provide	support	to	humanitarian	
assistance	in	last	resort	life-saving	situaions	and	when	requested	by	the	Government	of	Afghanistan	or	the	humanitarian	
coordinator	in	quesion.	The	UNAMA	Civil-Military	Guidelines	elaborate	what	these	in	extremis	situaions	might	include	
when	“there	is	no	comparable	civilian	alternaive”;	the	assets	are	needed	to	meet	“urgent	humanitarian	needs”;	
and	to	the	greatest	extent	possible	“the	assets	are	used	only	for	indirect	assistance	or	infrastructure	support.”	James	
Brown,	Humanitarian	Afairs	oicer	UNAMA,	“Afghanistan	Speciic	Civil-Military	Guidelines,”	presentaion,	htp://www.
unamagroups.org/Civil-MilitaryGuidelinespresentaion.ppt,	slide	10.
10	 		Chief	Ops	CJ9	Cdr	Henk	Warnar,	POHRF Quarterly Oct-Dec and annual report 2007,	(Kabul:	NATO/ISAF,	January	
24,	2008),	1.	
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general mobile medical supplies to treat civilians, mostly for conditions not caused by ISAF operations.11 
While neither of these aid projects had much of a connection with ISAF operations, as required under 
POHRF guidelines, two ISAF oicers in RCWest said they try to use the program as lexibly as possible 
because they have no other discretionary funds.12 
Beyond POHRF, many PRTs have their own national funds to undertake similar community-wide 
projects, with some ISAF countries taking an active role in funding and developing community relief 
and aid projects through PRTs.13 For example, US troop commanders can draw on a fund called the US 
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) to implement “community impact” projects in their 
zones of operations.14  his includes everything from building schools and infrastructure to supporting 
governance to helping repair communities or providing the funds for “condolences” (described below) 
for conlict-afected communities. 
Similarly, Canadian troops can draw from the Canadian Commander’s Contingency Fund (CCF) to 
carry out “quick impact” projects in the community.15 he purpose of the quick impact projects is to 
elicit community support or information. Projects range from assisting local governance to repairing 
damaged infrastructure, or anything else requested by the community. Not surprisingly, in conlict-
prone areas like Kandahar, where the majority of Canadian troops are based, many of the requests are 
related to damages or recovery from the efects of conlict.  
Compensation & Ex Gratia Payments
here are no ISAF common funds for compensation, nor any ISAF policy on how member countries 
should provide amends to civilians harmed by their troops.16  Any procedures on providing compensation 
or other assistance are shaped by each country’s national laws, and oten the personal preferences of the 
commander involved.17 here are therefore signiicant variations across Afghanistan in compensation 
amounts given, eligibility and veriication regulations, and the way money is distributed – from blind 
bank transfers to multiple face-to-face encounters mediated by community elders.
Some ISAF countries have provisions within their national judicial mechanisms for victims to bring 
formal compensation and liability claims against troops accused of wrongdoing or negligence in 
Afghanistan. hrough the US 1942 Foreign Claims Act (10 U.S.C. § 2734-2736), foreign citizens can 
make a formal claim for compensation up to $100,000 for harm resulting from non-combat activities 
of US troops abroad, for example. he deinition of non-combat activity has been interpreted narrowly, 
however, and many escalation of force incidents or other cases of accidental harm to Afghan civilians 
11	 	Lt.	Alex	Mioi,	RC	West,	Interview	#134,	July	29,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.	
12	 	Ibid.
13	 	Other	countries	sill	refrain	from	such	assistance	because	they	believe	that	military	should	only	be	involved	in	
humanitarian	aid	or	relief	in	“in	extremis”	situaions.	See	infra	note	9	in	this	chapter,	33.
14	 	United	States	Department	of	Defense,	Financial Management Regulaion, Vol. 12, Chap. 27: Commanders’ 
Emergency Response Program (CERP),	(Washington,	D.C.:	United	States	Department	of	Defense,	August	2008),	270103,	
htp://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/fmr/12/12_27.pdf.
15	 	See,	e.g.	Jon	Baker,	“Quick	Impact	Projects:	Towards	a	‘Whole	of	Government’	Approach.”	Paterson Review,	Vol.	
8	(2007)	at	htp://www.diplomatonline.com/pdf_iles/npsia/2007-08/1_QIPs_Jon%20Baker_FINAL.pdf.	
16	 	It	should	be	noted	that	ISAF	oicials	someimes	refer	to	the	Post	Operaions	Humanitarian	Relief	Fund	(POHRF),	
as	a	compensaion	fund.	In	pracice,	POHRF	funds	are	not	intended	to	be	used	for	directly	compensaing	or	providing	ex	
graia	payments.	
17	 	See	infra	note	9	in	Chapter	1,	8.				
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by US forces would are not eligible.18 Under similar legislation, the UK court system granted this kind 
of formal compensation to at least one Iraqi boy paralyzed by the negligent discharge of a UK soldier’s 
weapon in Iraq. he Ministry of Defence (MoD) paid his family £2 million.19 
he vast majority of “compensation” payments, though, are not technically compensation. hey are 
voluntary, non-legally binding “ex gratia” (meaning ‘out of kindness’) payments for unintentional 
harm caused during combat operations. Nonetheless, civilians tend to interpret these as appropriate 
compensation and they are made available more quickly than formal compensation mechanisms, which 
would require lengthy judicial action outside of Afghanistan. A detailed description of the compensation 
18	 	For	example,	the	claim	of	a	father	of	a	12-year-old	boy	who	was	mistakenly	shot	while	playing	soccer	was	
denied	as	“loss	resuling	from	combat	operaions.”	Jon	Tracy,	Compensaing Civilian Casualies: “I am sorry for your loss, 
and wish you well in a free Iraq”,	(Washington,	D.C.:	CIVIC	and	Carr	Center	on	Human	Rights	Policy,	November	2008),	35.
19	 	BBC	News,	“Wounded	Iraqi	is	given	£2	million	payout,”	BBC News,	April	15,	2008,	htp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uk_news/7347691.stm	(noing	an	MoD	spokesman’s	statement	that	this	was	an	excepional	case	and	that	such	high	
compensaion	was	not	likely	to	be	repeated).
LEGAL LIABILITY CONCERNS
Despite the ex gratia nature of most military-given assistance in Afghanistan, the military is oten 
wary of providing assistance for fear such amends will be equated with an admission of legal liability, 
or even just public responsibility.i  Civilians harmed by AGE actions remain largely ineligible for many 
victim assistance programs, as international actors want to draw a distinction of who is responsible. 
One representative of an ISAF member country told CIVIC that troops from his country would not 
provide ex gratia payments to any civilian harmed by insurgent activities because civilians should 
see the diference between insurgents, who are willing to harm civilians deliberately, and IMF, who 
are willing to help when they harm.ii
Even where harm was done by IMF, if IMF investigations cannot certify that the person in question 
(or his/her survivors) was a civilian rather than a combatant, they will not provide assistance. 
In Afghanistan, though, this is oten diicult to determine. Investigators oten cannot get to the 
site before a body is buried – typically within 24 hours of the death – due to security concerns 
and general transportation issues. his means that in many cases, particularly cases of air-strikes, 
there are oten a large number of those killed who cannot be deinitively identiied as a civilian. 
Whereas estimates of civilian casualties by other independent monitors or humanitarian actors 
might ballpark civilian casualty numbers including some of those with ambiguous status, IMF will 
not, nor will they generally provide compensation or ex gratia payments for any of these ambiguous 
cases.  
Finally, one reason POHRF provides emergency relief and reconstruction assistance rather than 
compensation or ex gratia payments is an aversion by some NATO member states to be seen taking 
responsibility for civilian casualties, particularly those caused by other countries.iii
i						Pauline	Chaterly,	Directorate	of	Safety	and	Claims,	Ministry	of	Defence,	UK.	Interview	#128,	May	12,	2008,	Email	to	Sarah	Holewinski.
ii					Foreign	Embassy	oicial,	Interview	#140,	April	16,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
iii				ISAF	oicial,	Interview	#180,	February	2007,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.-Foreign Embassy oicial, 
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and ex gratia systems of individual ISAF member countries can be found in Annex II of this report. 
Ex gratia payments vary signiicantly both across IMF and within each military that maintains such 
funds: CIVIC heard of families receiving just hundreds of dollars to $20,000 plus a new car. Many 
countries provided approximately $1,000 to $2,000 for the loss of a family member. 
Countries operating in areas of frequent ighting tend to have designated funds and procedures for 
addressing civilian harm. he United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands and Australia, all with troops 
in the high-conlict provinces in the South, have designated funds for ex gratia payments, and maintain 
procedures for distributing them (although speciic amounts have not been disclosed).20  he United 
States military has two funds for giving ex gratia monetary payments to civilians for death, injury, or 
property loss: “solatia” and “condolences.”21  he funds for both are distributed at the discretion of the US 
commander involved, but amount ranges are set for certain circumstances, particularly those involving 
death (typically $2,000 - $2,500 for a death).22 
More detail on these ex gratia payments is provided in Annex II, but to give a few other examples, the 
United Kingdom gave an estimated £700,000 between April 2006 and October 2008;23 the US obligated 
more than $876,137 in condolence payments alone through troops stationed in Regional Command 
East between January 2006 and November 2008;24 Canadian troops paid approximately $243,000 from 
2005 to 2008.25 
Oicials said they oten have more discretion in the amounts given for property loss.26 Ex gratia payments 
for property loss depended highly on the value of the property and the surrounding situation. CIVIC 
was told of instances where civilians were given the value of property in excess of $5,000, and other cases 
where the amount given was as low as $100 for a lost home. 
Ex gratia funds for property loss are also oten used in tandem with community or stabilization funds 
to help rebuild or repair damage to conlict-afected communities. Following extensive operations in 
20	 	See	Annex	II.	
21	 	Solaia	or	condolence	payments	are	drawn	from	diferent	funding	sources	–	solaia	from	unit	funds;	
condolences	from	the	Commander’s	Emergency	Response	Program	–	and	were	created	at	diferent	periods	of	ime	
but	are	used	interchangeably	in	Afghanistan,	according	to	interviews	with	military	oicials.	Ashwin	Corraiyil,	US	Navy,	
Interview	#152,	August	23,	2008,	Bagram	Air	Base;	Travis	Hartman,	CJTF-101,	Human	Rights	Program,	US	Army,	Interview	
#151,	August	23,	2008,	Bagram	Air	Base.
22	 	Though	US	commanders	have	discreion,	there	are	other	procedural	steps	involved,	such	as	verifying	the	claim	
through	a	local	Judge	Advocate	(military	lawyer)	in	the	case	of	solaia.	For	more,	see	Annex	II,	US	condolence	and	solaia.	
23	 	Sean	Rayment,	“Britain	pays	out	700,000	in	compensaion	to	civilian	casualies	in	Afghanistan,”	The Telegraph, 
November	23,	2008,	htp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/3501081/Britain-pays-out-700000-
in-compensaion-to-civilian-casualies-in-Afghanistan.html.	
24	 	Afghan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspecive on Operaions of 
Pro-Government Forces,	51.	See	also,	Ashwin	Coraiyil,	US	Navy,	Interview	#179,	August	25,	2008,	Email	to	CIVIC	(noing	
signiicantly	higher	condolence	payments	as	of	August	2008	(45	payments	totaling	$190,000)	than	included	in	the	AIHRC	
sum	because	of	payments	following	ISAF	operaions	in	Garmsir,	Helmand,	outside	of	RCEast).
25	 Jef	Davis,		“Canada’s	Record	and	Compensaion	Policy	for	Afghan	Civilian	Casualies,”	Embassy,	September	10,	
2008,	htp://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=2008/september/10/civilian_casualies/.	
26	 Maj.	Jan	Vandekamp,	Task	Force	Uruzgan,	Interview	#155,	August	21,	2008,	Email	to	Erica	Gaston;	Former	
UK	civilian	oicial	staioned	with	UK	troops	in	Helmand	province,	Interview	#	157,	October	15,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	
province	(also	noing	more	discreion	in	distribuing	UK	funds	for	civilian	property	damage	or	acquisiion	than	with	
civilian	deaths	or	injuries).	
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the Garmsir district of Helmand in 
April and May 2008, US “condolences” 
and other military funds in excess of 
$400,000 were distributed to ofset 
individual property damage as well 
as community infrastructure damage. 
Troops coordinated their activities with 
other eforts funded by the United States 
Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) to 
give civilians maximum assistance.27 
One aid worker working with a displaced 
community in the central province of 
Wardak in May 2008 said that ater a US 
airstrike destroyed much livestock and 
other property of one family, US troops 
sent a “humanitarian action” team to 
provide food and other assistance.28
Where possible, troops in high-
conlict areas attempted to distribute 
ex gratia funds directly to the family, 
but this was not always possible out of 
concern for the security of the troops 
and the beneiciaries.29 One former 
British oicial who helped with civilian 
property claims while stationed in 
Helmand said, “It’s too dangerous [to 
investigate claims]. We can’t just knock 
on someone’s door to verify that it is 
his house. It would require an entire 
military operation just to go there. 
And if we did go to his house and 
investigate it would compromise his 
position within the community and 
possibly endanger his own life, just by 
being associated with us. …hat’s why this becomes such a long process.”30 To get around the problem, 
27	 	L.	Rene	Cote,	24th	Marine	Expediionary	Unit,	Interview	#136,	July	17,	2008,	Email	to	Erica	Gaston;		UK	civilian	
oicial	staioned	with	PRT	in	Lashkarga,	Interview	#127,	June	19,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	
28	 	Foreign	aid	worker,	Interview	#118,	June	29,	2008,	Email	to	Erica	Gaston.	
29	 	See,	e.g.,	Jason	Straziuso,	“Afghans	Threaten	US	Troops	Over	Civilian	Deaths,”	Associated Press,	January	31,	
2009, htp://www.iht.com/aricles/ap/2009/01/31/asia/AS-Afghan-Civilian-Deaths.php	(describing	a	face-to-face	
distribuion	of	monetary	payments,	together	with	public	apologies	to	civilians	harmed	by	US	Special	Forces	night	raids	in	
Laghman	province).	
30	 	Former	UK	civilian	oicial	staioned	with	UK	troops	in	Helmand	province,	Interview	#157,	October	15,	2008,	
Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
HOW MUCH COMPENSATION 
IS APPROPRIATE? 
When compensation is paid, the amount must be sui-
cient so as not to be insulting. According to human rights 
lawyer Lal Mohammad, “To ofer too small a sum lat 
out can be insulting. People who get $2,000 only and not 
even an apology, and no reason given [for the incident], 
will likely be insulted…. People say ‘hey just smile on 
us. his is not compensation.’”i Military oicials with 
discretion to decide the amount of ex gratia payments 
said it was diicult to determine appropriate amounts. 
As one German oicer involved in an ex gratia pay-
ment said, “he amount of money was diicult [to de-
termine]. We didn’t know [what was appropriate]. We 
really had no idea. Someone said $1,500 but we thought 
that might be very bad.”ii He ended up relying heavily on 
a local leader with whom the German military had close 
relations to negotiate an appropriate sum. “It would be 
good if all troops who might face such a situation have 
some instruction or some hint of what could be done. I 
might explain irst that money is not compensation but 
a symbol and must be presented as such. …he family 
didn’t ever say ‘we want money’. hey never referred to 
it at all and when we gave it, it was ‘We accept your 
gesture.”iii
i								Lal	Mohammad,	Afghanistan	Human	Rights	Organizaion,	Interview	#160,	
October	28,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
ii							Dr.	Peter	Ptassek,	Civilian	Leader,	German	PRT	based	in	Kunduz,	Interview	
#158	,	October	16,	2008,	Telephone	interview.
iii								Ibid.
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IMF sometimes distributes the money through local intermediaries, through government oicials, and 
at least in one case, through blind bank transfers.31 Embassy oicials said distributing IMF payments or 
support through local government intermediaries also met a secondary goal of reinforcing the legitimacy 
of the local Afghan government.32
In contrast to designated funds and procedures for delivering payments, ISAF troops in low-conlict 
areas tended to deal with civilian losses on a case-by-case basis and with a personalized approach. hey 
typically have no oicial policy on how to deal with a civilian casualty incident, no set amount that 
should be given and no designated funds. his is the case for German troops, which sometimes donated 
a few hundred euros of their own personal funds when a suicide attack or other incident led to civilian 
losses.33  When German troops unintentionally shot three civilians (a mother and her two children) at a 
checkpoint in August 2008, they wanted to give more and had to go through special procedures to ind 
$25,000 in the German army budget.34  he German PRT worked closely with local leaders to negotiate 
this sum of money so that it would be received as a gesture of good will. 35
Civilian Responses to Military Assistance
Within the category of military assistance, civilians were most positive about medical assistance, both 
because the medical treatment was highly valued and because medical assistance appeared to be more 
accessible than, for example, compensation or ex gratia mechanisms. he broader community assistance 
funds, like POHRF or CERP, were not mentioned by any civilians interviewed by CIVIC. he impact 
of compensation and ex gratia payments was decidedly mixed. Whether civilians received one of these 
forms of military assistance depended a lot on where they lived and which ISAF country was involved. 
As discussed below, the number of civilians who reported receiving such funds from IMF has been low 
in the past. However, where they did receive funds, it oten had signiicant impact and was meaningful 
for the family. 
Medical Assistance
Medical assistance seemed the most accessible of the three types of assistance. Civilians generally 
know that medical assistance is available and they take advantage of it.  In contrast to civilians who 
told us they were turned away when bringing compensation or ex gratia claims to PRTs or IMF bases, 
no civilian said they were turned away for medical treatment. Many conlict-afected civilians noted, 
with gratitude, receiving free, high-quality medical treatment (and sometimes medical transport) from 
IMF immediately ater an incident.36 Better than the Afghan medical system, this assistance was highly 
valued by many families; some said they did not even care or want further compensation or apologies 
31	 	Foreign	Embassy	oicial,	Interview	#165,	November	11,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province;		Foreign	Embassy	
oicial,	Interview	#182,	August	20,	2008,	Telephone	interview.	Some	IMF	member	countries	may	also	prefer	to	distribute	
aid	through	Afghan	Government	oicials	in	order	to	reinforce	the	importance	and	legiimacy	of	local	government,	which	
are	oten	weakest	in	the	least	secure	provinces.	
32	 	Foreign	Embassy	oicial,	Interview	#149,	April	16,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province;	Foreign	Embassy	oicial,	
Interview	#148,	August	6,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	
33	 	French	Military	Civil-Miltary	Co-operaion	Oicer,	Interview	#168,	May	18,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
34	 	The	$25,000	included	$20,000	in	cash	payments	and	$5,000	for	a	new	car.
35	 	Dr.	Peter	Ptassek,	Civilian	Leader,	German	PRT	based	in	Kunduz,	Interview	#	158,	October	16,	2008,	Telephone	
interview.	
36	 	See,	e.g.,	Shah		family,	Interview	#16,	May	19,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province;	Ulam,	Interview	#18,	June	29,	
2008,	Bagram	area,	Kabul	province;	Said,	Interview	#20,	June	29,	2008,	Bagram	area,	Kabul	province;	Masood,		Interview	
#7,	February	21,	2008,	Gardez	city,	Pakia	province.
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so long as their family members received necessary treatment.37 We spoke to the mother of one boy who 
received emergency treatment at Bagram Air Base following a suicide attack near Kabul. he son was in 
the military hospital for forty days and was given a special boot cast.38 he mother told CIVIC: “When 
I saw the bicycle [that my son was riding at the time of the suicide attack] I never felt that my son could 
have survived. We were so fortunate, and to have the Americans at Bagram help us.”39 
Community Assistance
At the other end of the spectrum, broader community assistance from the military such as that provided 
by POHRF was not speciically noted by any civilians. his does not necessarily mean the assistance 
provided through these funds is not important, although it does suggest the assistance is not recognized 
by civilians as a speciic response to their sufering due to conlict. A few civilians vaguely referred to 
the larger contribution international troops were making. hese comments were more common in the 
Eastern region controlled by US troops, which have the most funding for these types of projects and the 
most discretion to do them. Overall, the POHRF fund is very small; as of October 2008 only €2.8million 
had been donated and of that only €1.7million have been used since its inception in late 2006.40 his lack 
of funding would also contribute to civilians being unaware of POHRF.
Compensation and Ex Gratia Payments
In many ways, this is the most important category of military assistance (if not of any assistance) because 
many Afghans have an expectation of receiving compensation from those they blame for their losses.41 
CIVIC’s interviews suggest that past mechanisms providing compensation or ex gratia payments were 
not transparent, known or negotiable by the average Afghan.  However, there are signs that troops across 
ISAF are making eforts to be more responsive. 
Within Afghan society, loss of family members, property or other harms are oten settled through 
informal dispute systems that require those responsible to make an apology and provide a sum as a 
token of recognition for the loss. Perhaps for this reason, many civilians said they wanted or expected 
direct compensation from the military, but few were satisied.  
here is evidence that troops in low-conlict provinces reached a greater proportion of families afected 
by their troop activities, perhaps because they had more time to devote to each case and fewer security 
restrictions in doing so. More generally, though, the record for providing prompt, consistent, and regular 
compensation and ex gratia payments is low.  Of the 143 interviews CIVIC conducted, only 14 had 
received payments from IMF. his may in part relect the period of time covered by CIVIC’s interviews: 
CIVIC interviewed civilians who sufered losses in conlict as far back as 2001 and at that point in time, 
few ISAF militaries had any ex gratia funds established. As time has passed, ISAF countries have been 
working to establish better means of responding to civilian losses, but they do not necessarily trace back 
to address the harm done to civilians in years past.
Part of the problem has been that many ISAF military units expected Afghans to come to them when 
37	 	Family	of	Bilal	Interview	#13,	June	18,	2008,	Gardez	city,	Pakia	province.	
38	 	Aziz,	Interview	#14,	May	3,	2008,	Bagram	area,	Kabul	province.
39	 	Wahida,	Interview	#14,	May	3,	2008,	Bagram	area,	Kabul	province.
40	 	Media	Operaions	Centre,	“NATO-ISAF	Post-Operaions	Humanitarian	Relief	Fund	(POHRF)	October	2008,”	North	
Atlanic	Treaty	Organizaion,	October	2008,	3.	
41	 	See,	e.g.,	Afghanistan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspecive on 
Operaions of Pro-Government Forces,	53.
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an incident occurred. But Afghan communities in many areas did not know these funds were available. 
One man who lost two brothers in an IMF airstrike in Shindand province did not ask foreign military 
for assistance because: “We didn’t know where we could go to do this.”42
Even if civilians knew they could request assistance, security concerns oten prevented them from 
reaching out to IMF.  Many were simply afraid to approach a PRT, the most obvious place to turn 
for help, for fear of being shot.43 Others feared Taliban retribution if they received help from IMF. In 
February 2008 the Canadian PRT in Kandahar gave wheat, oil and blankets to 300 families. Researchers 
from the AIHRC discovered that the Taliban immediately targeted this aid and “arrived to grab the 
donations ater the distribution trucks let, igniting a dispute with the villagers. he insurgents settled 
the argument by kidnapping eight men, holding them for 70 hours, and only releasing them when they 
came under ire by foreign troops.”44 
hose Afghans who did go to the military authorities to make a claim faced an uphill battle getting it 
heard. While many IMF say they have an “open door” to civilians,45 Afghans oten found it barricaded 
by sandbags, razor wire and hostile, heavily-armed soldiers. Many said they are turned away without 
their grievances heard. As one Afghan staf of an international organization described: “People don’t 
even try [to get compensation from the military] because the military are so hard to get to. You cannot 
get through or you can’t even get to the gate sometimes.”46 One man, whose brother was shot in ISAF 
crossire following a suicide attack on a military convoy, described how he “went to the airport to see the 
PRT twenty times but nobody was ever available to see me.”47
Another problem civilians faced was identifying the nationality of the troops involved in a particular 
incident. he military compensation and ex gratia mechanisms were not coordinated among troop-
contributing countries, so Afghans had to identify which troops were responsible for their losses and 
bring the claim directly to that foreign actor to be heard. Overlapping and oten ambiguous force 
structures made it impossible for civilians harmed by IMF to know which troop-contributing country 
was responsible, much less which unit. Troops involved in any given incident are not necessarily stationed 
at the local PRT or military base. he presence of mobile Special Forces units and other paramilitary or 
intelligence units make identiication even more diicult.48 
CIVIC was contacted by two elders from Wardak province in November 2008. hey said their property 
was destroyed in US air-strikes and others in their village were injured. he local PRT questioned them 
and took down information about property lost and they also traveled to Kabul to present their case to 
ISAF headquarters. Ater six months they had heard nothing.49 he local PRT in Wardak province is run 
by Turkish troops but given the timing and location of the incident, US forces likely caused the harm. 
hese men took initiative, presented their case to authorities, but brought their claims – through no 
42	 	Masood,	Interview	#42b,	July	29,	2008,	Shindand	district,	Herat	province.		
43	 	Afghan	aid	worker	involved	in	vicim	support,	Interview	#132,	June	30,	2008,	Telephone	interview.
44	 	Graeme	Smith,	“Daily	atacks	against	civilian	targets	on	rise,”	The Globe and Mail,	October	7,	2008,	htp://www.
theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20081007.wafghancivilians07/BNStory/Afghanistan.
45	 	Lt.	Alex	Mioi,	RC	West,	Interview	#134,	July	29,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.	
46	 	Afghan	aid	worker	involved	in	vicim	support,	Interview	#132,	June	30,	2008,	Telephone	interview.
47	 	Bakhiar,	Interview	#23,	July	2,	2008,	Kunduz	city,	Kunduz	province.
48	 	See,	e.g.,	Jason	Straziuso,	“Afghans	Threaten	US	Troops	Over	Civilian	Deaths,”		(noing	a	night	raid	carried	out	by	
US	Special	Forces	who	were	not	based	in	the	targeted	area	in	Laghman	province).	
49	 	Haji	Sharif,	Interview	#97,	November	8,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	
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fault of their own – to the wrong forces. It is unlikely their claims were ever forwarded to the appropriate 
troops. 
Continual troop rotation compounds these obstacles. In some cases, military units take the records 
of civilian claims with them when rotating out of an area. One man and his brother shot by ISAF 
troops following a miscommunication at a checkpoint approached their local PRT three times to ask 
for assistance with their medical bills and invoice for car damage. An individual at the PRT would tell 
him, “We will come ater three days, 
ater four days.”50 But no one came to 
see him. hen, when a new rotation of 
troops arrived, the PRT told him that 
they had no record of the event: “At one 
point they [the PRT] gave me a written 
statement telling me they would help, 
but then they took the statement back. 
hen a new rotation came in and I 
visited them also and they did not 
know anything about it.”51
Even if all these hurdles could be 
overcome, not all troop-contributing 
countries have the funds or the 
discretion to grant payment. As one aid 
worker in Kandahar put it: “If you’re 
injured under a Romanian lag, then 
you’re unlikely to get compensation, 
but if you’re injured by a Canadian or 
an American soldier then you’ve got a 
chance at least to get something.” One 
oicial at the German PRT explained to 
CIVIC: “It was diicult for us to ind the 
money [to help a war-afected family] 
because we don’t have a proper fund 
for casualties. … It would be good if all 
troops who might face such a situation 
have some instruction or hint as to what could be done.”52 Other ISAF countries have the funds, but the 
procedures for verifying and approving a claim are so cumbersome that the funds are rarely used. 
Not all of these critiques apply to all ISAF member countries, of course. he case described above where 
German troops sought out those harmed by their troops and worked with the community to provide 
adequate apologies and compensation is an example of how some troops are pro-active in making 
amends. Providing pro-active follow-up and individualized attention is no doubt more diicult in 
50	 	Torjan,	Interview	#21,	July	2,	2008,	Kunduz	city,	Kunduz	province.
51	 	Ibid.
52	 	Dr.	Peter	Ptassek,	Civilian	Leader,	German	PRT	based	in	Kunduz,	Interview	#	158,	October	16,	2008,	Telephone	
interview.
Mohddin’s	ankles,	showing	scars	from	when	he	was	shot	by	ISAF	troops	
while	riding	on	his	motorbike.	 	The	winter	snow	and	darkness	made	 it	
impossible	for	him	to	see	the	laser	ISAF	troops	used	as	a	signal	to	halt.		The	
troops	provided	him	with	immediate	irst	aid	at	the	ime	of	the	incident	
but	no	ex	graia	payments	were	made.		Mohddin	is	an	ACAP	beneiciary.	
See	his	comments	on	page	12.	 Photo courtesy of Rebecca Agule.
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conlict-prone provinces. Just as these positive eforts by some militaries create gains for all militaries 
working in Afghanistan (given that civilians do not know the diference between the various troops), 
militaries that do not take such proactive steps create negative feelings toward all international forces.
Recent steps taken, at least on the part of the largest troop-contributor, the United States, suggest that 
troops may be taking more seriously measures to make ex gratia payments more accessible and responsive. 
Following a summer in which US troops in particular received heavy criticism for high civilian losses in 
several airstrikes, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Afghanistan in September and ordered 
US forces to pay compensation and make amends promptly in the future airstrikes. In November 2008, 
US airstrikes resulted in the death of 37 civilians and 35 injured in Kandahar province. In contrast to US 
foot-dragging in admitting and addressing civilian losses in summer 2008,53 following the November 
2008 incident representatives quickly recognized the civilians losses and sent representatives to Kandahar 
within a week to meet with families and ensure compensation was paid.54 
US responses to three US Special Forces Operations (a January 7 nighttime raid in Laghman province; 
a January 19 raid in Kapisa province; and a second Laghman raid on January 23) that reportedly killed 
50 people, mostly civilians, suggest the response to the November 2008 airstrike was not an isolated 
incident. On January 27, 2009, US troops distributed $40,000 to the relatives of the deceased in Kapisa 
province – $2,500 for each death, $500 to two wounded civilians, and an additional $2,500 in property 
damage. US commanders then traveled to Laghman province approximately a week ater the second 
incident to ofer public apologies and assess how much should be provided in condolences and solatia 
payments. According to an Associated Press account of the meeting, US oicials expressed apologies 
and told those from the community, “We know these raids have let many widows and orphans, and we 
want your advice on how we should help them.”55
On the same day the $40,000 in payment were being made in Afghanistan US Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates testiied before the Senate Armed Services committee stated in a response to a question 
asked by Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC): 
[P]articularly in terms of how we respond when there are civilian casualties, 
I think we’ve been too bureaucratic about it.  Our approach has been in 
a way classically American, which is let’s ind out all the facts, and then 
we’ll decide what to do. But in the meantime we have lost the strategic 
communications war.  And so the guidance that I provided is that our irst 
step should be if civilian casualties were incurred in this operation, we 
deeply regret it, and you have our apologies. And if appropriate, we will 
make amends.  hen we will go and investigate, and then we will igure 
out whether we need to do more or frankly, if – if we paid somebody 
we shouldn’t have. Frankly, I think that that’s an acceptable cost.  But we 
need to get the balance right in this in terms of how we interact with the 
Afghan people, or we will lose.56 
53	 	Afghan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspecive on Operaions of 
Pro-Government Forces in Afghanistan, 19.
54	 	M.	Karim	Faiez	and	Laura	King,	“U.S.	acknowledges	37	Afghan	civilians	killed	in	ighing	last	week.”	Los Angeles 
Times,	November	9.	2008,	htp://aricles.laimes.com/2008/nov/09/world/fg-afghan9.
55	 	Jason	Straziuso,	“Afghans	Threaten	US	Troops	Over	Civilian	Deaths”,	Associated Press,	January	31,	2009,	htp://
news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090131/ap_on_re_as/as_afghan_civilian_deaths.
56	 	Robert	M.	Gates,	Tesimony	before	the	Senate	Armed	Services	Commitee,	January	27,	2009.
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ISAF has also taken measures to be more responsive to incidents of civilian harm. In the summer of 2008, 
ISAF headquarters established a “civilian casualty tracking cell” to enable the oice to better monitor the 
harms civilians were sufering.57 
he recent prompt and efective payments may relect a changed priority for compensation and public 
condolences. 
Overall, with the exception of military medical assistance, civilians did not have a positive response of 
the way compensation and ex gratia mechanisms worked on the ground.  Some of the issues in delivering 
monetary payments were due to factors beyond the control of IMF, particularly security. However, a 
great number of the problems are due to programmatic and implementation laws. In lieu of overhauling 
the whole system, better coordination between IMF and greater proactive eforts following any known 
or potential civilian loss might reduce some of the civilian access problems. Were IMF more proactive 
and coordinated, false claims might be easier to spot and aid might be distributed in a more timely 
manner, as civilians sufering losses need and prefer.   
Redress 
In addition to tangible assistance, many civilians said they wanted some form or recognition, apology, 
or justice done. Much of the harm done to civilians in Afghanistan is not considered a violation of 
international law governing warfare (though there have been cases of intentional violence committed 
by troops against civilians). For most of the civilians with whom CIVIC spoke, a formal trial or tribunal 
that would provide redress is not likely.  Yet as the AIHRC has noted, “he fact that […] perceived abuses 
or ofenses are typically met without recognition, apology, or compensation has led to increased anger 
and resentment toward [Pro-Government Forces, including IMF]”.58 Whether civilians felt a sense of 
resolution or recognition from those responsible for their loss may also be relevant for broader strategic 
discussions by the military of “winning hearts and minds,” although such efects are not discussed 
speciically in this report. 
Providing civilians with this sense of closure or resolution is not easily done, and CIVIC’s interviews 
suggest there is no “one-size-its-all.” However, one of the more signiicant indings from our interviews 
was that civilian satisfaction was far more dependent on who gave the assistance than on the type or 
amount provided. When, for example, responsibility for the loss was attributed to the IMF and apologies, 
inancial aid or livelihood assistance came directly from the IMF, civilians were more likely to feel redress 
had been provided. 
Requests for Redress and Acknowledgement by IMF
What exactly redress implies for Afghan civilians varies on a case-by-case basis. Overall, we discovered 
that civilians wanted three main things: 1) a formal trial of soldiers responsible for deaths or injuries; 
2) an apology or other gestures of respect; and/or 3) compensation. Sometimes a combination of these 
forms of redress worked; other times, civilians identiied one of the factors as critical.
Lal Mohammad is a human rights lawyer who has represented many would-be claimants against IMF. 
57	 	James	Brown,	Humanitarian	Afairs	oicer	UNAMA,	“Brieing	for	the	Kabul	Civil-Military	Working	Group,”	
presentaion,	January	29,	2009.
58	 	Afghan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspecive on Operaions of 
Pro-Government Forces in Afghanistan,	53.	
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He told CIVIC that most civilians who come to him wanted formal judicial resolution: “Most people 
want justice irst of all. hey want the killer brought to trial. Second they want sentences for any crime. 
hird, they want compensation for their families.”59 CIVIC found similar sentiments in some, but not 
most, of those interviewed. One father lost his brother, his daughter was almost lethally wounded and 
his home severely destroyed in a 2001 aerial bombardment by US troops in Herat province. He said he 
wanted justice done: “All I would ask from international forces is to please introduce me to the person 
who bombarded the area and give 
that person to us. We don’t want 
any assistance. We want them to be 
punished.”60 
Another man from Kandahar had 
not been directly harmed but had 
watched many of those around him 
sufer the consequences of war: 
“he soldiers should be put on trial 
and money should be paid,” he said. 
“When a few of them are put on 
trial, then others will pay attention 
and not make mistakes. And if they 
are destroying people’s property, 
then they should have to provide 
compensation.”61 
Beyond requests for formal justice, 
more civilians told us that some 
sense of redress could be achieved 
through a simple apology from those 
responsible for their loss. Time and 
again, CIVIC interviewees noted 
whether troops had apologized to 
them, publicly or personally.  According to Lal Mohammad: “In our culture, apologizing is very important. 
If I go and apologize, sometimes the person will forgive without any compensation at all.”62 Anja de Beer, 
the head of ACBAR said similarly, “he [IMF] are not straightforward on a human level to say that 
they’re sorry and in Afghanistan that is important. … Compensation is important in Afghanistan – yes, 
that is the whole justice system. But showing you’re sorry is also important.”63  hose CIVIC interviewed 
said the same. In addition, civilians also told us that they appreciated basic gestures of respect – such as 
stopping a convoy when a civilian has been injured – even when a formal apology was not provided.64
59	 	Lal	Mohammad,	Afghanistan	Human	Rights	Organizaion,	Interview	#160,	October	28,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	
province.	It	should	be	noted	that	those	seeking	a	lawyer	are	likely	a	group	that	self-selects	for	seeking	judicial	redress.
60	 	Ziaudin,	Interview	#43,	July	22,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.	
61	 	Gol,	Interview	#89,	July	21,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.
62	 	Lal	Mohammad,	Afghanistan	Human	Rights	Organizaion,	Interview	#160,	October	28,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	
province.	
63	 	Anja	de	Beer,	Director,	Agency	Coordinaing	Body	for	Afghan	Relief,	Interview	#144,	August	4,	2008,	Kabul	city,	
Kabul	province.	
64	 		Aziz,	Interview	#14,	May	3,	2008,	Bagram	area,	Kabul	province;	Omar,	Interview	#39,	July	8,	2008,	Jalalabad	
Alefuddin	 and	 his	 father.	 	 Alefuddin	 was	 paralyzed	 in	 the	 bombing	 and	
subsequent	escalaion	of	force	incident	in	Jalalabad	on	March	4,	2007.	ISAF	
paid	for	the	boy’s	treatment	in	both	Jalalabad	and	Kabul.		His	father’s	enire	
salary	goes	to	his	son’s	care	and	thus	ACAP	stepped	forward	to	further	assist	
the	family	in	expanding	their	spare	parts	shop.		Photo courtesy of Rebecca 
Agule.
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Even still, a number of our interviewees said they would not be satisied with a simple apology without 
an accompanying form of compensation as a gesture of respect for the loss.  Within many tribes in 
Afghanistan, the payment of “blood money” is a traditional way to extinguish a debt of honor and a way 
to resolve conlicts. he payment of compensation is therefore important and generally well-accepted 
within the Afghan population.
Impact of Attempts (or Failure) to Provide Redress
Whether civilians felt a sense of recognition or redress from any of the military assistance discussed in 
this chapter depended on the type of aid, the tact used to distribute the aid, and, of course, the individual 
emotional response of the family involved. he security situation in the relevant province also seemed 
to be a factor, although more research should be conducted to determine how much of an inluence this 
had on civilian attitudes. 
Civilians who felt there was no substitute for a formal trial and punishment of those soldiers involved 
were, not surprisingly, let unsatisied by assistance of any kind. According to the Military Technical 
Agreement governing the conduct and obligations of international troops in Afghanistan, ISAF troops 
are not required to pay any compensation, and are immune from the Afghan judicial system for activities 
carried out within the scope of their military duties.65  Any disciplinary measures or judicial resolutions 
are to be handled in the national courts of their own country; while such investigations do occur, the 
results are generally not made public and certainly not in local languages.66 
Medical assistance from the military, while greatly appreciated, was not generally viewed as a form 
of amends or redress.  When asking for an apology or that justice be done, civilians never mentioned 
medical assistance. hose receiving medical assistance seemed to have more positive impressions of 
IMF, but it is not clear they felt their losses were recognized and addressed absent an apology or payment 
of compensation. 
Given desires for an apology and the cultural tradition of compensation to settle conlicts, ex gratia 
or compensation payments given by IMF are more likely to provide a sense of resolution and redress. 
However, because only 14 of those interviewed had actually received compensation, it is diicult to 
judge whether this would hold true for the larger population without further research.  
here were a few civilians who received a direct apology and compensation from the military; they told 
CIVIC they forgave the troops involved. One man whose 10-year-old son was killed in a road accident 
with US troops noted that the troops involved stopped, took care of the body, and then apologized 
personally to him and his family with visible grief over the accident: “he guy [who was driving] was 
crying. He was shouting. he guy was totally unhappy about this incident. … And sometimes accidents 
are happening on these roads but the drivers leave without waiting to ind out what happened. When 
they hit someone they leave the area. We were happy that the soldiers waited for us. hey had respect for 
the dead.”67 he father said he forgave the troops because he could tell it was an accident and that they 
intended no harm. In addition, the troops gave him $1,000 and he later received assistance through the 
USAID ACAP program, discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
city,	Nangarhar	province.
65	 	Internaional	Security	Assistance	Force	and	Interim	Administraion	of	Afghanistan,	“Military	Technical	
Agreement,”	December	5,	2001,	htp://www.operaions.mod.uk/isafmta.pdf.
66	 	For	a	larger	discussion	on	the	impact	of	this	on	civilian	percepions,	see	Afghan	Independent	Human	Rights	
Commission,	From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspecive on Operaions of Pro-Government Forces in Afghanistan,	47-50.	
67	 	Omar,	Interview	#39,	July	8,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Nangarhar	province.
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In contrast, the lack of an apology can lead to signiicant resentment. One man mistakenly shot by US 
troops in an escalation of force incident at a checkpoint in June 2003 said he had a “lot of anger” toward 
US troops: “he Americans ofered me no reason for what they did, they ofered me no help, no excuse… 
not even an apology.”68  In July 2008, a US airstrike killed 37 civilians, mostly women and children, who 
were part of a wedding party in a remote district of Nangarhar province. Coalition authorities issued a 
statement from Bagram Air Base immediately ater the attack denying that any civilians had been killed. 
Although independent investigations later conirmed that civilians were killed, no subsequent retraction 
or apology was forthcoming from US authorities. CIVIC interviewed several men from that community 
shortly ater the attack: “In our culture if something happens to someone – they are killed, their property 
is destroyed – you come and apologize. ISAF should have come to the village and guaranteed that it 
would never happen again.”69  
Of course, there are no irm rules for whether an individual, or even a community, will accept payments 
as a gesture of condolence and redress. Much depends on the attitude of the individual concerned. 
CIVIC spoke with a widower in the eastern province of Jalalabad whose wife was shot in the head by a 
stray bullet as the family was driving through Jalalabad city. He said he was ofered $4,00070 through the 
Governor of Nangarhar but he originally did not want to take the money: “$4,000 cannot cover the space 
of my wife. I don’t need that money.”71 Another widower, whose wife was shot in the same incident while 
working in the family’s ields, said the same: “Human beings are very important. You cannot compensate 
as far as losing a wife.”72  
Although the two widowers had the same initial desire to reject ofers of compensation, their feelings 
ater receiving assistance were diferent. Both men accepted the money and were also assisted later by 
ACAP.  Both said the money helped cover funeral and other expenses for their children, and that the 
later ACAP assistance helped them substantially improve their businesses and quality of life. One of the 
men said he was not angry at IMF anymore.73 he other said he was still upset and that if the IMF did 
not stop “killing innocent civilians,” they could leave.74
Anja de Beer of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Development (ACBAR) noted that while 
IMF should “always try to get in touch [with the family afected] and show that they are sincerely sorry… 
It becomes more diicult to have that come across as sincere if incidents keep happening.”75
According to CIVIC’s preliminary research, a combination of apology, a gesture of respect by those 
perceived as responsible for the loss and monetary payment appears most likely to satisfy desires for 
redress. While this approach will not work for every individual – and particularly not for those civilians 
68	 	Torjan,	Interview	#21,	July	2,	2008,	Kunduz	city,	Kunduz	province	
69	 	Jamahon,	Interview	#40b,	July	20,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	
70	 	Nasar,	Interview	#57,	August	3,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Nangarhar	province.	CIVIC	learned	that	many	of	the	
afected	families	for	this	paricular	incident	received	both	solaia	payments	from	the	US	military,	and	payments	from	
President	Karzai’s	Code	99	Fund.	Since	both	funds	provide	approximately	$2,000,	it	is	likely	that	this	is	how	the	widower	
was	able	to	receive	$4,000.		
71	 	Nasar,	Interview	#57,	August	3,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Nangarhar	province.
72	 	Ahmed,	Interview	#55,	August	5,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Nangarhar	province.
73	 	Nasar,	Interview	#57,	August	3,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Nangarhar	province.
74	 	Ahmed,	Interview	#55,	August	5,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Nangarhar	province.
75	 	Anja	de	Beer,	Director,	Agency	Coordinaing	Body	for	Afghan	Relief,	Interview	#144,	August,	4,	2008,	Kabul	city,	
Kabul	province.
CIVIC 47
who demand nothing less than a full investigation and trial, providing an apology and compensation 
does appear to alleviate the anger and resentment of many Afghan civilians. 
Conclusion
For foreign troops in Afghanistan to make amends to civilians unintentionally harmed is a balancing act. 
Limitations on military-driven assistance or relief, as envisioned in the Oslo Guidelines, the UNAMA 
Civil-Military guidelines and other documents, are important to preserve the humanitarian space in 
Afghanistan, ensure protection for civilians, and ensure the most eicient use of resources.   Yet the 
assistance or gestures civilians told CIVIC they most valued from IMF are relatively uncontroversial. 
Medical assistance, particularly in the immediate wake of an incident or in areas where better help is 
not available, were spoken of more positively than any other type of aid CIVIC investigated. Civilians 
also oten (though not always) found value in public apologies and recognition, especially when coupled 
with a gesture of condolence such as ex gratia payments.1 Meanwhile, the military’s broader community 
assistance eforts, sometimes used for “hearts and minds” and most at odds with the humanitarian space, 
was not largely noted by civilians.  
he indings in this chapter suggest that IMF can make an important contribution to the emotional and 
physical recovery of conlict-afected civilians, while still respecting the civil-military divide. Despite 
mechanisms for providing public recognition and compensation being weak to non-existent in the 
past, there are encouraging signs that most ISAF member countries have recognized the importance of 
these measures and are improving.  Within the course of CIVIC’s year-long research, the attitudes and 
responsiveness of IMF shited.  International forces of one member country who, upon a irst visit in early 
2008, had never dealt with a civilian casualty and compensation issue, had by the end of the year been 
confronted with such a situation and found an appropriate way to deal with it.  he eforts of countries 
like the United States, with high troop contributions, to be more responsive in admitting civilian losses 
and getting aid or funds to afected civilians promptly are a further step in the right direction. 
 
1	 	Far	from	being	contenious	among	humanitarian	actors,	many	humanitarian	organizaions	have	made	calls	
for	IMF	to	provide	compensaion,	or	at	a	minimum	apologies	to	civilians	harmed	by	their	aciviies.	See,	e.g.,	Agency	
Coordinaing	Body	for	Afghan	Relief,	Protecing Afghan Civilians: Statement on the Conduct of Military Operaions, 
(Kabul:	Agency	Coordinaing	Body	for	Afghan	Relief,	June	19,	2007)	3.	
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Nazar’s	father.		Nazar’s	face	was	badly	burned	when	the	taxi	he	was	driving	was	shot	between	
Torcham	to	Jalalabad.		They	received	nothing	from	the	Afghan	Government	or	IMF.		ACAP	granted	
them	assistance	in	the	form	of	catle,	which	provided	both	food	for	the	children	and	goods	to	sell	
for	income.		Photo courtesy of Rebecca Agule.
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CHAPTER 4:
Assistance from Foreign Government Actors
Although the civilian counterparts of IMF countries provide much foreign aid and development 
assistance in Afghanistan, CIVIC was only able to identify one program funded by the civilian branch 
of an IMF country that speciically addressed conlict-afected civilians: the Afghan Civilian Assistance 
Program (ACAP).2  Created by the United States Congress and implemented on the ground by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), ACAP’s mission is to seek out and provide tailored, 
in-kind assistance to civilians harmed by IMF as far back as 2001. In iscal year 2008, the US Congress 
appropriated US$20 million for the program. 
ACAP aid packages require several meetings with a family and are tailored to meet their speciic 
circumstances. his family-speciic approach results in a far longer processing time and delayed delivery 
of assistance as a side efect. As a civilian organization, ACAP faces signiicant problems accessing 
civilians in some areas because of security concerns. Nonetheless, ACAP is unique among the programs 
surveyed in that it was the only organization with a mandate to seek out and help all civilians speciically 
impacted by IMF and provide them equal and sustainable treatment. Many of CIVIC’s interview subjects 
were located with the help of ACAP, so the vast majority of those CIVIC interviewed received assistance 
2	 	Someimes	ex	graia	payments	are	distributed	by	civilian	oicials	based	at	an	IMF	Forward	Operaing	Base	(FOB)	
or	PRT;	nonetheless,	the	funds	are	provided	by	the	Defense	ministries	or	agencies	of	that	country.	
CIVIC50
from ACAP.3 Still, civilians repeatedly noted that ACAP was the only program that followed through on 
promises of assistance. 
In this sense, ACAP was one of the few programs that met civilians’ expectations of assistance following 
harm. Also, because ACAP provides sustainable livelihood assistance rather than cash handouts, those 
who received aid frequently told us that their quality of life and economic situations were signiicantly 
improved; some now had better livelihood opportunities than existed prior to the incident. ACAP 
assistance was far less successful than military aid in providing civilians with a sense of redress, primarily 
because most of those receiving aid did not connect ACAP with those responsible for their losses. 
Assistance Available through the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP)
ACAP was oicially established by the US Congress in 2006, though its work had been operating under 
another similar mechanism several years before.  It is funded by USAID and implemented by IOM. 
According to the legislation, ACAP is “designed to assist Afghan families and communities that have 
sufered losses as a result of the military operations against the Taliban and insurgents.”4
Civilians eligible to receive ACAP assistance include families sufering losses due to US military activities 
since 2001 or any ISAF activities since 2006. his includes losses indirectly resulting from IMF actions, 
including suicide bombings or other attacks against IMF or support personnel for IMF.5  Eligible losses 
include the death of a family or community member, the severe injury of a family breadwinner, signiicant 
property loss and the loss of important community buildings or infrastructure. 
Staf from ACAP, usually Afghans, work individually with families to help them rebuild.  Aid packages 
include any or all of the following: developing a local business, supplementing an existing business, 
providing literacy or vocational training for children or adults in the family, rebuilding or constructing 
shelter, medical treatment or other in-kind assistance. 
Civilian Responses to ACAP Assistance
ACAP assistance varies depending on the needs of the afected civilians.  he primary form is livelihood 
3	 	As	noted	in	the	Methodology	secion,	CIVIC	has	in	the	past	advocated	that	the	US	Congress,	and	other	
countries,	support	ACAP.	This	chapter	is	not	intended	as	an	advocacy	tool;	however,	it	does	relect	the	reasons	CIVIC	
coninues	to	advocate	on	behalf	of	this	program.	
4	 	United	States	Agency	for	Internaional	Development	and	Internaional	Organizaion	for	Migraion,	“Eligibility	
Criteria	for	ACAP	Beneiciaries,”	[Date	not	available],	Copy	on	ile	with	CIVIC.
5	 	Ibid.
Nowadays, if you get a piece of bread from someone, you are happy. 
So this [ACAP] aid is very important. It will help to expand my 
supplies and to expand business. It will bring positive efects to my 
family. With this business, we can pay of the loans that we owe to 
people. hank you.
Mirweiss,	Interview	#41,	July	21,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.
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development. Families with an existing business may be given material to help expand it – from 
infrastructure improvement to additional stock for grocery stores, wood-selling businesses or other 
trades. Families with no regular business or income may be given material or the training necessary to 
develop one, such as materials for a grocery store, carpentry or mechanical training for sons of a family, 
or vocational training in cosmetics or sewing for women of the family. 
CIVIC interviewed a widow, Bibi Merra, who was training to become a beauty technician. She lost 
her husband and her home in a US air-strike in 2001 and, seven years later, was still forced to rely on 
relatives to provide food and shelter for her children. She told us: “Ater I inish I will set up a beauty 
salon for this business. … At irst I could not imagine 
that I could learn to do it. … [Now] I hope to have my 
own independent income and when I do this will take 
the pressure of of me a little bit.”6 
Timor, a taxi driver from the eastern province of Jalalabad, 
told CIVIC his taxi was destroyed by stray bullets in an 
escalation of force incident with US troops. He described 
how: “When I was discharged from hospital, I was 
totally recovered but I didn’t have any way to support 
my family now that my taxi had been destroyed. ACAP 
recently helped me purchase a vehicle. ACAP has also 
given assistance for the education of my three sons and 
ive daughters.”7
For many families, this livelihood assistance was not only 
a source of income but a way to reintegrate the disabled 
into their communities. Social stigmas in Afghanistan 
oten prevent the disabled from receiving an education, 
inding employment or otherwise carrying on a normal 
life.8 CIVIC spoke with one young man whose arm was 
incapacitated when a suicide blast exploded near him in the central market of Gardez city. ACAP helped 
pay for an apprenticeship as a mechanic and purchased the equipment he needed to start his business. 
He pointed to his partner, who was his teacher during the apprenticeship, “I was a student of this man 
[senior mechanic] but now I am better than he is!”9  
CIVIC also visited the tailoring shop of Khaled whose leg was amputated when he was 14 years old due 
to a cluster munition explosion. ACAP helped Khaled receive training as a tailor and to set up a shop for 
himself. Seven years ater he lost his leg, his tailoring business was thriving and he could barely keep up 
6	 	Bibi	Merra,	Interview	#48,	July	30,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.	
7	 	Timor,	Interview	#35,	July	7,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Nangarhar	province.
8	 	See	Ministry	of	Labor,	Social	Afairs,	Martyrs	and	Disabled,	Afghanistan	Naional	Disability	Acion	Plan	2008-
2011.	See	infra	Chapter	2	“Social	Sigma	and	the	Denial	of	Educaion.”	Other	disability-focused	non-governmental	organi-
zaions	or	internaional	organizaions,	including	the	Internaional	Commitee	for	the	Red	Cross	and	the	Swedish	Com-
mitee	for	Afghanistan,	have	microinance	and	other	livelihood	support	programs	for	the	disabled,	not	limited	to	those	
whose	disabiliies	are	due	to	conlict.	Fiona	Gall,	Swedish	Commitee	for	Afghanistan,	Interview	#130,		June	25,	2008,	
Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.		
9	 	Khalil,	Interview	#6,	February	20,	2008,	Gardez	city,	Pakia	province.	
GETTING AROUND 
CORRUPTION
No organization in Afghanistan can 
completely avoid issues with corruption. 
ACAP avoids some of the worst pitfalls 
by hiring its own carefully vetted, local, 
independent staf and giving in-kind 
gits directly to individual families. 
hey also regularly check that the aid 
is being properly implemented. he 
ACAP staf, however, still emphasized 
their constant battle to ensure that 
all applications made by community 
members were valid. his sometimes 
led to delays in aid delivery.
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with the work.10 
Most families also receive standard educational “kits” for children of the family. Literacy training for 
women or children in the family is strongly encouraged. Women of the family are oten given sewing 
kits, and where possible, found employment as seamstresses or other work appropriate to women. 
In some cases ACAP funds medical expenses or travel to/from medical treatment centers. Given the high 
poverty levels in Afghanistan, the cost of transport to the place where treatment is provided can prevent 
civilians from receiving critical or continuing 
treatment. In one of its more exceptional cases, 
ACAP assisted Bilal to go to India for eye 
treatment ater shrapnel wounds from a US 
air-strike in 2002 destroyed his vision.11 he 
treatment had not restored his eyesight as of the 
date of this report, but the operation provided 
him with a chance and he and his family were 
extremely grateful. hey said they had written 
countless letters to the US Embassy, military 
authorities and other agencies for years, and 
while everyone promised to help them, ACAP 
was the only one that actually did.12
Bilal’s comments are common. Other civilians 
told CIVIC that while they had asked for help 
– sometimes for years – from IMF, from the 
government or from other agencies, ACAP 
staf were the only ones to follow through on 
promises of aid. hree friends in Kandahar 
city lost their carpentry businesses and nearly 
their lives to a suicide bomb. he men said they 
received no help from anyone despite extensive 
publicity surrounding the bombing. When 
ACAP identiied them, medical expenses had 
put them into such dire economic straits they 
could barely feed their families. 
ACAP also provides community assistance, usually when an incident has afected the whole community 
or when security concerns prevent individual assistance. For example, a February 2002 US air-strike 
caused heavy losses for one village in southeastern Paktia province, but because of its remote location 
and high security risks, little aid or assistance by any humanitarian or government agency had been 
possible for years.13 In 2008, ACAP was able to help the community by providing them the materials and 
cash-for-work payments to build a retaining wall.
10	 	Khaled,	Interview	#49,	July	20,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.	
11	 	Some	expenses	of	the	trip	and	treatment	were	born	by	Bilal’s	family.	ACAP	only	contributed	and	helped	enable	
the	visa	process.	Brother	of	Bilal,	Interview	#13,	June	18,	2008,	Gardez	city,	Pakia	province.	
12	 	Ibid.	
13	 	Interview	with	ACAP	staf	and	beneiciaries,	Interview	#12,	June	18,	2008,	Gardez	city,	Pakia	province.
WHAT CIVILIANS WANT
While every beneiciary seemed happy to receive 
ACAP aid, not every beneiciary agreed that in-
kind assistance was the best way to make amends 
for the harm caused by the current conlict. “WFP 
distributed one bag of wheat for each family at 
that time; other agencies distributed blankets 
and some kitchen kits. From that time we did 
not receive any assistance from any national 
or international organization. One year ago 
ACAP discovered us. I am still not happy though 
because we wanted IOM to give us money, not a 
business.”i  Other aid workers, though, suggested 
that in-kind aid was more sustainable and 
helped civilians more in the longer term. One 
USAID oicial who worked on stabilization and 
immediate relief programming alongside US 
troops said in-kind aid was also less likely to be 
taken away from insurgents than money.ii
i							Ziaduin,	Interview	#43,	July	29,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
ii					USAID	mobile	stabilizaion	oicer,	Interview	#	171,	July	4,	2008,	
Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	
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Where ACAP assistance was delivered at approximately the same time as IMF ex gratia payments or 
Code 99 payments from the Afghan Government (described in the next chapter), civilians were far more 
likely to recover from their losses.14 ACAP assistance usually requires families to provide some input – 
for example, jointly splitting expenses with ACAP for an investment in a new business. A cash inlux 
from IMF or the Afghan government together with ACAP’s livelihood assistance tended to help families 
pay their share of these costs, or enabled them to pay for immediate funeral or medical expenses and 
still have money to contribute toward making the most of their ACAP assistance, according to ACAP 
staf.15 
While most beneiciaries seemed happy with the ACAP assistance, implementing this type of program 
has its challenges. 
Months can pass between when a family is identiied and when they actually receive aid because identifying 
eligible civilians is exceedingly diicult and any resulting aid package takes time to personalize.  Further, 
while distinct funding from the US Congress for ACAP did not come through until 2006, civilians are 
eligible for assistance based on losses sufered as far back as 2001. hese beneiciaries will receive aid ive 
or more years ater the harm occurred.  ACAP staf has a goal of turning around new cases within eight 
weeks, but the backlog of cases combined with new cases has made that goal impossible thus far. 
As violence escalates across Afghanistan, identifying civilians and delivering assistance becomes that 
much more diicult. As Masood Karakhoil, a humanitarian working in conlict-prone areas said: “he 
situation now… the frequency and intensity of attacks makes it diicult to ind families [who are eligible] 
and makes it even more diicult to ind out how to help them, what they need.”16 Reports by the media or 
other independent monitors are an important way for ACAP to verify claims but, as security conditions 
have crumbled, journalists and other monitors are able to access fewer areas to verify the number of 
civilians harmed.17 
Poor information sharing between independent monitoring agencies, the military and ACAP made 
it even more diicult for ACAP staf to overcome these issues. ACAP staf regularly reaches out to 
representatives of international organizations, military actors or others with knowledge of civilian losses, 
but such eforts did not always result in the type of information sharing or referrals that might help it 
identify and verify the eligibility of civilians more quickly. While energy is put into catching military 
commanders early in their rotation and information about ACAP is included in some brieings, no 
military representative CIVIC spoke to knew about the program.  Afghan Government agencies most 
related to ACAP’s mission or the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission Kabul oice 
also said they did not know about the program.  Several UN oicials knew of the program but said 
they did not generally refer cases.  A UN worker said he stopped referring cases to ACAP because the 
response time was so slow.18
Security issues also get in the way of quick and efective implementation.  USAID programming and 
other US government-funded programs have long been targeted by insurgents, so ACAP staf are not 
14	 	Catherine	Northing,	ACAP	oicial,	Interview	#101,	February	21,	2008,	Gardez	city,	Pakia	province.	
15	 	Ibid.
16	 	Masood	Karokhail,	Tribal	Liaison	Council,	Interview	#163,	November	4,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
17	 	UN	World	Food	Program	Area	Oicer,	Interview	#181,	July	21,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.	 
18	 	UNAMA	Human	Rights	Oicer,	Interview	#129,	July	15,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
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required to tell beneiciaries where their funding comes from, particularly where doing so might put 
anyone involved at risk. Now representatives of the international community in many areas across 
Afghanistan and regardless of their source of funding are being targeted. Afghan staf of ACAP face 
signiicant risk going into high-conlict areas to deliver assistance. One ACAP worker described how he 
was threatened by the Taliban in Kandahar: 
I was taking a survey and I had cameras up there. he Taliban surrounded 
us with guns pointed at us. We were captured and we were taken to an 
area with 70 other Taliban, and fortunately I met someone up there who I 
knew and that person saved me.19 
Another staf member described how the Taliban intimidated civilians eligible to receive ACAP assistance: 
“he Taliban said [to civilians] that if you take any money from the UN, then we will take it from you. 
Any international organization’s money will be spent on your burial.”20
 
Security is a bigger hurdle for ACAP relative to other programs given its goal of providing individually 
tailored aid. Each tailored package may require three or more visits to complete assistance, and each visit 
could be delayed by days, weeks or even months due to persistent security threats in an area, setting the 
whole process back. A civilian we spoke with described how these security problems undermined his 
ACAP assistance. An ACAP loan to rebuild his home was to be provided in four installments, with a 
progress check between payments.  However, the requirement that an observer had to check the building 
process before installments were paid proved impossible in the security environment: 
he [ACAP] observer said that we would have to guarantee his safety if 
he went up to see the land. But we cannot guarantee his safety. We cannot 
guarantee our own safety, so how can we guarantee the safety of the 
people coming to assess? he Taliban will see us bringing the observer 
and they will say that we are helping the government and bringing spies 
to the area.21 
he family’s inability to protect the observer means they have not received their second installment and 
cannot continue building their home. 
While ACAP is working to solve some of the issues noted above (for example, hiring more staf in order 
to speed delivery time), it should be noted that many of the problems ACAP encountered were due to 
the diiculty of implementing a program like this in Afghanistan rather than any weak or faulty program 
design. Many challenges are interrelated, making it diicult to address any one concern without creating 
other problems. For example, eforts to minimize the time it takes to deliver aid may involve trade-ofs 
in minimizing corruption, ensuring equal and consistent aid distribution, or a level of personalization 
in approach.
While conlict-afected civilians may prefer more timely, plentiful and personalized support, or monetary 
compensation rather than in-kind aid, program administrators and donors must balance these concerns 
19	 	Kandahar	ACAP	Field	Worker,	Interview	#172,	July	21,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province. 
20	 	Ibid.	
21	 	Alif,	Interview	#92a,	July	22,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.	
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against institutional priorities of ensuring that aid is accountable, fairly and consistently delivered, and 
reasonably priced. he fact that ACAP has been able to overcome so many of problems inherent to the 
current environment of Afghanistan and reach so many civilians in such a specialized way is in itself a 
huge achievement and certainly a step above many of the other civilian assistance programs discussed 
in this report. 
Redress
Sustainable livelihood assistance through ACAP seemed extremely valuable to beneiciaries given the 
economic pressures in Afghanistan. he assistance, however, did not always meet the emotional desire of 
civilians for redress. Although the program was funded by the US Congress in part to make amends (and 
promote strategic “hearts and minds” concerns), beneiciaries did not oten view the assistance as a source 
of atonement or condolence for their losses and did not report a sense of redress or reconciliation. 
One father beneiting from ACAP appeared to attain a sense of redress from the assistance:
In the irst few weeks or so, we were frustrated that [my son] got killed… 
Ater a few months we received assistance, [and] then we thought this 
shows that they care and that they didn’t do it intentionally now that they 
are helping our family. If we hadn’t received this assistance, we would have 
still been frustrated. It would have let our family hopeless. … So now we 
don’t hold anything personal against the international forces.22 
Not everyone shared his sense of resolution and many civilians had mixed responses on whether the 
assistance was received as an expression of concern by the warring party. For example, one man lost his 
father and niece in an escalation of force incident in Jalalabad. he shots from US forces let approximately 
1,250 holes in his car. He said the assistance he received from ACAP was a big help but he still wanted 
accountability in a formal trial: “We want justice,” he said. “Yes, there [have] been a lot of changes to my 
life since ACAP – but I still want justice.”23
One man’s son was killed by US troops in a road accident. He not only received ACAP assistance for a new 
business but also a direct apology and monetary support from the troops involved. When interviewed, 
he seemed to have found greater peace with the military payment and apology than with the ACAP 
assistance. He was enthusiastic in talking about the ACAP assistance he had received. But when he told 
CIVIC how the troops apologized directly to him and seemed genuinely remorseful, he said he forgave 
them and did not associate the same sentiments with the later ACAP assistance:  
“We appreciate the assistance. Nobody can give the price of the dead. 
Nobody can replace what you have lost. But this assistance that ACAP 
provided to us … we are very happy with it.” 24 
Although civilians may suspect the US Government as the source of ACAP aid, the lack of formal 
acknowledgement might undercut the potential for civilians to believe that those who harmed them 
22	 	Habibullah,	Interview	#82,		July	20,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.
23	 	Rahim,	Interview	#56,	August	5,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Jalalabad	province.	
24	 	Omar,	Interview	#39,	July	8,	2008,	Jalalabad	city,	Jalalabad	province.	
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were attempting to take responsibility or ofer support. Yet even in provinces where civilians did know 
that ACAP was supported by the US Government, it did not always provide a sense of redress.  One 
civilian whose family was killed by a suicide bomb targeting IMF said he knew the money came from 
USAID but that it “didn’t change my impression.”25  
It may be that unless the apology or form of amends comes from a military actor, it is not received as a 
gesture of respect. As mentioned previously, ACAP assistance oten comes long ater the actual incident. 
he gap in time between the incident and the response may also help explain why the assistance is oten 
not considered a direct response to the harm done. 
While few civilians talked about ACAP assistance as a means of redress, many said they enjoyed a better 
quality of life, and as a result seemed more positive about their situation and less resentful about the 
incident. Further research should be done into how this type of assistance might contribute to a sense 
of redress. 
Conclusion
ACAP is one of the more successful victim assistance programs and the only one funded by a foreign 
government speciically for conlict-afected civilians. he tailored aid seemed better able to meet 
the variety of needs from which conlict-afected families sufer than other approaches like military 
compensation. In many cases, ACAP assistance was extremely efective in helping victims of conlict 
rebuild their lives and recover from an incident. 
Challenges include the slow delivery of aid and access limitations due to increasing and geographically 
shiting insecurity. More funding and coordination might address some of these problems.  Greater 
funding for staf (in the works already, according to ACAP staf) might speed delivery times, and greater 
coordination with other victim support or ex gratia mechanisms might help get around security hurdles 
to identifying beneiciaries. 
25	 	Shah	family,	Interview	#16,	May	19,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
CIVIC 57
CHAPTER 5:
Assistance from Afghan Government
The Afghan Government has three mechanisms for providing support to those who have lost a 
family member or who have themselves been injured in conlict: President Karzai’s “Code 99” Fund 
and two funds administered by the Afghan Ministry of Labor, Social Afairs, Martyrs, and the Disabled 
(MoLSAMD) called the Fund for Martyrs and the Fund for the Disabled.
Afghan Government agencies are also involved in broader government services – from medical care 
overseen by the Ministry of Health to reconstruction and development projects overseen by the Ministry 
of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. While important, full descriptions of the ways these ministries 
provide broad support to conlict-afected civilians and communities is beyond the focus of this report.
Overall Afghan Government programs hold promise.  hey are administered by Afghan Government 
agents, and so were more accessible than IMF payments for example. Civilians are generally not afraid to 
approach Afghan Government oices to register a complaint or claim. hey also may be more accessible 
than ACAP assistance; whereas most civilians did not necessarily know about ACAP until they received it, 
many thought to ile a complaint or inquire with local authorities about assistance. In addition, following 
a well-publicized incident with multiple civilian casualties, the Afghan Government was proactive in 
providing immediate assistance and did not wait for civilians to ile claims.
All three programs, however, are plagued by implementation issues and seriously undermined by 
corruption. Available assistance was oten not distributed uniformly. At least with the Martyrs and 
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Disabled funds, few eligible civilians seemed to have even heard of the funds, much less received beneits 
from them. 
Assistance Available through the Afghan Government
President Karzai’s “Code 99” Fund
he “Code 99” Fund is an executive fund created and administered by the oice of Afghan President 
Hamid Karzai. he Code 99 Fund gives 100,000 afghanis (approximately $2,000) to families who have 
lost a family member in the ongoing 
conlict and 50,000 afghanis to 
individuals injured (approximately 
$1,000). In addition, where someone 
is killed, a member of the family is 
sent on the Haj to Mecca.  Civilians 
injured in any aspect of the ongoing 
conlict – whether due to activities 
of IMF, insurgent attacks or Afghan 
forces activities – are in theory eligible 
for this assistance, though in practice 
neither CIVIC nor other monitoring 
agencies have heard of the fund being 
given to civilians or their families 
harmed by Afghan force activities 
alone.1  
An Afghan oicial reported that 
more than 270 million afghanis 
(approximately $5 million US dollars) 
was distributed from the fund in 
2007,2 far more than the reported ex 
gratia payments of all ISAF countries 
combined. 
Civilians eligible for the program may 
be nominated either by local governors 
or oicials, by Ministers of Parliament 
or the Afghan President himself.3 Ater 
the names of those eligible are sent to the President’s oice, the information is fact-checked with other 
local government oices and then payments may be distributed either directly to the families or via the 
oicials who originally nominated them.
1	 	Civilian	casualty	invesigators,	Afghanistan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	Interview	#173,	November	
8,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
2	 	Afghan	execuive	oicial,	Interview	#166,	November	17,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	
3	 	Wasil	Noor	Mohammad,	Ministry	of	Labor	Social	Afairs,	Marytrs	and	the	Disabled,	Interview	#120,	May	6,	
2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province. 
TALIBAN PROGRAMS
A common question CIVIC receives is whether the 
Taliban or other insurgent groups are also providing 
compensation. At least one government oicial told CIVIC 
that he knew of Taliban actively compensating civilians 
300,000 afghanis (approximately $6,000) in some areas in 
the south.i  A few civilians interviewed whose losses stem 
from initial US bombings in 2001 – while the Taliban was 
still arguably in power – said they received immediate 
medical treatment, and typically food and non-food aid, 
immediately ater an incident.ii  With increasing reports 
of the Taliban establishing “shadow governments” in some 
districts and provinces, with the capacity to mediate and 
resolve claims and disputes (including those not related 
to combat) it seems likely that there are other instances of 
compensation, though the practice is not widespread and 
seems at odds with Taliban tactics like using civilians as 
human shields and suicide bombings in civilian areas.iii
i							Afghan	execuive	oicial,	Interview	#166,	November	17,	2008,	Kabul	city,	
Kabul	province.		
ii						See,	e.g.,	Bibi	Merra,	Interview	#48,	July	30,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province;	
Ziaudin,	Interview	#43,	July	29,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
iii			James	Joyner,	“Taliban	Shadow	Government	Nears	Kabul,”	Atlanic	Council	of	
the	United	States,	December	28,	2008,	htps://www.acus.org/new_atlanicist/
taliban-shadow-government-nears-kabul.				
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MoLSAMD Fund for Martyrs and Fund for the Disabled
he Fund for Martyrs and the Fund for the Disabled are administered by he Ministry of Social Afairs, 
Labor, Martyrs, and Disabled. he Martyrs Fund is similar to a pension system. hose killed due to 
conlict in Afghanistan, either before or ater the 2001 invasion or due to ERW,4 are considered “martyrs” 
and their survivors are eligible for monthly inancial assistance. Dependents of martyrs receive a monthly 
allowance of 500 afghanis (approximately $10 per dependent). Support is tied to each child and ends 
when a male child turns 18 or when a female child marries.5 To be eligible for payment, families or 
individuals must be certiied by a local court. 
he MoLSAMD Fund for the Disabled has the same structure and purpose as the Martyrs Fund and is 
intended as a form of social solidarity with those injured during conlict.  Injured individuals receive 250 
to 500 afghanis a month ($5 to $10), depending on whether they were certiied by health oicials as 50 
or 100 percent disabled. 
As of January 2009, there were 118,000 “martyrs” and 74,000 disabled persons registered with MoLSAMD 
and receiving payments.6
Civilian Responses to Afghan Government Assistance
he level of accessibility and efectiveness of Afghan Government aid strongly depends on which oice 
– either Karzai’s oice or MoLSAMD – is administering the claim. Code 99 payments are signiicantly 
more common and are sometimes distributed more quickly than any other type of assistance discussed 
in this report. In contrast, only one civilian CIVIC interviewed had received support through the Martyrs 
and Disabled funds, and only one other civilian knew they existed. Corruption and coordination were 
signiicant problems for both programs. 
here are no irm statistics on the total number of payments received by civilians from the Code 99 
Fund... In the interviews CIVIC conducted, twice as many civilians reported receiving government 
assistance through the Code 99 Fund than reported receiving compensation or payment from IMF. 
Other humanitarian and international observers conirmed that they heard of the Code 99 funds being 
distributed far more frequently than IMF compensation.7 Many civilians also seemed aware of this 
program. Local and provincial government oicials, typically the ones to nominate civilians for the 
Fund, have an incentive to actively identify civilians eligible for this assistance because in doing so they 
can provide services to their communities. 
Implementation was not uniform. Civilians and aid workers across diferent regions conirmed that 
Code 99 payments were more likely to be distributed ater large-scale rather than smaller, isolated 
incidents. Payments have, for example, been made ater most air-strikes that caused signiicant civilian 
losses: forty-seven Code 99 payments were given when a US air-strike in Nangarhar province on July 6, 
4	 	See	infra	Chapter	1	“Landmines	and	Other	Explosive	Remnants	of	War”,	13.	
5	 	Wasil	Noor	Mohammad,	Ministry	of	Labor	Social	Afairs,	Marytrs	and	the	Disabled,	Interview	#120,	May	6,	
2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
6	 	Wasil	Noor	Mohammad,	Ministry	of	Labor	Social	Afairs,	Marytrs	and	the	Disabled,	Interview	#183,	January	20,	
2009,	Email	to	CIVIC.
7	 	Civilian	casualty	invesigators,	Afghanistan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	Interview	#173,	November	
8,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
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2008 killed 47 and wounded another 10 civilians in a wedding party.8 Code 99 has also been used ater 
many of the more high-proile suicide bomb incidents. By comparison, CIVIC rarely heard of Code 99 
payments going to civilians injured or killed in isolated incidents, like escalations of force at checkpoints 
or incidents involving only Afghan national security forces. 
As with direct payments from IMF, money civilians received from the Code 99 Fund was helpful in 
paying for immediate expenses (funeral expenses are oten quite large in Afghanistan) or immediate 
medical bills.  Afghan oicials said this was one of the 
Fund’s original intentions: “he initiative was initially 
taken from the President himself. When someone dies 
their family can’t even aford the process of grieving 
in many cases.”9 However, many civilians afected 
by the conlict said that ater these initial expenses 
were paid, there was not much let for anything else, 
particularly if a breadwinner was killed. 
Corruption stymies many good intentions in 
Afghanistan and these government programs are not 
immune. Some civilians told CIVIC they thought 
the allocation and distribution of Code 99 funds was skewed by corruption. One man from Kandahar 
province lost six members of his family in an IMF airstrike; another 24 members of his community, 
some extended family members, were killed in the strike and subsequent ighting.  He said: 
We were promised by the government that we would be given 50,000 
afghanis for the injured and 100,000 afghanis for the dead from the 
government fund. We went to the provincial government and a member 
of the provincial council went to Karzai and Karzai promised the money. 
But it has never come.10
 He thought the money was taken by local leaders: 
here are a few tribes who rule the government and they are in 
administration. Some tribes don’t have representation in the administration 
and the money will go directly to those with connections.11 
hose involved in administering the Code 99 Fund said they were aware of this issue and were working 
on various types of distribution mechanisms, sometimes bypassing local leaders, to allow them to get 
around this problem in some areas.12 
Corruption is a likely factor behind the poor implementation of the Martyrs and Disabled program. In 
contrast to the number of civilians and communities who knew of the Code 99 Fund, only two of the 143 
8	 	Marin	Paience,	“Concern	over	Afghan	civilian	casualies,”	BBC News,	July	11,	2008,	htp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/south_asia/7502137.stm.
9	 	Afghan	execuive	oicial,	Interview	#166,	November	17,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
10	 	Haji,	Interview	#92b,	July	22,	2008,	Kandahar	city,	Kandahar	province.	
11	 	Ibid.
12	 	Afghan	execuive	oicial,	Interview	#166,	November	17,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	
“Compensation or development projects 
that target an area but that don’t reach 
the people they are intended for… because 
of corrupt elders or oicials… raise even 
more resentment.”
Afghan	aid	and	development	worker,	Interview	#163c,	
November	4,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	
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war victims CIVIC interviewed knew of the Martyrs 
and Disabled funds and only one had succeeded 
in receiving payment (see adjacent box “A Success 
Story”).13 Any person eligible for the Martyrs and 
Disabled unds must be certiied through the judiciary, 
which is notoriously corrupt.14 For this reason alone, 
civilians may have been discouraged from trying to 
register for the funds; the costly bribes and judicial 
fees involved in getting certiied can outweigh the 
funds’ beneits.   
he fact that so few civilians mentioned these funds 
suggests that the implementation problems stem from 
more than just corruption. As the Afghan National 
Development Strategy has noted regarding the 
Martyrs Fund: “he beneit is paid quarterly through 
banks that are usually situated in the provincial 
capitals. Given this, many poor and eligible Martyrs 
families and disabled are discouraged to apply as the transportation costs exceed the beneits.”15 Prior 
to 2006 the Ministry had not kept up with recent injuries and losses. It does not seek out civilians but 
rather expects those eligible to initiate the process of certiication through local authorities and courts. 
As a result, many beneiciaries on the MoLSAMD Martyrs and Disabled lists were from decades-old 
conlicts. 
MoLSAMD itself has recognized these issues and as a result, in 2006, the Ministry put a stop to all 
payments while it conducted a census to update its records. A database was introduced in 2007 and 
payments to all registered individuals or families recommenced in fall 2008.16 While updating the current 
roster is an improvement, it was not clear from interviews with MoLSAMD what steps would be taken in 
the future to make sure the database is kept current. At the date of this report, other accessibility issues 
have not been addressed to CIVIC’s knowledge. 
One way in which MoLSAMD could improve their records of eligible civilians would be to work with 
other programs that continuously identify and track conlict-afected civilians. It would make particular 
sense if various government oices that record civilian casualties had a centralized database. he Code 
99 Fund keeps a database, and appears to efectively and quickly identify potential beneiciaries, but 
President’s Karzai’s oice and MoLSAMD Martyrs and Disabled funds administrators do not share 
information about civilian victims of conlict. 
13	 	Neurallah,	Interview	#22,	July	2,	2008,	Kunduz	city,	Kunduz	province.	See	also,	Hasan,	Interview	#32,	July	2,	
2008,	Kunduz	city,	Kunduz	province	(saying	he	had	applied	for	the	Disabled	Fund	through	the	local	governor’s	oice	in	
Kunduz	province	but	had	never	heard	anything	back).	
14	 	Sayed	Yaqub	Ibrahimi	and	Jean	MacKenzie,	“Fears	over	‘Islamicisaion’	of	Afghan	judiciary,	Insitute of War and 
Peace Reporing,	October	9,	2008,	htp://www.humanrights-geneva.info/Fears-over-Islamicisaion-of,3588.
15	 	Government	of	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Afghanistan,	Afghanistan Naional Development Strategy, Social 
Protecion Sector Strategy,	13.
16	 	Wasil	Noor	Mohammad,	Ministry	of	Labor	Social	Afairs,	Marytrs	and	the	Disabled,	Interview	#120,	May	6,	
2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province;	Wasil	Noor	Mohammad,	Ministry	of	Labor	Social	Afairs,	Marytrs	and	the	Disabled,	
Interview	#183,	January	20,	2009,	Email	to	CIVIC.
A SUCCESS STORY
Ater he lost his leg due to shrapnel wounds 
from a US air-strike in northern Kunduz 
province in 2001, Neurallah applied irst 
to the governor’s oice for MoLSAMD 
disabled funds. he degree of disability 
he sufered then had to be certiied at the 
hospital, and his inal application and 
disability status was then veriied by a 
mullah and inally referred to MoLSAMD 
in 2003/
Neurallah,	Interview	#22,	July	2,	2008,	Kunduz	city,	Kunduz	
province.	
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Redress 
Payments made to civilians by the Afghan Government did not appear to provide a signiicant feeling 
of redress. he lack of emotional impact of these payments is due, no doubt, to civilians not linking 
gestures made by the Afghan government to the harm caused them by AGE or international military 
forces. CIVIC found no cases where Code 99 or Martyrs Fund payments were made to civilians sufering 
harm due solely to Afghan forces. 
Even though the amount given is the same, civilians did not appear to receive similar emotional redress 
when Code 99 payments (as opposed to IMF ex gratia funds) were ofered as a result of IMF activities. 
Following the July wedding party bombing, the Afghan Government gave each family that had lost a 
loved one 100,000 afghanis (approximately $2,000) from the Code 99 Fund. hose CIVIC interviewed 
said unless it came from those forces who attacked them, it did not make any diference.  One civilian 
afected by the wedding party bombing told us: “If President Karzai pays all of Afghanistan for one killed 
person, it is not enough. … People believe ISAF just pours salt in the wound, because of how they acted. 
People are angry because no representative from ISAF came to see what happened, or to apologize that 
it was a mistake.”17 
Unfortunately, because the Afghan Government is eager to be seen as addressing civilian harm and they 
have fewer obstacles to verifying civilian losses quickly,18 Code 99 payments are oten given in place of IMF 
ex gratia payments following large airstrikes or attacks.  CIVIC and other observers noted that where the 
Afghan Government has provided Code 99 payments, IMF will not provide ex gratia payments, perhaps 
in an attempt to prevent double compensation.19  For example, following two incidents in summer 2008 
in which OEF airstrikes resulted in tens of civilian casualties and much public attention (the July 6, 
2008 air-strike in the district of Haskamina, Nangarhar province; the August 22, 2008 strike against the 
Azizabad district of Herat), Code 99 payments were distributed to civilians.20 While it is possible that 
IMF involved would have provided ex gratia payments in these cases, the Code 99 payments were given 
out within days or weeks of the incident, before investigations by the IMF involved had even taken place 
much less before any ex gratia payments could be processed. 
his speed of delivery is good from a humanitarian point of view (quick aid is helpful for families 
dealing with medical and funeral expenses), but it creates unintended side efects in terms of redress. 
he US representatives involved in these incidents decided not to provide monetary payments because 
the civilians had already received Code 99 funds and instead decided to channel their aid into schools 
and other construction projects in the area. 21 But according to the BBC’s Ian Pannell, who organized 
a meeting between Azizabad local leaders and US representatives in Kabul, who gave the civilians the 
payments mattered as much as whether any money was given or not.22  Pannell said that although, “the 
US had met with families and ofered sympathies… the families felt more was required and concepts of 
justice (and blood money), in the eyes of those bereaved were not met.”23 
17	 	Ali,	Interview	#40a,	July	20,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
18	 	See	Chapter	3	box	“Legal	Liability	Concerns.”	35.
19	 	See	also	Afghanistan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission,	From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspecive on the 
Operaions of Pro-Government Forces,	13,	17	and	49.
20	 	Burhanullah	Shinwari,	Deputy	speaker	of	the	Afghan	Senate,	Interview	#174,	July	17,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	
province	(noing	his	role	as	head	of	the	Afghan	Government	invesigaion	into	the	incident	and	subsequent	payments);	
BBC	News,	“US	Killed	47	Afghan	Civilians,”	BBC News,	July	11,	2008,	htp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7501538.
stm;	BBC	News,	“Inside	US	Hub	for	Afghan	Air	Strikes,”	BBC News,	November	29,	2008,	htp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south_asia/7755969.stm.
21	 	Ian	Pannell,	BBC	News,	Interview	#	184, December	1,	2008,	Telephone	interview.
22	 	Ibid.	
23	 	Ian	Pannell,	BBC	News,	Interview	#185,	January	4,	2009,	Email	to	Erica	Gaston.
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Conclusion
he success of Afghan Government mechanisms to address civilian harm is mixed. Ideally, if these 
programs shared information and were better coordinated they might be an efective way of helping 
members of the population afected by conlict, i.e. the Code 99 Fund would give families a large sum of 
cash to deal with any immediate funeral or medical bills, while the Martyrs and Disabled monthly payments 
might provide more sustained support in years to come.  In practice, though, there is no coordination 
between the two programs, not even sharing of databases compiled on newly identiied civilian victims. 
In addition, the Martyrs and Disabled funds have a limited reach and serious implementation laws. 
Corruption inhibited efective delivery of assistance for both of these programs. 
he Afghan Government Code 99 Fund was very successful in other ways. Within the category of 
monetary payments, Code 99 payments seemed to reach more civilians and more quickly than most 
IMF ex gratia payments or other forms of assistance. Many more civilians also knew of the Afghan 
Government payments, suggesting awareness of the Code 99 Fund is more widespread than IMF 
payments. Building on this promise and coordinating eforts with other assistance programs might 
enable the Afghan Government to make an even more signiicant contribution to the recovery and 
rehabilitation of its population. 
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CONCLUSION &
RECOMMENDATIONS
This report draws out the need for, challenges to and successes of compensation and victim assistance 
programs in Afghanistan.  he analysis will, we hope, encourage more research and the development 
of best practices. We hope it will generate greater information sharing and coordination between the 
actors mentioned: ISAF troops, the US Government and the Afghan Government. Finally, we hope it 
will encourage other ISAF member states, those with troops in relatively peaceful posts as well as those 
involved in active combat, to increase their support for conlict-afected civilians.
Above all, CIVIC’s research shows that compensation and support to victims of conlict are both 
possible and practical, despite statements from government and military oicials to the contrary.  Several 
mechanisms for addressing civilian losses exist and are now working on the ground.  heir creation is 
an important symbolic statement about the concern of international actors and the Afghan Government 
over civilian casualties.  On the ground, however, there remains a disconnect between worthy intentions 
and successful implementation. Problematic elements detailed in this report can be addressed with 
concrete, immediate eforts to:  identify civilians harmed by the conlict and respond to them proactively, 
track afected civilians and any aid they receive and, importantly, improve coordination among actors 
providing compensation and victim assistance so that no civilian sufering losses is overlooked or 
ignored. 
... Particularly in terms of how we respond when there are civilian casualties, I think we’ve been too 
bureaucratic about it.  Our approach has been in a way classically American, which is let’s ind out 
all the facts, and then we’ll decide what to do. But in the meantime we have lost the strategic com-
munications war.
    And so the guidance that I provided is that our irst step should be if civilian casualties were in-
curred in this operation, we deeply regret it, and you have our apologies. And if appropriate, we will 
make amends.  hen we will go and investigate, and then we will igure out whether we need to do 
more or frankly, if -- if we paid somebody we shouldn’t have. Frankly, I think that that’s an accept-
able cost.  But we need to get the balance right in this in terms of how we interact with the Afghan 
people, or we will lose.
Secretary	Robert	M.	Gates,	US	Department	of	Defense
In	tesimony	given	to	the	Senate	Foreign	Relaions	Commiitee	
January	27,	2009
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here is no single, ideal approach to delivering aid to individuals, and no “one-size-its-all” strategy. 
Each approach to civilian sufering detailed in this report has its beneits.  Combining diferent types 
of programs and approaches already working in Afghanistan may be the only way to address victims’ 
economic, physical and emotional needs while more efectively sidestepping corruption, security and 
poor development progress. 
In 2007 and 2008, an estimated 3,641 civilians were killed by parties to the conlict in Afghanistan.1 
For every civilian killed, as many or more are injured, lose their homes or livelihoods. For each family 
struggling to recover from losses, there are ripple efects on the continued development and stabilization 
of Afghanistan. No amount of compensation or assistance can bring back a loved one, yet survivors 
can experience a real sense of redress when provided with an apology, recognition and/or monetary 
payments by the actor that caused them harm. It only takes seeing one family maltreated and ignored 
by military forces for an individual or community to turn against the international efort. For moral 
and strategic reasons, the billions of dollars spent to win, keep and rebuild Afghan communities must 
include speciic outlays for recognition and assistance to civilians sufering losses due to the conlict. 
Take-Aways and Lessons Learned
For countless Afghan families living on the margins, the loss of a breadwinner, high medical or funeral 
costs, or the inancial burden of supporting disabled or dependent relatives can make basic survival 
diicult.  Civilians who sufer losses want help with any necessary medical assistance, timely and adequate 
help rebuilding and recovering economically, and to know their losses have been recognized. he more 
assistance eforts can provide these elements, particularly if the civilians perceive the help as coming 
from those they blame for their losses, the more families are able to recover.
CIVIC’s interviews airmed that many civilians want more than physical or inancial help – they expect 
apology, recognition or some other form of redress. Existing compensation and support mechanisms did 
not ofer a sense of redress in all cases, stymied by the approach taken, larger program design issues, the 
situation surrounding the incident in question or varying individual emotional responses to assistance. 
Still, in many cases civilians were satisied.  General trends and patterns in civilian responses suggest 
that three factors contribute to feeling a sense of redress when: 1) any follow-up and assistance came 
immediately or soon ater the incident; 2) any apologies or response were perceived by the victim(s) as 
coming from the entity responsible for the loss; and, 3) the entity responsible attempted to personalize 
any responsive gestures, oten in discussion with community elders.  CIVIC hopes these conclusions will 
be tested with more rigorous research.
Most programs speciic to war victims are relatively new, as is the concept of warring parties providing 
amends to civilians they harm.  It will take time for best practices and strategies for assistance to emerge. 
Without taking away from the enormous strides military, governmental and non-governmental actors 
have already made in addressing the needs of conlict-afected civilians, it is important to note a few 
overarching concerns and constraints: 
1	 	In	2007	and	2008,	an	esimated	3,641	civilians	were	killed	by	paries	to	the	conlict	in	Afghanistan.	United	
Naions	Assistance	Mission	in	Afghanistan,	Civilian Casualty Esimates Update, January – December 2008,	1.	
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Gaps exist. A signiicant number of civilian survivors of combat operations receive no help •฀
and those that do oten ind it is too little, too late. hose who are victims of AGE attacks still 
have little chance of receiving most types of compensation or assistance. hose harmed before 
these programs were created have a minimal chance of now receiving compensation or certain 
types of redress or help. Many civilians sufering in high-conlict districts can seldom be reached 
even when mechanisms exist to help them.  If civilians leave zones of conlict they may be out of 
immediate danger but are more likely to lose their homes, property and any means of support, 
and in many cases are not able to establish these losses to the satisfaction of aid and compensation 
program criteria. 
Lack of coordination leads to missed opportunities to improve victim identiication and •฀
assistance. he same casualties are identiied over and over again, while others fall through 
the cracks.  Aid is delayed across the board.  To CIVIC’s knowledge, six distinct governmental, 
international and military entities including most of the programs discussed in this report 
have some form of database or register tracking civilian casualty incidents; yet none of these 
organizations coordinate information or resulting eforts to address the recorded harm.2 
Coordination and information sharing might also allow families to make better use of what aid is 
available to them.  As an Afghan Government oicial told us: “During a bombardment oten the 
house is destroyed, property, animals and other losses like death or injury. [A one-time payment 
by one group] is not enough to cover all that. If there was coordination then they [diferent 
groups] could cover all their needs.”3 Frequent communication and cooperation among those 
actors might address some of these issues, even if not publicized or tightly knit. 
Victim needs are consistently – and mistakenly – given a lower priority than liability concerns. •฀
In discussions with representatives of ISAF member countries, many said they did not donate 
to some of the mechanisms described in this report for fear of being associated with liability 
for their own or other countries’ casualties. Yet the average Afghan cannot tell one ISAF troop 
from another.  Popular anger and resentment over civilian casualties and property loss does not 
distinguish between one ISAF country or another. hese emotions run especially strong when 
no help is provided following harm. To the extent this is a collectively recognized problem (as it 
appears to be given recent statements by US and other ISAF oicials), it should be supported by 
all ISAF countries. 
here is oten a regrettable disconnect between policy level recognition of the importance of •฀
these programs and the dedication of suicient resources and energy toward making them to 
work on the ground. Ex gratia payments by ISAF member countries work on paper, but are 
oten hamstrung in practice by unworkable procedures. hey are not made accessible to average 
Afghans.  Many actors involved in compensation and victim assistance complained that funding 
shortfalls prevented them from helping those identiied, or from dedicating suicient staf and 
resources to fully address any claims or beneiciaries. In some cases, particularly with US and 
other military compensation, the ad hoc nature of mechanisms severely limits fair and equitable 
distribution across Afghanistan.  IMF forces with funds for ex gratia payments should have a 
2	 	Some	of	the	program	operators	discussed	in	this	report	said	they	tried,	for	example,	to	reach	out	to	other	
government	or	military	eniies	in	order	to	beter	share	informaion	but	to	litle	efect.
3	 	Afghan	government	oicial,	Interview	#166,	November	17,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	See	also,	Catherine	
Northing,	ACAP	oicial,	Interview	#101,	February	21,	2008,	Gardez	city,	Pakia	province.
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clear set of guidelines to ensure that all Afghans are treated fairly.  Any actor engaging in combat 
in Afghanistan should have dedicated, suicient funds for addressing civilian harm that may 
occur during the course of operations. ISAF should establish policies that allow troops in one 
location to refer known civilian losses to ISAF troops in another.  
  
hese overarching concerns present signiicant challenges.  he good news is that the necessary tools for 
more holistic and widespread victim relief are already in place. Existing victim assistance mechanisms 
can appropriately address civilian sufering. A perfect scenario following an incident might be the 
provision of immediate medical and emergency relief to afected families, subsequent cash from military 
ex gratia funds and/or the Afghan Government Karzai Fund, livelihood assistance from ACAP and then 
long-term support from the Martyrs or Disabled funds.  hese eforts can be bolstered by the extensive 
network of humanitarian aid available through NGOs, the UN and other actors active in helping the 
civilian population more broadly in Afghanistan. 
Going Forward
he success of victims’ assistance programs in Afghanistan holds larger lessons for the ability of 
compensation or victim support programs to successfully address civilian sufering in other conlict and 
post-conlict zones.  Some of CIVIC’s interviewees in the military sector, and not just in Afghanistan, told 
us that compensation for individual civilian victims is not realistic given the insecurity and diiculty in 
identifying victims in conlict – that these eforts are only feasible in a post-conlict environment. Others 
working on international legal standards and mass atrocities suggest that because such compensation or 
support can provide an element of redress, it should be considered along with long-term considerations 
of transitional justice, oten commenced post-conlict.4 
he issues discussed in this report inform both of these debates. In many ways, Afghanistan is both a 
conlict and a post-conlict zone. Provinces in the south and in some areas in the east have the violence 
and instability of a conlict zone, while the north, central and some parts of the western provinces are 
more characteristic of post-conlict zones with latent insecurity and spillover efects. Noting how the 
same types of programs work across these regions ofers preliminary responses to these two critiques. 
Above all, they prove that compensation and redress programs are feasible in periods of conlict albeit 
with signiicant limitations.  
Research on the issues discussed in this report should not stop here. More studies are needed, particularly 
as regards program efectiveness versus program cost, indirect efects of some of these programs in the 
larger aid schema, and more rigorous testing of the impact of these programs in providing redress. 
Recommendations
here are concrete, immediate measures that can and should be taken to ix many of the problematic 
issues detailed in this report, particularly those that deny civilians appropriate amends for harm.  he 
below recommendations are not all easy.  hey do, however, match the gravity and urgency of civilian 
sufering in this conlict.  
4	 	ISAF	oicial,	Interview	#180,	February	2007,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	Also,	CIVIC’s	execuive	director,	
Sarah	Holewinski,	has	found	in	discussions	with	humanitarian	organizaions	and	military	actors	in	regions	of	incredible	
instability	–	for	example,	Somalia	–		would	be	infeasible	unil	greater	levels	of	security	were	established.	
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CIVIC irst and foremost urges all parties to the conlict in Afghanistan to take all possible steps to 
avoid civilian deaths, injuries and property damage. In the event that civilians are directly harmed or 
otherwise afected by the conlict, CIVIC urges:
All actors involved in implementing compensation and victim support programs, to: 
Work jointly to improve identiication of civilians, whether through sharing databases, establishing •	
mechanisms for civilian referral and identiication or other measures that respect conidentiality 
concerns of both the actor and the civilian;
Coordinate eforts to ensure civilians receive any and all aid measures available, preferably in a •	
way that maximizes the beneit; 
Share best practices with other compensation and victim assistance programs.•	
Militaries comprising the International Security Assistance Force and NATO, to: 
Adopt a coordinated if not collective response to providing compensation and ex gratia payments •	
across all ISAF participants, whether they have combat troops or not;
Make standard procedure the tracking of any ISAF eforts at compensation, follow-up or other •	
amends alongside the new ISAF Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell created in 2008;5 
Ensure that any coordinated policy includes mechanisms for referring cases of civilian casualties •	
that may be eligible for compensation or ex gratia funds to the appropriate troops;
Develop practices and procedures that enable troops to be more pro-active in providing •	
compensation and ex gratia payments where harm occurs; 
Be as transparent as possible in investigations of civilian casualties and, where necessary, admit •	
responsibility (though not necessarily legal fault) quickly and publicly; 
Share best practices among ISAF countries on how to appropriately interact with civilians when •	
ofering compensation and recognition;
Make an attempt to provide civilians with a sense of redress and closure through public apologies •	
and recognition;
Ensure designated funding streams to address civilian harm resulting from combat operations. •	
Member countries of the International Security Assistance Force, to: 
Adequately fund the programs currently in place, which currently means increasing donations;•	
Develop mechanisms for providing compensation or ex gratia payments that provide immediate •	
relief and recognition in ways consistent with ISAF countries’ national policies; 
Work jointly with other member countries to develop common policies on compensation and •	
ex gratia payments to ensure Afghans are treated fairly no matter where they are or by who they 
were harmed.
he United States Government and/or Military, to: 
Create a position at the Pentagon to strategically address potential and actual civilian casualties;•	
Assess compensation, ex gratia and ACAP support to ensure they are providing a level of •	
assistance that matches civilian losses and the stated strategic interest of the United States to 
“win hearts and minds”6; 
5	 	James	Brown,	Humanitarian	Afairs	oicer	UNAMA,	“Brieing	for	the	Kabul	Civil-Military	Working	Group,”	
presentaion,	January	29,	2009.
6	 	See,	e.g.,	Robert	M.	Gates,	Tesimony	before	the	Senate	Armed	Services	Commitee,	January	27,	2009;	United	
States	Army,	Counterinsurgency, United	States	Army,	December	2006,	191.
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Better coordinate with the Afghan Government and other IMF, where applicable, to ensure that •	
eforts to avoid double compensation do not result in civilians feeling ignored or unrecognized 
by US troops. 
he Afghanistan Government, to: 
Develop alternate mechanisms for identifying and verifying those eligible for the Martyrs and •	
Disabled funds that minimize corruption and maximize speed and accuracy;  
Share casualty information across all three existing programs; •	
Ensure all Afghans are aware of their rights to register a complaint or concern about •	 any warring 
party; 
Ensure Code 99 payments are provided to victims of Afghan National Security Force actions, •	
even where these forces are acting independently of IMF; 
Ensure Code 99 and Martyrs and Disabled payments are provided equally to victim of insurgent •	
attacks, unless doing so would put the recipients at risk of reprisals;
Coordinate the distribution of Code 99 funds with IMF (where the incident involved IMF) to •	
jointly plan the best available means of aid and redress for afected civilians.
he United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, to: 
Undertake a complete analysis of civilian-assistance programs currently in place so that aid •	
eforts are streamlined and, to the greatest extent possible, avoid duplicating aid to some civilians 
while entirely overlooking others; 
Track whether and when speciic relief for conlict-afected civilians is provided by the military •	
or other actors concurrently with tracking civilian casualties; 
Coordinate information gathering across all groups to facilitate the proper and prompt •	
identiication of civilians in need.
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ANNEX I:
Civilians, in their own words
What happened to 
your family?
What assistance did 
you receive?
What are your feel-
ings about the incident 
now?
Mother lost a husband and 
son to a suicide attack
“My husband and only son 
were killed [in a suicide 
bomb attack]. ...When the 
blast happened, pieces of the 
lesh thrown from the blast 
landed in our yard.”
Received ACAP assistance; 
Italian soldiers who were the 
target of the suicide bomb 
provided immediate medical 
help and rebuilt a bridge 
that was destroyed.
“he big problem is that 
there’s no male in our family 
now.... I am not able to think 
of ... what we can do. We 
are drowning in agony and 
misery.”
IDP led Helmand province 
with 100 other fellow vil-
lagers following months of 
ighting and bombardment
“We came because there 
is no security and there is 
ighting all the time in the 
village we came from. here 
was one night of ighting 
and a lot of bombardment. 
We became afraid and inal-
ly ran away. …We irst went 
to Kandahar to but then the 
ighting spread there also 
so we came to Kabul …We 
don’t have enough shelter 
and food. We don’t have 
wheat on our own here.”
Some assistance provided 
through the Afghan Red 
Crescent Society, UNHCR, 
and DoRR.
“When there is security 
we will go back. You see 
our lifestyle here and the 
problems we face. As soon 
as there is security we want 
to go back but we just don’t 
know when that will be. We 
would leave but we don’t 
have any option but to be 
here.”
Boy lost his legs and was 
permanently disabled due to 
cluster munitions dropped 
in 2001 in Herat province
“When I was taken to the 
hospital … the doctors were 
thinking that I almost died 
and they put me in the place 
for dead bodies…. Ater 7 
days in surgery I swallowed 
and [another explosion]… 
there was a piece of the 
bomb inside my belly”
No assistance provided as 
yet.
“hey told me to talk to the 
PRT or other government 
oicials. Because I cannot 
walk, … I cannot go like 
you and others to meet with 
people to tell them what 
happened to me.”
Two relatives from Paktia 
province lost several family 
members and their homes 
in 2001 bombing
“About 1:00am the airplanes 
started to drop their bombs. 
In the irst bombardment 
four family members of my 
uncle were killed. … [As 
we went to help them the] 
2nd bombardment hit ... My 
mother lost her leg; my sis-
ter was killed. My sister was 
14 years old. Her name was 
Sharifa. She was too young 
to die.”
 ACAP assistance; US mili-
tary gave $5000 to distribute 
among everyone afected.
“When the incident hap-
pened, the Americans 
announced ‘We are sorry, 
that was not our intention. 
Our intention was to hit the 
Taliban.’… Mistakes happen 
but our family members had 
already lost their lives and 
[those who] were not killed, 
we could not get our lives 
back.”
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What happened to 
your family?
What assistance did 
you receive?
What are your feel-
ings about the incident 
now?
Man from Kunduz lost a leg 
in US airstrikes in 2001
“I saw a convoy of Taliban 
and then suddenly the 
bombing started. I heard 
irst the sound of aircrat 
and then I felt on my leg 
a great pain he shrapnel 
had cut a major artery in 
my leg so when they got to 
the hospital they had to cut 
most of it of or it would be 
worse for me.”
Received a prosthetic leg 
from ACAP and livelihood 
support; Receives monthly 
payments from the MoL-
SAMD Disabled Fund.
“Well it’s true that I was 
injured [by international 
troops] but on the other 
hand there was no security 
in the province before they 
came. Now there is security. 
Before my family and I felt 
in danger all the time. Now 
we know we are safe. I do 
not worry that something 
will happen to them.”
Man’s wife was killed by US 
Marines in an escalation of 
force incident in 2007
“We were traveling from 
Kabul to Pakistan for a 
wedding. I heard iring 
and I tried to push my wife 
down to protect her. But 
then I saw the blood. … Our 
children were there when it 
happened and they watched 
her die.”
Received ACAP assistance; 
received $2000 from US 
solatia payments and $2000 
from Karzai’s Code 99 fund.
“I was let with 2 young 
daughters, one was only 8 
mo. old when she was killed. 
I wish I could protect them 
from knowing what hap-
pened to their mother but I 
know that isn’t possible.”
Father lost seven members 
of his extended family in 
2008 airstrike in Wardak; 
living as IDP in Kabul
“When I arrived at the 
house, I saw that a bomb 
had hit it directly…. I could 
see all the dead and injured 
bodies. My son’s wife was 
horribly injured. My son had 
injuries on his feet and the 
force of the blast had thrown 
him over the tree. Another 
daughter was blasted into 
so many pieces that we still 
have not been able to ind 
her body.”
In process of receiving 
ACAP assistance; received 
immediate transport from 
US troops to medical servic-
es; one son given $200 and a 
guitar from US military who 
temporarily detained him 
mistakenly.
“Everything we have now 
has been provided to us by 
friends and relatives …he 
ICRC ofered to give us tents 
and mattresses. But this 
wasn’t enough. We couldn’t 
live in a tent. … he cost of 
transportation for the tents 
and mattresses to Kabul 
where we have family and 
support would cost us more 
than the items are worth.”
15-year-old boy lost his 
sister in a US airstrike on a 
wedding party in Nangarhar, 
July 2008
“I was also a member of the 
wedding party [that was 
bombed] but I was farther 
away [from the direct hit]. 
We lost my 16-year-old 
sister though.”
Received Code 99 payment. “I feel bad and angry when 
I see international soldiers. 
I thought that they were 
coming to help and bring 
peace but they aren’t paying 
attention to civilians.”
Brother-in-law killed in es-
calation of force incident in 
Kandahar in February 2007
“hat morning he went to 
consular of Pakistan to get a 
visa… and on the way back, 
he was faced with an ISAF 
convoy. He wasn’t aware and 
they ended up shooting.  … 
His brother called him and 
asked him what’s taking 
you so long. And one of the 
doctors from the hospital 
replied and said you should 
come and collect the body.”
Received ACAP assistance “In the irst few weeks, we 
were frustrated that he 
got killed, but ater a few 
months we received assis-
tance, then we thought ‘his 
shows that they care – that 
they didn’t do intentionally.’ 
Now we don’t hold any-
thing personal against the 
international community or 
international forces”
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What happened to 
your family?
What assistance did 
you receive?
What are your feel-
ings about the incident 
now?
hree neighbors whose 
village in Shindand district, 
Herat was bombed twice by 
US forces as of interview 
date, once in April 2007 and 
once in July 2008
“I was asleep but woke up 
with the bombing and got 
out and saw that my cousin 
was killed by this incident. 
I was seeing that there were 
helicopters that were shoot-
ing the people they were 
seeing so I led into a home 
for cover… When I went to 
see my house [4 days later]. 
It was destroyed and noth-
ing was there. Some of our 
family members let even 
their shoes.”
Eligible for ACAP assistance 
but blocked for more than 
a year due to persistent 
security concerns; Some 
members of this community 
received Code 99 payments 
and community assistance 
when the area was bombed 
a third time approximately 6 
weeks later.
“Last year also our house 
was bombarded. Completely 
destroyed in the bombing. 
Still I don’t receive any help 
for that. Why should they 
help me this time?”;
“In my mind, I thought that 
international forces were 
not using force on civil-
ians. Now I see that it has 
changed – they are killing all 
people. hey don’t care if it 
is civilians or the bad guys. 
hey think all the people 
are the same. hey see it all 
from the same lens.”
Man lost his father and 
niece and himself injured by 
US Marines in March 2007; 
vehicle also destroyed
“We were going to Jalalabad 
to pay bills and then on the 
main road, a suicide bomber 
attacked [a US military 
convoy] and they started 
iring. ... I was injured and 
I also lost my father and 
my 14-year-old niece. Our 
vehicle was totally destroyed 
-- we found 1,250 holes in 
the car.”
Received ACAP assistance; 
received $1000 from the 
Afghan government, $400 
from US military for his 
injuries and for damage to 
his car.
“I’m disappointed by inter-
national forces. hey are 
killing innocent civilians. If 
they are here for peace and 
prosperity, that is good. But 
if [they are here] for killings 
and bombardments, then 
there is no reason for them 
to be here...We want justice. 
We want a trial of those 
harming civilians.”
“I’m disappointed by inter-
national forces. hey are 
killing innocent civilians. If 
they are here for peace and 
prosperity, that is good. But 
if [they are here] for killings 
and bombardments, then 
there is no reason for them 
to be here...We want justice. 
We want a trial of those 
harming civilians.”
“Ater a few days, the attacks 
of the Taliban had started. 
he Special Forces did an 
air-strike. hen there was 
a 9 month battle and the 
British forces cleared 5 km 
all around their base and 
destroyed everything in 
that 5km radius. On the 
3rd day of the air strike, my 
clinic was hit and destroyed 
completely.”
None; British forces prom-
ised to provide money for a 
new clinic but the Afghan 
Government denied the ap-
plication for land.
“I would expect the British 
forces to give me compen-
sation ...he international 
forces come in the name of 
reconstruction and rehabili-
tation ... but they should irst 
reconstruct areas that they 
have destroyed themselves.”
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ANNEX II:
IMF Compensation & Ex Gratia Programs
he below  annex  provides detailed information about the various compensation and ex gratia mechanisms 
maintained by ISAF member countries with such mechanisms in place. his annex supplements the 
discussion of military compensation and ex gratia payments in Chapter 3. CIVIC has made every attempt 
to provide the most up-to-date information; however, the mechanisms and procedures for distributing 
funds are constantly in lux and may have been amended by any of the below ISAF countries subsequent 
to this report, published on February 17, 2009. 
his list is not intended to be inclusive. Not all ISAF countries responded to CIVIC requests for 
information. CIVIC interviews focused primarily on ISAF countries with signiicant troop deployments 
in conlict-prone provinces. CIVIC also surveyed the approaches of some other ISAF member states 
whose troops are stationed in low-conlict provinces for comparison. hese countries may not have 
experience with civilian combat casualties, but have sometimes provided monetary support for other 
civilian deaths or injuries resulting from non-combat activities.   
United States
“Solatia” and “Condolence” payments 
US military units have two available mechanisms for giving ex gratia payments where death, injury, 
or individual or community property losses result from US troop activities: solatia and condolence 
payments.1 Both are given without inference of legal liability for harm.  Solatium are drawn from unit 
funds, whereas condolences are drawn from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, described 
briely in Chapter 3.2 Condolences could be approved in a couple of days, whereas solatium usually take 
at least one month to be approved.3 
Despite these technical diferences, in practice the two systems are used interchangeably except that 
condolence payments (sometimes called “battle damages”) are more likely to be used for community 
property damage.4  he US PRT Commander for the Jalalabad PRT approved dozens of solatia payments 
related to a shooting incident involving US Marines on the main Jalalabad highway on March 4, 2007.5 
1	 	The	stated	purpose	of	solaia	payments	are	to	“alleviate	grief,	sufering,	and	anxiety”	and	to	“meet	cultural	
expectaions.”	Dr.	Sharon	Westbrooks,	CJ8,	Special	Programs	Fund	Manager,	Interview	#153,	July	8,	2008,	Email	to	CIVIC.
2	 	See	infra	Chapter	3	“Community	Support”,	9.
3	 	Travis	Hartman,	CJTF-101,	Human	Rights	Oicer,	US	Army,	Interview	#151,	August	23,	2008,	Bagram	Air	Base.	
4	 	Community	property	loss	could	either	be	due	to	one-ime	damage	or	to	instances	where	repeat	use	by	the	US	
military	(e.g.	-	a	road	frequently	used	by	troops)	causes	persistent,	long-term	damage.
5	 	UNAMA	oicial,	Interview	#167,	August	20,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.
CIVIC 75
Following the destruction of many families’ homes and business during joint operations in Garmsir, 
Helmand, US Marines set up a temporary station for Afghans to come and report damages, and provided 
“battle damages” and condolences ranging from $1 to $500 for conirmed damages.6 
he amounts given by the two funds is roughly the same:
Solatia1 Condolences
Death $2,000 $2,500
Serious Injury $400 $1,500
Non-Serious Injury $200 $600
Serious Property Damage -- $2,200
Non-Serious Property 
Damage
$200 $250
hese amounts are oten used as only rough guides. For example, while the same amount of condolences 
given for a death ($2,500) are oten also given for large-scale property loss for families (including complete 
destruction of a home or livelihood support), the amounts vary greatly from province to province and 
depend on the operation in question.7 
Although each claim is investigated and must be vetted by a local military lawyer and approved by the 
commander,8 solatium or condolences can be given to civilians even when there is doubt about which 
warring party caused the harm. he commander on the ground maintains discretion.  he program is 
designed primarily to quell anger among the local population, so the perception of harm oten matters 
most:  “here’s no policy of this, but say there’s a ireight between our forces and the bad guys and some 
civilians get injured, we’re likely to just pay it without worrying who the bullet comes from.”9  
US Foreign Claims Act
hrough the 1942 Foreign Claims Act (10 U.S.C. § 2734-2736), foreign citizens can also make a formal 
claim for compensation up to $100,000 for harm resulting from non-combat activities. he deinition of 
what is a non-combat activity has been interpreted narrowly. Analysis of legal claims released through the 
Freedom of Information Act to the American Civil Liberties Union in April 2007 suggests that incidents 
at checkpoints, roadblocks or other escalations of force are likely to be excluded.10 For example, the 
claim of a 16-year-old boy who was mistakenly shot while walking near an American base was denied as 
6	 	L.	Rene	Cote,	24th	Marine	Expediionary	Unit,	Interview	#136,	July	17,	2008,	Email	to	CIVIC.	See	also	David	
Zucchino,	“First	war,	now	peacemaking:	Ater	rouing	the	Taliban	in	the	south,	Marines	take	on	unfamiliar	roles	as	they	
try	to	win	over	wary	Afghans,”	Los Angeles Times ,		July	6,	2008,	at	A1.	
7	 	Ashwin	Coraiyil,	US	Navy,	Interview	#187,	September	6,	2008,	Email	to	CIVIC.
8	 	Whether	an	Afghan	civilian	or	family	is	eligible	for	a	solaia	payment	is	at	the	discreion	of	the	commander	
responsible	for	that	area	of	operaion;	however,	the	local	Staf	Judge	Advocate	must	approve	the	decision	before	a	
solaium	payment	will	be	made.
9	 	Travis	Hartman,	CJTF-101,	Human	Rights	Oicer,	US	Army,	Interview	#151,	August	23,	2008,	Bagram	Air	Base.
10	 	See,	e.g.,	Jon	Tracy,	Compensaing Civilian Casualies: “I am sorry for your loss, and wish you well in a free Iraq, 
(Washington,	D.C.:	CIVIC	and	Carr	Center	on	Human	Rights	Policy,	November	2008),	22.
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“loss resulting from combat operations.”11 According to a 2007 report by the United States Government 
Accountability Oice, “Department of Defense paid about $26 million to settle approximately 21,450 
claims iled between iscal year 2003 and iscal year 2006 in Iraq and Afghanistan.” 12
United Kingdom
Ex gratia payments
Between April 2006 and October 2008, the United Kingdom made 858 ex gratia payments to Afghan 
civilians who sufered the loss of a family member, injury or property.13 he total amount of payments 
for injuries or property loss was £90,000. Much more has been given for property loss or acquisition: 
£120,000 for 35 cases involving property in 2006; £271,000 for 332 property claims in 2007; and £199,000 
for 440 property claims up to April 2008. British government personnel formerly stationed with the 
British military in Helmand province said there are civilian MoD oicers on-the-ground with discretion 
to give ex gratia payments, primarily for property damage or acquisition but also for isolated cases of 
death or injury.14 
Formal compensation claims
Civilians may make a formal liability claim through the UK court system if they believe that UK troops 
acted negligently or wrongfully toward them. In the only claim CIVIC has found to have succeeded so 
far, an Iraqi boy was paralyzed by the negligent discharge of a UK soldier’s weapon in Iraq. he MoD 
paid him and his family £2 million.15 
Canada
he Canadian military maintains exc gratia payments for Afghan civilians injured by Canadian troops. 
In March 2008, he Toronto Star reported at least eight instances in which the Canadian government 
compensated Afghan families or individuals for unintended deaths or injuries.16  he paper reported that 
payments ranged from $1,971 to $31,584. In an Embassy magazine story on Canadian compensation, 
the Canadian Defence Department spokeswoman Lt. Isabelle Riché “told Embassy that Canadian Forces 
personnel help Afghan civilians ile claims for compensation following incidents in which they were 
wronged. ‘Each request is expeditiously investigated and ex-gratia payments of up to $2,000 are delivered 
under the authority of Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces legal oicers.’”17  Canadian 
troops paid approximately $243,000 from 2005 to 2008.18 
11	 	Peter	Symonds,	“Civilian	compensaion	claims:	a	glimpse	into	US	crimes	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,”	Global 
Research,	April	15,	2007,	htp://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5388.
12	 	Government	Accountability	Oice,	“Department	of	Defense’s	Use	of	Solaia	and	Condolence	Payments	in	Iraq	
and	Afghanistan,”	GAO-07-699,	(Washington:	Government	Accountability	Oice,	May	2007),	50.	
13	 	Sean	Rayment,	“Britain	pays	out	700,000	in	compensaion	to	civilian	casualies	in	Afghanistan.”
14	 	UK	civilian	oicial	staioned	with	PRT	in	Lashkarga,	Interview	#127,	June	19,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province;	
Former	UK	civilian	oicial	staioned	with	UK	troops	in	Helmand	province,	Interview	#157,	October	15,	2008,	Kabul	city,	
Kabul	province.
15	 	BBC	News,	“Wounded	Iraqi	is	given	£2	million	payout,”	BBC News,	April	15,	2008,	htp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/7347691.stm,	(noing	an	MoD	spokesman’s	statement	that	this	was	an	excepional	case	and	that	such	high	
compensaion	was	not	likely	to	be	repeated).
16	 	Murray	Brewster,	“Compensaion	for	Afghan	families	under	wraps,”	The Canadian Press,	March	24,	2008,	htp://
www.thestar.com/News/Canada/aricle/350077.	
17	 Jef	Davis,		“Canada’s	Record	and	Compensaion	Policy	for	Afghan	Civilian	Casualies,”	Embassy,	September	10,	
2008,	htp://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=2008/september/10/civilian_casualies/.	
18	 Ibid.
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he Netherlands
Dutch troops stationed at the Dutch PRT in Uruzgan province have a “pocketmoney” fund, which they 
may draw upon to provide ex gratia payments to Afghans who sufer the death of a family member, 
injury or property loss as a result of troop activities.19 he payments are not considered an acceptance of 
blame, nor are they required under the Dutch agreement with the Afghan government. Instead they are 
treated as an expression of moral obligation to families unintentionally harmed, as well as a politically 
prudent step to avoid alienating the population from Dutch troops.20 Unlike some ex gratia mechanisms, 
it must be established without a doubt that Dutch troops caused the damage, signed of by the legal 
advisor to Task Force Uruzgan (the Dutch mission) and at least the commander of the Mission Team (in 
some cases a more senior oicial depending on the amount in question). 
In June 2007, predominantly Dutch troops engaged in a four-day battle with AGE to defend the Chora 
district of Uruzgan province from AGE attack, resulting in the death of at least 50 civilians. Two hundred 
and ity thousand euros was made available for families, although the entire amount was not necessary 
to settle all of the claims.21
Australia
Australia has a fund for providing “honour” payments to civilians. he standard for distributing such 
funds is high: two separate ministries must sign of on any payment.22 With such cumbersome veriication 
procedures, where a given operation involves Dutch troops who are co-stationed at the same PRT as 
Australian troops, Dutch compensation is relied on because it can reach the families more quickly.23 
In September 2008, Australian troops in Uruzgan province unintentionally killed a local community 
leader who was helping them oppose insurgent forces. Following a joint ISAF-Afghan investigation they 
provided compensation to the family.24
Italy
Neither the Italian military nor the Italian Government have a formal fund for helping civilians harmed 
by Italian troop activities. 25 Although most Italian troops are stationed in a province where there is 
ongoing conlict (Herat), Italian troops are less frequently involved in combat operations unless as part 
of general ISAF Regional Command West activities.26 here have been at least two cases where the Italian 
government assisted families of those injured in accidents involving Italian convoys. On June 2, 2006, a 
19	 	Maj.	Jan	Vandekamp,	Task	Force	Uruzgan,	Interview	#155,	August	21,	2008,	Email	to	Erica	Gaston.	See,	also,	
C.J.	Shivers,	“Dutch	Soldiers	Stress	Restraint	in	Afghanistan,”	The New York Times,	April	6,	2007	(“[M]ost	Dutch	units	now	
take	extraordinary	steps	to	avoid	military	escalaion	and	risks	of	damage	to	property	or	harm	to	civilians.	(When	armored	
vehicles	damaged	a	grove	of	mulberry	trees,	a	captain	came	by	the	next	day	to	negoiate	a	compensaion	payment	for	
the	farmers.)”).
20	 	Maj.	Jan	Vandekamp,	Task	Force	Uruzgan,	Interview	#155,	August	21,	2008,	Email	to	Erica	Gaston.
21	 	Maj.	Jan	Venekamp,	Task	Force	Uruzgan,	Inteview	#188,	November	1,	2008,	Email	to	CIVIC	and	AIHRC.
22	 	Foreign	Embassy	oicial,	Interview	#147,	August	18,	2008,	Kabul	city,	Kabul	province.	
23	 	Ibid.
24	 	Tom	Hyland, “Lack	of	Coordinaion	&	Intelligence	Missteps;	Intelligence	gaps	blamed	for	fatal	Afghan	gunight,” 
The Sunday Age,	October	26,	2008,	7. 
25	 	Foreign	Embassy	oicial,	Interview	#149,	August	20,	2008,	Telephone	interview.		Italian	oicer	with	the	PRT	in	
Herat,	Interview	#141,	July	31,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
26	 	Italian	oicer	with	the	PRT	in	Heart,	Interview	#141,	July	31,	2008,	Herat	city,	Herat	province.
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child was killed when he ran in front of Italian convoy. 27 he Italian government helped the family cover 
funeral expenses and gave them several thousand dollars as a condolence for the loss of their child. In 
another case in early 2008, a child was hit by a convoy and received immediate medical assistance but no 
additional compensation as he survived his wounds. In both cases, Italian troops stopped on the scene 
and identiied the families by talking to locals in the community. In one case, the driver and translator 
of an Italian journalist were captured and killed by the Taliban. he newspaper of the Italian journalist 
raised funds for both families. he Italian government facilitated a four-year scholarship for the younger 
brother of the translator killed. hey also worked with the Afghan Red Crescent to set up a trust fund 
for the driver’s family from the funds collected by the Italian newspaper. 28
Germany
German soldiers have no designated funds to help civilians injured in conlict. However, when German 
soldiers shot three civilians at a checkpoint in northern Kunduz province in August 2008, they provided 
$20,000 in cash and a car worth $5,000 to the family, a sum they arrived at in consultation with the family 
and community leaders. 29  Although they did not formally accept liability, they did accept responsibility 
and apologize to the family, “We didn’t make any attempt to excuse our behavior or [suggest that] this 
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interview.
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ANNEX III:
Civilian Casualty Estimates
2008
Civilian Casualties Organization Reporting
Groups Responsible for Casualties – 
and other speciic information about 
igures
2118 UNAMA1 1160 AGE; 828 PGF; 130 other
2000 Amnesty (citing ANSO)2 25% IMF; 50% AGE
1445 Brookings Institute3 N/A
1070 ISAF4 97 ISAF; 973 AGE
2007
Civilian Casualties Organization Reporting
Groups Responsible for Casualties – 
and other speciic information about 
igures
2026 ANSO5 996 AOG; 541 IMF; 489 ACG
1633 HRW6 950 insurgents; 434 IMF
1500 
UNAMA7
46% insurgents; 41% IMF and pro-gov
2006
Civilian Casualties Organization Reporting
Groups Responsible for Casualties – 
and other speciic information about 
igures
1315 ANSO8
557 AOG; 161 IMF; 458 ACG (armed 
criminal group)
1000 Amnesty Intl9 All “insurgency related” deaths.
929 HRW10 699 insurgents; 230 IMF 
670 ICRC11 N/A
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